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vInternational trade has assumed a central role in economic growth and poverty reduction efforts in developing 
countries. Since its establishment in 2002, the Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Initiative (APTII) at the UNDP 
Regional Centre in Colombo has contributed to developing approaches and strategies which help align trade 
dynamics with the objectives of poverty reduction and human development in the Asia-Pacific region. The 
APTII has promoted innovative research and policy advice that seek to clearly define the substantive linkages 
between trade and human development and is consistent with the objective of supporting the attainment of 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Striving to build on its previous work and achievements, in its third and current phase of the work 
programme (2008-2011), the APTII aspires to make a significant contribution to policy dialogues by fostering 
regional trade and investment regimes that are consistent with human development goals in the region. 
A central challenge facing policy-makers in the region is to facilitate patterns of inclusive regional integra-
tion that enable them to address specific development priorities and goals, particularly with reference to the 
development needs of least developed countries (LDCs), landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) and small 
island developing states (SIDS). The focus, for APTII’s current work programme therefore, will be on 1) enhanc-
ing trade competitiveness and capacity development to formulate employment- and gender-responsive 
trade policies; and 2) capacity strengthening to implement pro-poor regional integration strategies, including 
through key regional processes and/or mechanisms. In line with this focus, APTII will publish a series of studies 
and discussion papers which shall highlight the policy implications of the multifaceted dimensions of the 
current trade trends and patterns and their human development impacts in the Asia-Pacific region.
South-South trade and investment flows are becoming a key factor behind the growth processes in 
the Asia-Pacific region. The current study, South-South Regionalism and Trade Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific 
Region, by Mehdi Shafaeddin, offers a well rounded perspective on the economic rationale for South-South 
trade cooperation and regional integration while bringing out its nature and pattern in the Asia-Pacific region 
and its underlying main drivers. Based on extensive data analysis, the paper also identifies limitations and 
vulnerabilities for countries involved in the process of South-South trade. It identifies a wide array of policy 
measures with a potential for creating new synergies and enhancing the participation of low income countries 
in the rapid growth of intra-industry trade and product sharing arrangements.
We hope that the policy paper would be useful to the governments, UNDP country offices, research 
institutions, civil society and other stakeholders in the Asia-Pacific region in furthering the process of regional 
integration with a human development orientation.
 Omar Noman
 Chief of Policies and Programmes 
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This study of regional South-South (S-S) trade and cooperation in East, South and South-East Asian countries 
(ESSEA) aims to provide an economic rationale for S-S trade; shed some light on the extent and pattern of S-S 
trade in the ESSEA region; examine the dynamic forces behind the expansion of such trade, and its shortcom-
ings and vulnerabilities; propose policies for enhancing and strengthening regional cooperation; and identify 
areas for further research.
The main conclusion of the study is that, while the rapid expansion of trade among ESSEA countries 
has been mainly the result of industrialization and industrial collaboration in the form of production sharing, 
it has not been driven through the operation of market forces alone. South-South trade can also be used as a 
policy-driven vehicle for industrialization in lower-income countries, and is linked to the principle of dynamic 
comparative advantage. The resultant expansion of supply capabilities and diversification of the structure 
of production and trade, in turn, potentially leads to further expansion of S-S trade and to the geographical 
diversification of trade for the countries involved, with a positive impact on their bargaining power. However, 
enhancing S-S trade requires proactive policy measures for cooperation that go beyond tariff reduction and 
trade agreements.
The paper begins by providing a rationale for S-S trade as a vehicle for promoting industrialization 
and development. It goes on to show that regional trade has expanded rapidly in ESSEA mainly through 
intra-industry trade in the form of production sharing in electrical and electronic products. The region has 
become not only the most dynamic area for S-S trade, but also a major force in international trade in general. 
Nevertheless, intraregional trade among ESSEA countries has led to three main developments that these 
countries need to consider collectively and address through joint policy initiatives in order to further promote 
industrialization and development.
These developments are:
(i) The concentration of intraregional trade among the relatively more advanced countries of 
the region, which suggests the need for better integration of the lower-income countries;
(ii) The dominance of production sharing in a limited number of parts and components (P&C) 
in trade among the second-tier NIEs, and the need for their technological upgrading; and
(iii) The increased vulnerability of the countries involved in production sharing (stemming 
from their dependence on external markets and on their own interdependence). This 
development suggests the need for countries to protect themselves against risks related 
to unforeseen events, external shocks and instability in the international financial markets, 
particularly because most countries in the region depend heavily on exports.
More specifically, the paper seeks to demonstrate that the neo-liberal argument against S-S trade is not 
justified, as it is based on a static version of the theory of comparative advantage. According to this theory, 
countries tend to specialize in exportation of what they already can produce, rather than in new products they 
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would like to produce and export in order to deepen their industrial structure and enhance their development. 
Yet opponents of this argument so far have not been able to provide a strong economic rationale in favour of 
proactive expansion of S-S trade. Developing-country policy-makers have paid lip services in support of S-S 
trade in various international forums, while scholars discussing the issue in the literature have often taken a 
defensive approach. S-S trade is favoured, for example, due to problems of, or limits to, trade with the North; 
weakness and asymmetries in the international trading system; or due to lopsided North-South (N-S) trade 
agreements. Geographical diversification to reduce risks of dependence of developing countries on markets 
in developed countries, and the resultant improvement in their bargaining power and terms of trade, are 
cited in the literature as some of the benefits of S-S trade. While such benefits are undeniable, tariff reductions 
and the operation of market forces alone are not sufficient instruments for promoting S-S trade; there is also 
a need for a dynamic mechanism for enhancing industrialization and development, which, in turn, would 
further boost such trade.
This study regards trade as a means to development, defines development as an “upward movement 
of the whole social system,” and considers industrialization as an important requisite. Within this framework, it 
considers S-S trade as additional to N-S trade, and as a dynamic component of trade and industrial policy for 
enhancing industrialization, upgrading of the industrial structure and development through fuller utilization 
of unemployed and underutilized resources in developing countries. Such a rationale is based on a combina-
tion of three main elements: the theory of “vent for surplus”; the resource scarcity problem of developing 
countries; and division of labour and specialization. By arranging industrial collaboration and/or cooperation 
on research and development (R&D) through division of labour and specialization, developing countries could 
remedy their problem of scarcity of the complementary factors of production needed for the expansion of 
supply capacity and/or upgrading of their industrial structure. By sharing the additional markets created, they 
would also benefit from larger markets and internal and external economies of scale (i.e. increasing returns). 
The expansion of supply capabilities and S-S trade would in turn improve their bargaining position vis-à-vis 
developed countries in multilateral forums as well as in their bilateral trade relations.
Furthermore, to achieve such objectives, S-S cooperation for trade expansion should follow the princi-
ple of dynamic comparative advantage. This requires government intervention to correct and remedy market 
failures and deficiencies, as well as cooperation beyond international trade, covering not only industrial col-
laboration and R&D, as mentioned above, but also such areas as back-up services and adjustment assistance 
to lower-income countries, for instance in training and skills development.
Regarding the experience of S-S trade in ESSEA, it is shown that the region has increasingly become a 
dynamic source of S-S trade, and of supply and demand in international trade in general. The rates of growth 
of exports and imports of ESSEA well exceed those of S-S trade and world trade, particularly for manufactured 
goods. However, trade agreements and tariff reductions are not the main contributory factor. While it is true 
that trade agreements have increased trade among members of each regional trade bloc, particularly that of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), some other factors seem to have been more important 
in expanding regional trade in ESSEA. The share of intraregional trade of each regional group is not in all 
cases greater than its trade share with a different group or groups. Demand and supply dynamism, policies of 
governments and transnational corporations (TNCs) for industrial collaboration through production sharing, 
as well as measures taken by some “demand dynamic countries” for the expansion of supply capabilities in 
lower-income countries are among the important contributory factors.
To explain further, the countries with strong industrial supply capabilities (indicated by the ratio of 
manufacture value added to gross domestic product – MVA/GDP ratio) are among the most dynamic in 
regional trade. This would imply that industrial capacity is an important factor in the expansion of regional 
trade. At the country level, China and India, as the most dynamic countries in terms of GDP growth, have also 
been the most dynamic sources of supply, thus boosting regional trade. Their rates of growth of exports, and 
particularly imports, well exceed the average for ESSEA, and they highlight trade deficits with the region.
xBy contrast, generally speaking, with the exception of Nepal, and to some extent Sri Lanka, the lower 
the per capita income, the lower is the average growth rate of exports to the region. While the lower-income 
countries of the region have acted as a market for exports of other countries, they have not benefited much 
from the market opportunities provided by the demand dynamic countries. The value of regional imports of 
non-fuel products from these countries has not been significant and the value of manufactured goods has 
been low. Some countries (e.g. Bangladesh and Pakistan, both of which are members of the South Asian As-
sociation for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)) and Cambodia (a member of ASEAN) exhibit no signs of growth 
in their regional exports. Indeed, the growth rates of exports of Bangladesh and Cambodia to the region have 
been negative. Further, for most of the lower-income countries, the rates of growth of exports to the region 
were negative or lower than the rates of growth of their total exports. In other words, despite the fact that, 
generally speaking, tariffs and non-tariff barriers are lower in the newly industrializing economies (NIEs) and 
the second-tier NIEs than in the lower-income countries of the region, regional agreements have not been 
able to provide a significant impetus to regional exports of the lower-income countries of the region. Various 
factors may be responsible for such discrepancies in the performance of the two groups of countries, but the 
lower-income countries’ lack of supply capabilities in manufactured goods is definitely a crucial factor.
The exceptional case of trade between India, on the one hand, and Nepal and Sri Lanka on the other, 
reflects India’s deliberate policy aimed at the expansion of supply capabilities in these countries rather than 
being the outcome of the operation of market forces alone. Generally speaking, India is not only the largest 
and most dynamic importer of non-fuel products, including manufactured goods, from the lower-income 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region, but also the structure of its imports of manufactured goods is diverse. 
Indeed, India’s imports from the lower-income/small countries in the region are larger than the imports of the 
whole of ASEAN from those countries. India’s manufactured imports consist of such diverse items as chemicals, 
textiles, processed ores and metals, paper and cement. Twenty-four items account for 24.2 per cent of its total 
non-fuel imports and for over 75 per cent of its imports of manufactured goods from these countries. Two 
neighbouring countries, Nepal and particularly Sri Lanka, enjoy important trade relations with India. They are 
the source of nearly 31 per cent and over 20 per cent, respectively, of India’s imports from lower-income/small 
countries. India received over 60 per cent of Nepal’s exports in 2004/05 compared to about 10 per cent in 
1991/92. Apart from their membership in SAARC (a plurilateral trade agreement), these two countries also 
benefit from close proximity, cultural and political ties, as well as bilateral trade relations with India. Most 
importantly, India has actively contributed to the expansion of the supply capacity of its partners, inter alia, 
through FDI. By contrast, Bangladesh, Bhutan and other SAARC members have neither similar bilateral trade 
agreements with India nor do they receive similar levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) from that country.
Contrasting the case of India with the Republic of Korea is also an indication of the inefficacy of market 
forces alone in the expansion of S-S trade. The growth rate of imports of the Republic of Korea from low-income 
countries was negative during the period 1995–2005. Similarly, ASEAN’s growth of imports of manufactured 
goods from these countries has also been negligible in the absence of production sharing.
The low industrial and skills capabilities of the lower-income countries, in particular, have prevented 
them from participating in the rapid expansion of intra-industry trade and production sharing in the region. 
Yet it was this rapid expansion of intra-industry trade and production sharing in a limited number of electrical 
and electronic products that was a particularly dynamic force behind the expansion of regional trade, which 
was concentrated among the first-tier Asian NIEs, and subsequently the second-tier Asian NIEs. For example, 
seven such products accounted for nearly 58 per cent of non-fuel imports and for about 66 per cent of imports 
of manufactured goods of China from six ASEAN countries. More importantly, only two categories of electrical 
and electronic products (thermion, cold and photo-cathode valves; and automatic data processing machines) 
accounted for over 50 per cent of total non-fuel imports and for about 60 per cent of manufactured imports 
by China from those countries. Their total value, which in 2005 amounted to US$34 billion, increased at an 
average annual rate of 63 per cent during the period 1995–2005. In the case of Malaysia, these two product 
categories constitute over 60 per cent and 69 per cent, respectively, of its imports of non-fuel products and 
manufactured goods from China. China, as the largest and most dynamic regional market, imports some 
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sophisticated electrical and electronic products from the NIEs. It is also a major regional market for parts and 
components used for the assembly of products that are exported mainly to Europe and the United States. 
Indeed, industrialized countries account for over half of China’s exports.
There is a common misconception about the role of market forces in the rapid expansion of regional 
trade in ESSEA. Some believe such trade is driven by market forces. This paper argues that the main driving 
force has been production sharing, which is basically an inter-firm operation that was initially prompted by 
changes in the government policies of Japan and by Japanese TNCs, as well as by the governments of the 
participating East Asian countries themselves. The integration of lower-income countries in regional trade 
through intra-industry trade and/or production sharing has to be policy-driven, which requires regional 
cooperation, not only in trade but also in other areas.
The reliance on a limited number of products, the interdependence of the countries of the region 
and their heavy dependence on the markets of developed countries entail a number of risks. Such risks have 
increased over the last two decades because of the growing tendency of boom and bust cycles in developed 
countries, and an increase in the correlation of business cycles between economies across the ESSEA region 
since the mid-1980s. Sources of risk include bottlenecks in production, or the emergence of financial shocks in 
one country and their transmission to other countries, resulting in slow growth. In particular, the dependence 
of other countries on China increases their vulnerability to external shocks and business cycles.
The contagion effects of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 is a reminder of weaknesses in the 
international financial architecture, and thus of the need for strengthening regional financial cooperation in 
order to reduce the risk of socio-economic losses. The sub-prime problem in the United States, leading to a 
crisis in the financial markets, is another reminder of this effect. Moreover, not only do trade and industrial 
policies pursued in one country affect prospects for trade and development in other countries of the region, 
but also other policies, such as the exchange rate, financial and macroeconomic policies, in one country may 
have an impact on the economies of others.
Therefore, this study suggests the need to enhance and strengthen regional cooperation in four ar-
eas. The first is industrial collaboration through division of labour and specialization for building the supply 
capacity of the lower-income countries. As the countries concerned have common production and export 
structures, they currently have little prospect for regional trade expansion. The idea is for them to develop 
complementarity through the division of labour and specialization in different products with the aim of creat-
ing supply capabilities based on the principle of dynamic comparative advantage. The cooperation experi-
ence of India with Nepal and Sri Lanka shows not only the importance but also the feasibility of industrial 
collaboration among lower-income countries.
Second, regional arrangements should also include establishing a facility for providing adjustment 
assistance to lower-income countries for building supply capacity and back-up services, as well as for training 
and skills development. The NIEs in particular, which are interested in seeking new markets, should contribute 
to such a facility, as the development of lower-income countries would provide them with additional market 
opportunities in the region. The third area for cooperation is in technological capacity building and R&D 
among the second-tier NIEs. Finally, there is a need for enhancing financial cooperation and control of capital 
movements to reduce the risks arising from interdependence and vulnerability to external factors. The paper 
proposes, inter alia, the establishment of a regional bank for the South, which could also incorporate the 
existing Asian bond market schemes of the Chiang Mai Initiative. Although not discussed in this study, the 
countries of the region may seriously consider development of a strategic energy reserve facility to reduce 
their vulnerability to possible interruptions in petroleum supplies.
A number of areas are identified for further research. These include the impact of the dynamics of 
economic changes in China and India on export opportunities and industrialization of lower-income/small 
countries; the evolution of the relationship between FDI and regional trade, particularly production sharing, 
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in the ESSEA region; modalities of adjustment assistance to lower-income countries; trade and supply capac-
ity building of lower-income countries of the region to enable them to target the Chinese and Indian markets; 
feasibility and modalities of industrial collaboration by lower-income countries; modalities of cooperation 
on R&D among second-tier NIEs, China and India; regional cooperation in the services sector; the feasibility 
and modalities of a regional South Bank and modalities of capital control; and development of facilities for a 
strategic energy reserve.
11. Introduction
Over the past 25 years, South-South (S-S) trade has been expanding faster than international trade. For ex-
ample, the average annual growth rate of exports of developing countries to other developing countries 
during the period 1995–2005 was more than 11 per cent, compared to 6.6 per cent for the world a whole2. 
Furthermore, intraregional trade in the East, South and South-East Asian region (ESSEA) has increased more 
rapidly than S-S trade as a whole (table 1). However, trade growth has been concentrated among countries 
with relatively better developed industrial capabilities. Therefore, the paper argues that this cannot be ex-
plained by regional trade agreements (RTAs) alone. Rapid trade growth in ESSEA has been due largely to 
the expansion of intra-industry trade, particularly production sharing in electrical and electronic industries. 
South-South trade has thus contributed to the development of the region through its positive cumulative 
effects. Nevertheless, it has had certain drawbacks as well.
First, intraregional trade has been concentrated mainly among China, the first-tier NIEs and the four 
second-tier NIEs3. The low-income countries have not benefited from intraregional trade as much as other 
countries in the region; indeed, some of them have benefited very little. An intensification of regionalism 
among the more advanced developing countries of the region as well as with developed countries may result 
in a further concentration of regional trade against low-income countries. Therefore, the dynamism behind 
the rapid expansion of regional trade in ESSEA, its concentration in certain countries/areas and the reasons 
for the sluggish performance of some of the regional blocs in Asia need to be explored more closely. Which 
factors explain the divergences in their performance? Is the expansion of S-S regional trade the result of devel-
opment, or vice-versa? Does it take place sufficiently through the operation of market forces alone? Can it be 
used also as a tool for the development and industrialization of the lower-income countries? What measures 
need to be taken for this purpose? What policies/measures could be taken by the lower-income countries 
themselves? What could the more advanced country members of S-S regional agreements do to assist the 
low-income countries to enhance their regional trade as a means of development?
Second, the increased interdependence among the countries of the region that are heavily involved 
in intraregional trade has increased the vulnerability of each of them to economic and policy changes in the 
other countries of the region. What could be done to cushion this?
Finally, countries of the region are not homogeneous: They have different economic structures as well 
as different issues to tackle. While they have some common interests in intensifying regional cooperation, the 
main interests of different groups of countries vary. For the first-tier NIEs, market expansion and developing 
frontier technologies seem to be the main concerns; for the second-tier NIEs, on the other hand, the burning 
2  For non-fuel exports, the corresponding figures were over 10 per cent and 5.9 per cent, respectively (table 2 and its sources). 
3  The first-tier NIEs are Hong Kong (SAR, China), the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan (Province of China). The second-tier NIEs are 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Most of these countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand) are also members of ASEAN.
2issue is upgrading their industrial structure; and the main preoccupation of the low-income countries is the 
expansion of supply capacity. What measures can be taken to respond to the needs and interests of each 
group?
The governments involved in regional cooperation in ESSEA need to address all of the questions that 
have been raised above. The study attempts to shed some light on these issues while presenting information 
about the expansion of regional trade in ESSEA. The following section provides a brief background on the 
expansion of regionalism in ESSEA. The third section is devoted to an analysis of the economic rationale for 
S-S trade. Section 4 explains the role of the ESSEA region as a market and source of supply in world trade and 
regional trade, and identify dynamic sources of supply and dynamic markets at the country level. The role of 
regional agreements is also examined. Subsequent sections explain the role and drawbacks of intra-industry 
trade and production sharing in the regional trade of ESSEA and examine the importance of China as an 
engine of regional trade. Reference is also made to the misconceptions about the role of market forces in the 
expansion of production sharing. Before concluding the study, policy initiatives propose what is needed for 
enhancing and strengthening regional cooperation, and this section identifies new areas for further research 
in the concluding remarks.
32. Background to regionalism and S-S trade cooperation in the 
ESSEA region
South-South cooperation was first formally introduced in 1958 with the agreement for the establishment 
of a Central American Common Market. Such cooperation was given further impetus by the success of the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the early 1970s. Subsequently, with the begin-
ning of negotiations for a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in early 1990s (following approval 
of the United States Tariff and Trade Act of 1984, which authorized the Government to enter into regional 
trade agreements (RTAs)), RTAs became more fashionable in general. During the first half of 1990s, 19 new 
notifications on RTAs were received by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), as compared with 
25 for the entire period 1948–1989. There was a veritable explosion in the number of RTAs concluded after 
the Uruguay Round: during the second half of 1990s, the number of notifications received by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and remaining in force was 37, followed by 106 for the period between early 2000 and 24 
September 20074. According to the WTO, all member countries are party to one RTA or more (in some cases 20 
RTAs), resulting in what is referred to as a “spaghetti- bowl” of RTAs. Developing countries are involved in RTAs 
with other developing countries as well as with developed countries and transition economies. One impor-
tant difference between S-S trade agreements and N-S trade agreements is that the latter are dominated by 
free trade agreements (FTAs), while S-S agreements are mostly preferential, although FTAs among developing 
countries are also increasing5.
In Asia, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates that there are about 192 bilateral and subregional 
FTAs signed or under negotiation6. In East Asia, as on June 2007, out of 102 FTAs, 26 were plurilateral and 75 
bilateral, 21 were intra-East Asian and another 80 were extra-East Asian (Kawai and Wignaraja, 2007: table 5). 
The main reasons for the rapid expansion of RTAs in East Asia include trade liberalization, growth of inward FDI 
and vertical production networks, development of logistic support services and the rapid economic growth 
of large emerging markets (ibid: 4-5).
Baldwin (2006) argues that East Asian regionalism is fragile because of the interdependence of these 
countries through intraregional trade, and a lack of discipline and of a mechanism for dispute settlement 
in the absence of bound preferential tariff cuts in their regional agreements. He proposes a binding of the 
region’s tariff cuts in the WTO and an arrangement for “management effort” to discipline the member coun-
tries in implementing the regional agreements concerned. However, binding of tariff cuts in WTO may not be 
4  The data cover RTAs that were in force and active as on 24 September 2007. Otherwise, there were 256 new notifications for the period 1995 
to 24 September 2007 (www.wto.org/).
5  Out of 41 N-S agreements (on trade in goods), 40 are FTAs, as compared with 22 out of 45 S-S agreements. In the latter, another 18 are 
preferential agreements (based on Rollo, 2007, table 1).
6  ADB in Brief, Regional Cooperation and Integration, available at: www.adb.org/Media/Articles.
4in the interest of the countries of the region as it would limit their policy space and their room for manoeuvre 
vis-à-vis all other countries.
While the debate on whether RTAs are “building blocks” or “stumbling blocks” for multilateralism and 
for global free trade continues, the “spaghetti bowl” is becoming bigger and bigger. A discussion of whether 
or not RTAs are building blocks for achieving global free trade is not within the scope of this study. Those 
involved in this debate advocate universal free trade. However, neither universal free trade nor the expansion 
of trade, per se, should be an objective of development. We consider trade as a “means” to development – not 
an end. The end is development. Universal free trade might be advocated when all countries reach the same 
level of development.
Hence, the purpose of this study is to examine whether, and how, S-S regional trade and cooperation 
could be used as a vehicle for enhancing the development of developing countries in general, particularly 
in ESSEA. Expansion of regional trade among the more advanced developing countries of the region has 
helped their development, which in turn has led to growth of regional trade among them. But how are the 
lower-income countries of the region affected by this process? Most of the bilateral trade agreements in the 
region are those concluded between the more advanced developing countries, or between these countries 
and developed countries (UNDP, 2005a; Hufbauer and Schott 2007: 2-16). There are also attempts to intensify 
regional integration among the more advanced countries of the region. For example, ASEAN already has an 
FTA with China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ASEAN+3); further ASEAN+3 is involved in a trade agree-
ment with Australia, New Zealand and India (Kawai and Wignaraja, 2007). According to a study by Kawai and 
Wignaraja (2007) based on a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, such a development will benefit 
the more advanced countries of the region, but will have less beneficial income effects on the lower-income 
members of ASEAN that have little to offer. It will also have detrimental (i.e. discriminatory) effects on lower-
income countries that are not covered by the ASEAN agreement, such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and 
countries of central Asia (Kawai and Wignaraja, 2007: table 11).
Trade liberalization is regarded as the solution for the expansion of S-S trade (Kowaski and Shepherd, 
2006; DAFT, 2004). However, tariffs alone do not necessarily explain the lack of participation in S-S trade by 
low-income countries. For example, even though the exports of low-income countries to upper-middle-in-
come (developing) countries of the ESSEA region face more or less the same average tariff rates as imports 
from other groups (high- and middle-income countries) (Kowaski and Shepherd, 2006: table 14), they do 
not benefit from the same rate of growth of exports as those other groups (ibid: tables 10). It seems that low 
supply capacity is, inter alia, one of the major factors impeding regional trade expansion by the low-income 
countries.
Developing countries have collectively expressed their political will and desire for the expansion of S-S 
trade and cooperation in different forums, such as at meetings of the G-77 and non-aligned movement (NAM), 
particularly since the adoption of the Mexico City Programme of Action (1976). Yet, to the author’s knowledge, 
they have not always provided a clear economic justification and rationale for S-S trade as against N-S trade, 
as explained in the following section.
53. The economic rationale for S-S trade
3.1 The controversy
Cooperation among developing countries for the expansion of S-S trade in general has been at the centre 
of controversy between neoclassical/neo-liberal economists and their opponents, as have RTAs. However, 
neither of the groups has been able to present a valid or strong argument to support their respective stands. 
The proponents of universal free trade have argued against discriminatory trade agreements, in general, and 
FTAs among developing countries for the expansion of S-S trade, in particular. For example, Viner (1950) argues 
that regional integration would result in diversion of some trade from low-cost producers (non-members of 
RTAs) to high-cost producers (members of RTAs). Even if some trade were to be created as a result of RTAs, the 
welfare costs of trade diversion would be higher than the benefits of trade creation. In some recent literature, 
RTAs are, in fact, considered to be undesirable. Greenaway and Milner (1990:1) argue that:
The case for specific policies to promote South-South trade is not convincing…The expansion of 
South-South trade can be expected to continue in the context of multilateral trade expansion and 
the potential gains are likely to be greater if this process is allowed to evolve freely in a multilateral 
setting.
Corden (1993: 457, 459) goes even further, arguing that developing countries will be far better off if 
they liberalize their trade regime “unilaterally in a non-discriminatory fashion” rather than targeting markets 
in the South. According to him, for developing countries “…there is only the option of multilateral free or 
freer trade, i.e. GATT…”7 According to the World Bank (2000) and Moen (1998), RTAs between the South and 
North are more advantageous than RTAs among developing countries themselves (see also Subramanian and 
Tamirisa, 2001).
An OECD study states that “…South-South trade does not clearly have a vast development potential”; 
the theory of comparative advantage would indicate that “North-South trade would achieve higher gains” 
(Kowaski and Shepherd, 2006:10). Further, it maintains that “…the potential for trade based on economies of 
scale among relatively small and poor countries of the South is uncertain” (ibid).
However, inefficiency of regionalization has been disproved empirically, for example in East Asia and 
Latin America where economic gains from integration agreements have been considerable (Ng and Yeats, 
2003; Baier, Bergstrand and Vidal, 2007). It has also been demonstrated that regionalism has trade creation 
effects not only for members but also for trade with third parties (Cernat, 2003).
The neo-liberal views against S-S trade are based on their ideological bias in favour of universal free 
trade, which is influenced by the static version of the theory of comparative cost advantage. This theory 
7  For a critique of this view, see Shafaeddin, 1997.
6is, in turn, based on hypothetical and unrealistic assumptions. They are ideologically biased because they 
argue in favour of the expansion of trade for maximizing global welfare rather than for the development of 
developing countries. The theory of cost comparative advantage is based on a number of assumptions, in-
cluding full employment of resources, availability of the same technology to all countries, independence of 
present and future costs of production, as well as the lack of influence of experience on the production cost, 
the lack of external economies, atomistic units of production, constant returns to scale and the lack of risk 
and influence of power in trade. They do not take into account the characteristics of developing countries, 
such as underemployment of resources, their lack of technological capabilities, existence of scale economies 
in many manufacturing industries, and the interdependence of present and future costs (i.e. the fact that 
present production may reduce future costs by gaining experience as well as reaping internal and external 
scale economies).
List (1856) was among the first to challenge the classical “theory of exchangeable value” (universal 
free international trade). While arguing that free trade could be an ultimate aim, he introduced his theory of 
“productive power” (which in modern economic terminology amounts to development or building of supply 
capacity). To him, trade was a means to enhancing “productive power” – not an aim per se. Kaldor (1972) sug-
gested that developing countries should be concerned mainly with promoting “creative efficiency” (growth 
and development) rather than allocative efficiency (i.e. allocation of given and “fully employed” resources 
among different activities efficiently as argued in neo-classical theory). In other words, while allocative ef-
ficiency is the concern of the static theory of cost comparative advantage, developing countries are to be 
concerned with attaining dynamic comparative advantage for the sake of promoting “creative efficiency”. 
However, dynamic comparative advantage will not be attained automatically through the operation of mar-
ket forces alone; to attain it requires actions by the government (Cline, 1983; Amsden 1989; Shafaeddin, 2005a 
and 2005b).
List also introduced, inter alia, the idea of regional integration in his proposal for German unification 
and cooperation among European countries, which eventually led to the signature of the Treaty of Rome in 
19578. In the early 1950s, Raul Prebisch provided the strongest dynamic argument for regional integration 
in developing countries in the context of his theory, advocating import substitution and “collective import 
substitution” for a transitory period during the course of industrialization and development (ECLA, 1950; 
Prebisch, 1984). However, his theory is often misinterpreted. It is true that he took a “defensive” approach, 
but his vision was based on the internal conditions of developing countries and the international economic 
situation that prevailed in the early 1950s. It was a defensive approach in the sense that at the time he did not 
see significant prospects for the expansion of exports of manufactured goods from developing to developed 
countries. Developing countries did not have the necessary industrial infrastructure for producing goods for 
the markets of the North. Moreover, the protectionist policies of the governments of the “centre” and the strat-
egies of their industrial firms were not conducive to industrial exports from developing countries. Therefore, 
preferential regional trade agreements, and eventually common markets, were seen as means for facilitating 
intraregional trade in order to promote industrialization. Prebisch modified his theory later on, first in 1958. At 
that time, he regarded both import substitution and export expansion as parts of a long-term dynamic trade 
policy (Prebisch, 1984; Shafaeddin, 2005a: 151–153). Yet he saw a place for regional integration for upgrading 
of the industrial structure, which required a larger market than the internal market of a single country.
For many years, following the initial ideas of Prebisch, arguments in favour of S-S trade centred mainly 
on the issues of small size of the domestic market, economies of scale, problems of access to developed-
country markets (see, for example, UNCTAD, 1986:10–11 and Agatiello, 2007) or a slowdown in growth rates 
of developed-country economies and growing potential for S-S trade expansion (South Centre 1996: ix-xiii). 
Some elements of these arguments are no longer valid. For example, access to markets of the North has 
improved considerably. Moreover, S-S trade will not necessarily expand, even when regional preferential or 
free trade agreements are signed among a number of developing countries. Experience of a number of inte-
8  The first attempt at regionalism was initiated in the 1660s by 12 provinces in the Paris Basin for political reasons (UNDP, 2005:18).
7gration agreements in the 1960s and 1970s confirms this statement to the extent that their related treaties 
were sometimes referred to as dead letters (de Melo and Panagariya, 1993:14–15 and chapters 8 and 9). The 
Regional Cooperation Agreement for Development between Iran, Pakistan and Turkey is an example in Asia.
Scholars have provided other “defensive” arguments in favour of S-S trade. One is that trade among 
equal partners will have a positive influence on net barter terms of trade (Sarkar and Singer, 1991)9. Another 
is that too much reliance on trade with the North will increase vulnerability and risks of dependence on trade 
(Hirschman, 1968). Hence, there is a need for geographical diversification to reduce the related risks. Of course, 
geographical diversification would be possible to the extent that alternative sources of supply are available 
in the South. While both arguments seem reasonable, the question is “how” alternative sources of supply 
can be developed. In other words, what is the dynamic vehicle for the expansion of S-S trade as a means of 
promoting industrialization and development?
The “defensive” approach in favour of regionalization and S-S trade has not vanished in the recent era of 
globalization, although the arguments provided are different. Some have attributed the revival of regionalism 
in the 1990s to disappointment by the United States at slow progress in Uruguay Round negotiations (e.g. 
Bhagwati, 1993), and, more recently in the Doha Round, to the lack of development dimensions in multilateral 
institutions and to weaknesses in the international trading system (UNCTAD, 2007a: 40-45, and ch. VI; Kowai 
and Wingaraja, 2007: 8). Others regard regionalization as a possible option for countries that risk exclusion, or 
marginalization, from the growth dynamics of globalization (Oman, 1994).
Further, N-S plurilateral and bilateral agreements, it is argued, can limit policy space of developing 
countries by including clauses covering aspects that go beyond those imposed on them through multilateral 
trade rules. This is done by the inclusion of “WTO-plus” conditions and “Singapore issues”10 in these agreements 
in areas such as tariffs, subsidies, trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS), government 
procurement, rules of origin,11 performance clauses, trade-related investment measures (TRIMs)12 and even 
competition policy. In fact, it has been noted that, although N-S trade agreements have put in place many 
policy-stabilizing mechanisms, they are unevenly applied, and “post-modern” hidden protectionist “backslid-
ings such as antidumping practices are still present even in advanced North-South or East-West RTAs” (Cernant 
and Laird, 2007). Imposition of commitments to forgo performance requirements in investment agreements 
beyond the TRIMs Agreement is a clear example of “WTO-plus” conditions imposed on developing countries. 
Eleven developing countries have agreed to forgo such conditions in FTAs and bilateral agreements; among 
them eight have committed never to use them against any foreign investor. Another 27 developing and 
transition economies have made similar commitments in their investment agreements with the United States 
and 8 countries in their agreements with Canada (Baldwin et al., 2007: tables 1 and 2 and figure 6). S-S trade 
agreements are therefore preferred to N-S agreements because they do not limit policy space of the partners 
(UNCTAD, 2007a: 54–64 and chap. IX).
9  Note, however, that products traded among developing countries are different from those traded between developed and developing 
countries. Exports of technology-intensive products by developed countries, in particular, are subject to patent and monopoly rights or 
oligopoly of the exporting firms, which, thus, carry premium prices.
10  WTO-plus conditions are those included in bilateral or regional agreements in addition to, or more severe than, conditions covered in 
Uruguay Round (WTO) agreements. Singapore issues are those that were proposed by developed countries in the WTO Ministerial meeting 
in Singapore in 1996 for inclusion in the next round of trade negotiation. They included, for example, competition policy, trade-related 
environmental issues and labour standards.
11  Rules of origin are criteria, laws and regulations used to define the country of origin of goods. Regional trade agreements may have 
different criteria than the rules of origin applied by WTO rules. Usually, a certain proportion of a product should be produced by the country 
that enjoys preferential treatment in a bilateral agreement, or by countries involved in RTAs in the case of regional agreements. The provision 
permits a final good for export by a country to contain a small quantity of the same kind of imported inputs from other countries not covered 
by the related trade agreement.
12  TRIPS are rights given to individuals or companies to protect the creations of their minds for a specific period of time. They cover copyright 
and other rights related to copyright, and industrial property such as patents. TRIMs are investment measures that affect goods. TRIPS and 
TRIMs are two multilateral agreements that were signed by the WTO’s contracting parties at the end of Uruguay Round of Trade Negotia-
tions.
8Unfulfilled expectations from N-S RTAs, is another reason provided. In this respect, the example of 
NAFTA is often cited because it did not enhance Mexico’s industrialization and development. Some regard the 
maquiladora sector, which expanded fast due to its ease of access to the United States market, as an enclave 
with limited contribution to the internal development of the country (Gallagher and Zarsky, 2007; Shafaeddin 
and Pizarro, 2007)13.
Although the points raised by those using the defensive approach about the existence of problems 
with the multilateral trading system and N-S RTAs are valid, they are not an argument in favour of S-S re-
gionalism or S-S trade. Even if S-S trade is proved desirable theoretically, the question is what conditions 
and what kind of dynamic mechanism should be envisaged that would be beneficial to industrialization and 
development of the partner countries? It is true that developing countries that are at early stages of industrial 
development have benefited less from regional integration than those with a more diversified production 
structure (UNCTAD, 2007a: 41; xxi). Nevertheless, two points are worth emphasizing in this regard. First of all, 
this may not necessarily be the case, as is indicated by the example of the European Union (EU). Economies 
with relatively lower levels of development (e.g. Cyprus, Greece, Portugal and Spain) than other members 
of the EU benefited a lot more than their partners when they integrated into the EU. Much depends on the 
integration mechanism employed. Secondly, if economic development is the key objective, in order to benefit 
from regionalism and S-S trade should a country develop first before integrating regionally, rather than using 
regional integration and S-S trade as a vehicle for industrialization and development?
Some argue that when conditions for South-South intra-industry trade exist, it could offer opportu-
nities for learning-by-doing, and external economies or economies of scale (Otsubo, 1998). However, it is 
not clear how such opportunities could be developed in lower-income countries that are at early stages of 
industrialization. Should they wait until they are developed and conditions for intra-industry trade prevail?
Hence, the “normative” aspect of S-S regionalism for the expansion of S-S trade as a means of indus-
trialization and development should be based on more solid ground than on the analysis of the “positive 
economics” of S-S regionalism and trade.
3.2 An alternative conceptual framework and mechanisms for S-S trade
The paper’s starting point is that trade is a means to development. Following Myrdal (1971), development is 
defined as a movement upwards of the whole social system, which includes, inter alia, the need for expansion 
of income, employment and social services and human development, which are also among the objectives 
of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The experience of almost every developed 
country and NIE is that industrialization is an essential part of a strategy that aims at rapid development. 
“… [F]or the Asian Pacific region….a major rational for strategic and selective government intervention in 
the industrial policy context is to fashion a national trade policy which actively prioritizes both domestic 
industrialization and increasing the value [sic] of higher value added manufactured and services exports” 
(Malhotra, 2006:11; UNDP, 2003). Within such a policy framework, addressing supply-side capacity constraints 
for expansion of productive capacity and/or upgrading of the industrial structure play a key role (Malhotra, 
2006: 9). So does market expansion.
Why and how can S-S trade and regional integration work as a vehicle for industrialization and develop-
ment? The paper shows that expansion of S-S trade is needed to supplement N-S trade for a fuller utilization 
of unemployed resources of developing countries and for the expansion of their productive capacity and 
upgrading of their industrial structure. For achieving such objectives, S-S cooperation for trade expansion 
should follow the principle of dynamic comparative advantage, rather than static comparative advantage. 
Moreover, it requires government intervention to correct and remedy market failures and deficiencies, as the 
expansion of S-S trade cannot take place automatically through the operation of market forces alone. It also 
13  See also UNCTAD, 2007a: 65-79.
9requires S-S cooperation in other areas than trade, including industrial collaboration. It is therefore argued in 
this section that the rationale for S-S trade in general can be based on a combination of four main elements: 
an extension of the “vent for surplus theory”; dynamic comparative advantage; scarcity of resources needed 
for industrialization and development; and “division of labour” and specialization. The paper postpones until 
section 6 the discussion on the modalities and a mechanism for the promotion of S-S cooperation for the 
expansion of supply capacity – particularly in low-income countries – and for the upgrading of the industrial 
structure.
To begin with, contrary to the neoclassical theory of international trade, resources of developing 
countries are not fully employed, production of agricultural goods and manufactured products are subject to 
diminishing and increasing returns, respectively, and resources are not fully mobile and flexible to be easily 
transferable from the production of one good to another. In technical terms, in comparative cost advantage 
theory, movement can take place along a static “production possibility curve”. As resources are fully employed, 
any expansion of exports will be at the cost of production for the domestic market. The theory is concerned 
with reallocation of resources. Further, any adjustment from production for the domestic market to produc-
tion for export, takes place easily as resources are assumed to be mobile and flexible.
In developing countries, resources are not, in fact, fully employed and the economy is below the pro-
duction possibility curve, particularly at early stages of development. Labour, land and/or natural resources are 
often unemployed or underemployed. In addition, in many instances there is an army of unemployed labour. 
Even when land is fully cultivated, it may not be used efficiently if the yield is low; therefore the contribution 
of land does not realize its full potential. Primary commodities are also generally exported before process-
ing, for increasing value added, or for use in the process of industrialization through “lateral diversification”14. 
In other words, a developing country possesses some potential surplus productive capacity, which can be 
mobilized for producing additional goods for export without shifting resources away from production for the 
domestic market (Myint, 1958). By providing effective demand, in theory, trade can provide opportunities for 
a fuller utilization of resources for the production of goods for which sufficient domestic effective demand is 
lacking. This is the essence of the “vent for surplus theory” (ibid). The argument can be extended by saying that 
production of goods for “additional” exports can take place without shifting resources away from production 
for domestic consumption and/or for exports to the North.
Nevertheless, in practice, this potential capacity cannot be realized unless two conditions are met: 
additional effective demand through international trade, and the existence of the complementary resources 
needed for production. In neoclassical theory, trade liberalization, in addition to trade with the North, could 
provide the necessary effective demand leading to specialization and division of labour. This is because the 
structure of production is assumed to be flexible and resources can easily move from one activity to another. 
Yet the experience of the last quarter century indicates that even when trade liberalization has led to export 
expansion in lower-income countries, it has often resulted in deindustrialization, unemployment and spe-
cialization based on natural-resource-based industries and/or assembly operations, rather than in industrial 
development and upgrading (and a shift upwards of the production possibility curve). This is because N-S 
trade is governed by the principle of static comparative cost advantage. A developing country can export 
to the North what it can produce cheaply. The North will not provide effective demand for high-cost new 
products of a developing country that is at the early stages of industrialization. The experience of successful 
industrializers indicates that creating supply capabilities is a prerequisite for export expansion and intra-in-
dustry and inter-industry trade (Amsden, 1989; Malhotra, 2006; and Shafaeddin, 2006).
Even if the markets in the North were to provide the necessary effective demand for new industrial 
products of lower-income countries, the potential surplus capacity of the latter countries would not be turned 
into actual production capacity. This is because of their scarcity of the complementary resources necessary for 
14   Lateral diversification (as distinct from horizontal and vertical diversification) is the process of combining various resources for production 
of a product – or products – based mainly, but not exclusively, on domestic inputs together with imported inputs.
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production and the inflexibility of an unskilled labour force that prevents it from moving to new activities that 
require some skills. Complementary resources are scarce in the areas of finance, skills, technology, organiza-
tion, entrepreneurship, “supply determined” factors such as some natural resources, and, more importantly, 
decision-making capabilities of the government machinery (Hirschman, 1958). This scarcity limits the realiza-
tion of potential productive capacity for export and accelerated growth. Further, the lower-income economies 
lack the necessary flexibility to adjust their methods and factors of production easily.
Can TNCs contribute significantly to the process of expansion of productive capacity and upgrading 
to enable an increase in exports to the North? In this age of globalization, the power of TNCs in international 
trade, production and other economic activities is growing. By the turn of the twenty-first century, 1,000 com-
panies accounted for 80 per cent of industrial production and 500 firms for 70 per cent of world trade. Since 
then, mergers and acquisition have accelerated, contributing to further concentration of economic activities 
in these companies. During the period 2000–2006, the number of cross-border mergers and acquisitions with 
values of over US$1 billion had reached over 813 with values amounting to nearly US$3 trillion (UNCTAD, 
2007b: table 1.1)15.
The large TNCs enjoy economies of scale not only in production, but also in marketing and distribution, 
and, more importantly, in R&D. In such a world, independent and newcomer firms to a particular field of 
production in developing countries are in a disadvantageous comparative position. The combination of the 
problem of scarcity and international market concentration renders their penetration into the world market, 
initiation of new competitive industries and/or upgrading of their existing industrial structure difficult.
Foreign direct investment by TNCs of the industrial countries can remedy some of the scarcity problems 
and act as a channel for exports to developed countries. However, the interests of TNCs – which is to earn prof-
its - are different from those of a host developing country. Even when they contribute to export expansion, 
it is basically in assembly operations and resource-based activities that are governed by static comparative 
advantage of the host country (Lall, 2004). Their contribution to upgrading of the industrial structure of the 
host country is often limited. Further, FDI increases the vulnerability of the host country to external factors. 
Again, the experience of Mexico is telling. Despite extensive involvement of TNCs and the NAFTA Agreement, 
Mexico has had little success in upgrading its maquila industries. Further, in recent years, following the world 
economic recession, its average annual rate of growth of manufactured exports fell from 19.8 per cent during 
the 1990s to 5.7 per cent in the period 2000–2006 (UN COMTRADE database). In contrast to the interests of 
TNCs, the interests of a host developing country are, or are supposed to be, industrialization and develop-
ment. Hence, TNCs’ contribution to development of the host country would depend on the extent to which 
these firms are managed and regulated by the government of the host country. East Asian NIEs have managed 
to harness FDI to some extent. However, similar tools for controlling and regulating FDI are no longer easily 
available to developing countries due to the fact that their policy space has become limited by international 
trade and investment rules and bilateral trade agreements and arrangements. Moreover, the experience of 
the last quarter century demonstrates that lower-income countries in particular encounter difficulties in at-
tracting FDI.
How can S-S trade contribute to remedying the scarcity problem? What is required in the context of 
lower-income countries is that, instead of trade leading to division of labour and specialization, it should 
be the other way round. That is, division of labour and specialization in production, along with provision 
of back-up services for S-S trade should help trade expansion. FTAs, or preferential tariff agreements, can 
facilitate, inter alia, the S-S flow of trade in products that are already being produced, provided the necessary 
back-up services and infrastructure are available. Yet preferential tariffs are insufficient because of similarities 
in the production structure of the lower-income countries, their lack of complementarities and scarcity of 
back-up services, infrastructure and institutions necessary for S-S trade. The operation of market forces and 
15 This is 55 per cent higher than the total number of mergers and acquisitions for the previous 13 years (i.e. 1987–1999) (based on UNCTAD, 
2007b: table 1.1).
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their contribution to remedying the scarcity problem for production of new products is limited, especially in 
countries at early stages of industrialization and development.
To overcome the scarcity problem for expansion of supply capacities, concerted policy measures for 
extending S-S regional cooperation to other areas than preferential trade agreements are needed. The first 
requirement is cooperation for supply capacity creation in accordance with dynamic comparative advantage; 
that is, for production of new “industrial” goods and/or upgrading of the industrial structure. One way is to 
make arrangements for the division of labour and specialization in the whole spectrum of the value chain for 
production and exports of various finished products and/or parts and components (P&C) through industrial 
collaboration. Division of labour and specialization in this case means that each country would be allocated 
the production of a particular manufacturing product, and parts and components for production of another 
product, the output of which would be exchanged with other countries or would be sent to another country 
for assembly. At the same time, each country may be engaged in assembly operations, or production of a 
product, and production of parts of that product or other products. The choice of products would have to 
be determined for the specific countries involved. In this way, both the scarcity problem and the “effective 
demand” constraint would be remedied. Although for a while high cost products would be exchanged, this 
would be only an accounting issue as long as bilateral trade or the trade balance of each country with its 
partners is balanced. The result would be the creation of employment and income. As industrialization pro-
ceeds, the cost of production would decline gradually due to learning-by-doing, experience, internal and 
external economies of scale and increasing return, which are characteristics of manufacturing (Young, 1928). 
Of course, in the meantime lower cost alternatives would be available on the international market, but the 
necessary purchasing power for acquiring the extra imports would be missing in this case. The type and spe-
cific arrangement needed would depend on the level of development and industrial capacity of the countries 
concerned, as explained in section 6.
The second requirement is cooperation in the provision of producer services, training and skills devel-
opment, back-up services, including trade facilitation, export credit, insurance and infrastructure necessary 
for the expansion of regional trade and supply capacity and R&D, among others.
The third requirement is government intervention and a clear industrial policy, both by individual 
countries and collectively. As the market fails to provide the necessary skills, infrastructure, back-up services 
and institutions, collective arrangements are essential in these respects. Further, all countries should follow a 
dynamic industrial policy, with performance requirements in exchange for facilities and a collective market, 
provided that over time they improve their competitiveness in the international market. The advantage of this 
scheme over traditional import substitution, where protection was provided across the board to all industries, 
is selectivity in the use of scarce resources as well as benefiting from the larger size of the collective market. 
Its advantage over selective infant industry protection is the benefit of the larger market provided by the 
member countries.
Geographical diversification to reduce risks of dependence on markets in developed countries, and 
the resultant enhancement of bargaining power by developing countries in international forums and in their 
bilateral trade relations with developed countries are among additional benefits of such S-S cooperation ar-
rangements.
The achievements and weaknesses of the ESSEA region in S-S trade provides clues as to the potential 
and possibilities for enhancing and strengthening S-S cooperation in the region, particularly through produc-
tion sharing, which is a form of industrial collaboration. The paper follows with these issues below.
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Developing countries of ESSEA, constitute a major and growing source of supply as well as a market in 
world trade, and account for the bulk of international trade of developing countries. Furthermore, ESSEA 
intraregional trade accounts for the lion’s share of their total trade and of S-S trade. The region encompasses a 
number of RTAs, but they are not the only force behind regional trade dynamism. Moreover, the low-income 
countries do not benefit from regional trade as much as the other countries of the region.  
4.1 ESSEA in world trade and S-S trade
Table 1 provides data on the shares of developing countries and the main Asian regional trade groups in 
world trade in 2005. As only a limited number of countries export petroleum, fuel is put as a separate item 
and our analysis focuses on trade in non-fuel products. Further, SITC 9 (mainly armaments and special items) 
is excluded from non-fuel exports in order to concentrate on trade in commercial products. The trade data 
of Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region of China (hereafter referred to as Hong Kong [SAR, China]) and 
Singapore include re-exports16. Unfortunately, it is not easy to exclude the figures on re-exports from various 
product groups because of the lack of comprehensive data for all countries.  Hence, the data slightly overes-
timate the role of the region as a source of supply and a market. With this caveat in mind, the table highlights 
that ESSEA countries are an important source of world supply of and demand for non-fuel exports. In 2005 
they accounted for over a quarter of world exports of these products and three quarters of exports from 
developing countries, including China. Similarly, they accounted for over 21 per cent of the market for world 
imports and 75 per cent of the imports of developing countries17.
4. The role of ESSEA as a market and source of supply
16 For example, re-exports constituted about 94 per cent of total exports of Hong Kong (SAR, China) in 2007, and re-exports of SITC 7 items 
alone constituted over 53 per cent of total exports (HKMDS: tables 3.1 and 3.8).
17 The shares of West Asia in world exports and imports of non-fuel products (including SITC 9) are only 1.9 per cent and 3.4 per cent, respec-































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































+ 28 + 
68)
Exports
Asia excl. China 2.4 1.4 7.6 6.8 6.5 11.7 7.5
China 7.0 3.5 15.5 18.6 17.6 12.0 17.5
Asia incl. China 3.3 1.7 9.1 9.4 8.9 11.7 9.3
All developing countries excluding China 3.3 2.0 7.8 7.1 6.6 12.1 7.7
All developing countries including China 3.7 2.2 8.5 9.3 8.5 12.1 9.1
East, South and South-East Asia 3.1 1.6 9.5 9.2 8.7 11.0 8.9
East, South and South-East Asia excl. China 2.0 1.4 7.8 6.5 6.1 10.9 6.5
Main Asian economic groupings:        
     ASEAN-10 3.0 1.7 5.5 6.7 6.2 9.4 6.5
     SAARC-6* 4.1 2.6 21.1 9.7 9.1 41.3 10.0
     India 3.6 6.6 20.8 11.6 10.7 46.2 11.8
     SAARC excl. India 5.4 -3.2 26.9 5.6 5.5 18.9 5.6
     APTA-6 5.2 3.6 15.9 14.2 13.6 15.9 13.5
     APTA excl. China 2.7 3.7 16.5 8.7 8.5 20.2 8.6
World 3.2 1.8 6.2 6.3 5.9 12.2 6.6
Imports
Asia excl. China 2.6 0.1 5.8 5.2 4.9 12.7 5.7
China 10.9 14.2 25.0 18.2 18.0 27.0 18.5
Asia incl. China 3.6 4.2 10.5 7.5 7.3 14.3 7.9
All developing countries excl. China 3.1 0.4 5.9 5.4 5.1 12.2 5.8
All developing countries incl. China 3.8 3.6 9.9 7.1 6.9 13.5 7.4
East, South and South-East Asia 3.3 4.2 10.5 7.3 7.1 14.5 7.7
East, South and South-East Asia excl. China 1.8 -0.6 5.0 4.6 4.3 12.7 5.1
Main Asian economic groupings:  
     ASEAN-10 2.4 0.0 3.6 3.3 3.2 12.7 4.0
     SAARC-6* 5.3 8.6 8.1 9.9 9.2 15.9 10.8
     India 10.1 8.2 7.9 12.8 11.9 17.2 13.3
     SAARC excl. India 2.5 9.1 8.6 5.2 5.0 10.3 5.6
     APTA-6 7.8 8.2 16.1 13.3 13.0 16.6 13.2
     APTA excl. China 5.3 0.4 7.3 7.1 6.7 13.4 7.9
World 3.5 1.5 6.2 6.6 6.1 12.5 6.7
Source: Same as table 1.
See table 1 for country composition of the regional blocs.
*Bhutan is not included as a reporter, but is included as a SAARC member.
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The share of ESSEA in trade in manufactures, which accounts for the bulk of world trade in non-fuel 
products, is particularly significant (table 1). ESSEA also accounts for the bulk of both exports (over 80 per 
cent) and imports (67 per cent) of manufactured goods of developing countries. By contrast, for food and raw 
materials it is more of a market than a source of supply. 
The ESSEA region encompasses a number of regional trade groups in which lower-income countries 
also have membership (as shown in the note to table 1). When large and dynamic countries, such as China, 
India and the Republic of Korea, are excluded from the economic groups, with the exception of ASEAN, the 
two other regional groups included in the table do not constitute an important market or sources of supply18. 
In other words, LDCs and some other lower-income countries in the region, as a group, are only minor sources 
of supply and markets. 
ESSEA is also a major source of growth of international trade. During the period 1995–2005, the average 
annual growth rates of both exports and imports of manufactured goods and minerals of ESSEA exceeded 
those of the world as a whole (table 2). However, for agricultural goods, the region is more of a dynamic 
market than a dynamic source of supply. China, in particular, stands out in terms of the size and growth rate 
of its trade in various product groups, particularly its exports of manufactured goods and imports of primary 
products. 
If China, India and the Republic of Korea are excluded from their respective regional blocs, the rates 
of growth of trade in non-fuel products, particularly manufactured goods, of the remaining countries in the 
regional blocs lag behind those of China as well as of ESSEA as a whole. The relatively high growth rate of 
exports and imports of the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA), excluding China, is due to the Republic of 
Korea (table 9). Once again low-income country members of the trade blocs SAARC and APTA exhibit lower 
growth rates of both exports and imports than the average for the ESSEA as a group. In other words, involve-
ment in RTAs does not necessarily lead to regional trade expansion.
4.2 Regional trade of ESSEA
The ESSEA region is the main sources of supply and the main market for S-S trade, particularly for non-fuel 
products, and manufactured goods dominate such trade (table 3). Therefore, this study examines the evo-
lution of the regional trade of ESSEA in relation to S-S trade in manufactured goods and non-fuel primary 
products separately (tables 4 and 5). 
In 2005, the magnitude of South-South trade in manufactured goods was more than 6 times higher 
than that of non-fuel primary commodities as a whole, while it was 7.5 times higher in ESSEA-South trade. 
Moreover, while growth of S-S trade exceeded that of world trade for both manufactured goods and primary 
products, manufactured goods were more dynamic in the expansion of S-S trade, to the extent that the share 
of S-S trade in manufactured exports of developing countries reached almost 47 per cent, approaching that 
of non-fuel primary products (which was over 47 per cent in 2005).
18  If China and the Republic of Korea are excluded from APTA, the share of the group in world exports and imports falls to 2.2 and 1.2, 
respectively (sources same as table 1).
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Table 3: S-S trade and the role of ESSEA, 2005*
(% Share)
 Items Total trade Share of non-fuel 
   items
Share of S-S trade in total trade of the South:
 Exports 44.4 51
 Imports  51 54.8
Share of manufactures in S-S trade:
 Exports 68.9 84.5
 Imports 69 83
Share of ESSEA in S-S trade:
 Exports   75 67.9
 Imports 72.1 69.3
Sources: Based on UNCTAD, 2007c, table 2.2.D.
*Only merchandise goods.
Regarding trade in manufactures, the rapid growth of intra-ESSEA trade, has made it a major market 
for S-S trade. The ESSEA region accounted for the lion’s share of S-S trade (nearly 36 per cent of over 46 per 
cent), and intra-ESSEA trade accounted for over 42 per cent of the market for its total exports of manufactured 
goods in 2005 (table 4).  By contrast, the rest of the developing countries received less than 8 per cent of 
manufactured exports of the ESSEA region. Moreover, the growth of exports of ESSEA to China significantly 
exceeded that of its intraregional trade for the group, let alone South-South trade. This indicates once again 
the importance of China as a large, dynamic market for exports of manufactured goods from the region. In 
other words, China alone has been the most dynamic market for ESSEA exports. Of course, China is involved 
in APTA and has a bilateral trade agreement with ASEAN as well as with various individual countries in the 
region, but so have many other countries (UNDP, 2005). 
 As expected, the shares of intra-ESSEA non-fuel primary exports in total exports of ESSEA in 1995 
and 2005 were considerably smaller than the corresponding figures for manufactured goods (tables 4 and 5). 
Furthermore, non-fuel primary exports experienced a lower growth rate over this period. The share of China 
as a market for exports of primary products of ESSEA was also smaller than its share of manufactured goods. 
While over half of China’s imports of non-fuel primary products originated from developing countries in 2005, 
over 20 per cent of these imports originated from ESSEA, as compared to about 60 per cent for manufactured 
goods. In other words, primary products, which are the main export items of lower-income countries of the 
region, benefited less from dynamism in regional trade than from S-S trade in general. These countries’ trade 
in primary products was sluggish, both with China and with the ESSEA as a whole.  
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Reporters 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005
Value (US$ billion)
ESSEA 303.8 841.4 61.7 256.8 242.1 584.6 357.9 998 772.6 1 991.0
South 316.6 877.6 62.7 264.4 253 613.2 412.2 1 133.9 941.9 2 440.0
World 738.9 1 525.0 114.5 431 624.4 1 094.0 1 105.3 2 308.0 3 772.2 7 349.7
ESSEA 39.3 42.3 8 12.8 31.3 29.3 46.3 50.1 100 100
South 12.9 35.9 2.5 10.8 26.8 25.1 16.8 46.4 100 100
World 10.1 20.7 1.6 5.9 16.5 14.8 15.1 31.4 100 100
Share in total imports of the group (at f.o.b prices) (%)
ESSEA 41.4 55.1 53.9 59.5 38.7 53.4 32.4 43.2 20.5 27.1
South 42.8 57.6 54.7 61.3 40 56.1 37.2 49.1 25 33.1
World 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Average annual growth rates, 1995–2005 (%)
ESSEA 10.7 15.3 9.2 4.2 9.9
South 10.7 15.4 7.2 10.7 10
World 7.5 14.1 5.7 7.6 6.7
Source: Author’s calculations, based on UNCTAD, 2007c, table 2.2.
Note: f.o.b = free on board.







Reporters 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005
Value (US$ billion)
ESSEA 40.1 81.6 8.3 17.4 31.8 64.2  59.3 133.1 133 251.1
South 63.8 123 13.9 42.4 49.9 80.6 95 187.6 225  396.1
World 121.1 223.7  23.3 82.7 97.8 141 198.3 354.7 757.6 1 158.3
Share in total exports of ESSEA and developing countries to the world (%)
ESSEA 30.1 32.4 6.2 6.9 67.6 60.7 44.5 53.3 100 100
South 28.3 31.1 6.1 10.7 67.1 65.7 42.2 47.3 100 100
World 15.9 19.3 3.1 7.2 67.2 63.1 26.2 30.6 100 100
Share in total imports of ESSEA and developing countries (at f.o.b prices) (%)
ESSEA 33.1 36.4 35.6 21 33.5 32.3 29.9 37.5 17.6 100
South 52.6 54.9 9.6 51.2 53.8 54  47.9 52.8 29.7 100
World 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Average annual growth rates, 1995–2005 (%)
ESSEA 7.3  7.6 7.2 8.4 6.5
South 6.7  11.8 4.9 7.0 5.8
World 6.3  13.5 3.7 5.6 4.3
Source:  Same as table 4.
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4.3 The role of regional agreements
In order to differentiate between trade in the ESSEA region and that of the individual trade groups within ES-
SEA, this paper refers to the latter as blocs. Hence intrabloc trade refers to trade among members of the same 
trade group within ESSEA, while intraregional trade refers to trade among countries of the ESSEA region. 
It is not easy to separate the impact of regional trade agreements from other factors on the expansion of 
trade among members of such agreements. Further, members of each trade bloc are also involved in bilateral 
trade agreements, sometimes even with other members of the same bloc (UNDP, 2005)19. Nevertheless, one 
may still examine the trade among members of a regional trade bloc and the intraregional trade of individual 
countries located in the ESSEA region as a whole. To do so, first this section examines the data on intrabloc 
trade of members of the main Asian regional trade blocs and then the trade between those blocs, or interbloc 
trade. This is followed by an examination of the intraregional trade of individual countries located in ESSEA. 
   
Table 6 provides data on the evolution of intrabloc trade of the main Asian trade blocs. As comprehen-
sive data on the direction of trade for the different SITC product groups are not readily available, the table 
covers all SITC groups based on IMF Direction of Trade Database.  It exemplifies that, first of all, in all cases the 
share of intraregional exports in total exports has increased over time. Secondly, ASEAN is the most success-
ful trading bloc in terms of its intrabloc trade, and SAARC (an agreement between low- and middle-income 
countries), is the least successful in the ESSEA region20, perhaps partly because of political differences within 
the region. However, regional politics cannot be the only reason, as trade between India and Bangladesh 
is not particularly buoyant either. ASEAN is also the most successful among all the regional trade blocs of 
developing countries in terms of the intrabloc trade ratio:  The share of intrabloc exports in total exports of 
the group was more than 26 per cent in 2005. The closest group to ASEAN was the Central American Common 
Market with a corresponding share of 18.9 per cent (UNCTAD, 2007c, table 1.4). The low intrabloc trade of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is mainly due to extreme similarities in the export structure of the member 
countries, all of which focuses mainly on oil exporting. The poor performance of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO) is mainly due to political factors. 
Table 6: Intrabloc trade of Asian regional trade groups
Groups Value
(US$ bn)
Share in total exports of the group Share of the group in 
regional exports
(2005) 1980 1990 1995 2005 (2005)
ASEAN (1967)   165.1 17.4 18.9 24.5 26.2 41.7
APTA (1975)  127.3  1.7 1.6 6.8 11.0 22.1
ECO (1992)   14.0 6.3 3.2  7.9 7.6 22.8
SAARC (1985)        7.1 4.8  3.2 4.4    5.5 12.8
GCC (1981)    16.5 3.0   8.0   6.8    4.8 7.3
Source: UNCTAD, 2007c: table1.4.
Note: See Annex 1 for list of member countries of the regional blocs listed in this table.
Thirdly, and most importantly, the share of trade of each bloc with the ESSEA region, outside a formal 
plurilateral trade agreement, is greater than that of the intrabloc trade of each group. In other words, while 
RTAs have led to increased trade among members of each RTA, other factors seem to have been more impor-
19 For example, China is a member of APTA and has trade agreements not only with ASEAN and its member countries, but also bilateral 
agreements with other members of APTA (UNDP, 2005a).
20 For Asia as a whole, GCC is the worst performer.
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tant in expanding regional trade in ESSEA. As discussed later, the degree of demand and supply dynamism of 
countries and production sharing are among other important factors. The rapid increase in the intrabloc trade 
of APTA is due to the involvement of two growth dynamic countries, China and the Republic of Korea: They 
have contributed to production sharing, which is also an important feature in ASEAN.
Table 7 shows the shares of intrabloc and interbloc exports of each of the main trading blocs in ESSEA, 
while table 8 highlights the growth rates of such exports during the period 1990–2005. China’s exports to the 
various blocs are discussed separately because of its important weight in the region’s trade. First of all, the 
share of intrabloc exports of each group has not always been greater than its share of exports with a different 
group or groups. For example, in 2005 the intrabloc exports of SAARC countries accounted for 5.5 per cent 
of their total exports, while ASEAN and APTA received 8.2 per cent and 10.9 per cent, respectively, of the 
total exports of SAARC (table 7).  By contrast, in the case of ASEAN, the share of intrabloc exports in its total 
exports was greater than the shares of its interbloc exports. Yet its interbloc trade is expanding faster than its 
intrabloc trade, and the growth rate of its trade with other blocs and with China far exceeds the growth rate 
of its intrabloc trade (table 8). 
As for APTA, its exceptionally high intrabloc trade is basically due to the involvement of China, which 
accounted for over half of APTA’s intrabloc trade in 2005 (table 7). Nevertheless, China’s performance cannot 
be attributed to its trade agreements through APTA alone, or even to its bilateral agreements with other 
members of APTA. It has also developed exceptional trade relations with some other countries, both as an 
exporter and importer, particularly with ASEAN, as a result of its intra-industry trade and production sharing 
(see below). 
Exports of SAARC to China increased by an average annual rate of nearly 29 per cent during the period 
1990–2005. Over the same period, exports of China to SAARC increased by 18 per cent (table 8). In other 
words, although the growth rates are high in both cases, as expected China’s market for SAARC’s exports was 
more dynamic than the market of SAARC for the exports of its own members. In the event the agreement 
on the Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries (GSTP) becomes operational, it is 
very likely that interbloc and intrabloc trade in ESSEA will expand further, at least among countries that are 
contracting parties to GSTP (Annex 3). 
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 1990 18.9 2.5 7.1 26.6 1.8 37.5
 2005 26.2 3.4 15.3 41.9 8.3 46.2
SAARC-6
 1990 4.4 3.2 4.3 9.3 0.4 23.5
 2005 8.2 5.5 10.9 20.5 5.4 42.5
APTA-6 
 1990 6.7 1.8 1.6 8.9 0.0 38.6
 2005 8.1 2.4 11.0 19.5 5.9 39.7
Total of above groups* 
 1990 12.5 2.2 4.4 17.4 0.9 37.9
 2005 14.3 2.8 12.5 27.3 6.7 42.0
China  
 1990 6.6 1.5 1.4 8.8  59.5
 2005 7.3 2.1 6.2 14.0  41.6
Developing countries excl. China  
 1990 7.5 1.8 6.6 14.5 3.3 26.3
 2005 9.5 2.3 17.2 27.2 12.3 32.1
Source: Based on table A.1.
* Includes all member countries of the above groups counted only once.
Note: Bhutan is not included as a reporter, but is included as a SAARC member.








ASEAN-10 10.4 12.0 14.6 11.6 19.8 9.9
SAARC-6 12.2 13.3 15.7 14.1 28.7 12.9
APTA-6 13.2 14.0 23.6 17.1 36.8 12.3
Total above* 11.2 12.9 18.0 13.5 24.0 11.2
China 17.9 18.4 23.5 19.3  13.6
Developing countries excl. China 9.1 9.9 14.0 11.7 16.0 8.9
Source: Same as table 7. 
* Includes all member countries of the above groups counted only once.   
Note: Bhutan is not included as a reporter, but is included as a SAARC member.
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Finally, China has been relying more on markets in the rest of the world than have developing countries 
as a whole. This is partly related to the involvement of TNCs in assembly operations and to the fact that China 
has been acting as an engine of export growth for the region (Lall and Albaladejo, 2004) through production 
sharing (i.e. importing parts and components from a number of countries in the region and exporting finished 
products to third countries, mainly the United States and Europe, as discussed below).
4.4 Dynamic markets and sources of supply: Country level
Which individual countries, in addition to China, are dynamic sources of supply and markets for regional trade 
in ESSEA? To help determine this, table 9 provides data on regional trade in non-fuel products of individual 
countries of the region. It also includes data on per capita income and MVA/GDP ratios as rough indicators 
of the level of development and industrial capacity of the countries concerned. All the economies, except 
Hong Kong (SAR, China), Mongolia and Taiwan (Province of China), are included in an overall group denoted 
by “A”. Hence, in the following paragraph, the regional trade of a country means its trade with “A”. The three 
economies that are not part of “A” are included separately, as they do not participate in many trade agree-
ments. Furthermore, the trade of Hong Kong (SAR, China) includes considerable re-export, the inclusion of 
which would distort the picture. Accordingly, the most important point emerging from the table is that the 
countries with industrial supply capabilities (indicated by MVA/GDP ratios) are among the most dynamic in 
regional trade. This implies that industrial capacity is a significant factor in the expansion of regional trade. 
The table indicates different categories. One category comprises the large and relatively high GDP growth 
dynamic countries of China and India, which are also dynamic in their regional trade. Their rate of growth of 
exports and particularly imports well exceeds that of the average for A, and they demonstrate trade deficits 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The second group consists of the more industrialized economies of the region, such as the Republic 
of Korea, Taiwan (Province of China), Singapore, and, to some extent, Malaysia and Thailand. Their share of 
regional trade in total trade (both exports and imports) is increasingly high. Nevertheless, all of them, particu-
larly the most industrialized (i.e. the Republic of Korea and Taiwan (Province of China) are regional exporters 
(sources of supply and market seekers) more than importers (markets), and they run a considerable trade 
surplus with “A”. They seek markets in other countries, and are also involved in production sharing and FDI, 
mainly with NIEs.
The third group consists mainly of low-income countries. These are more of a regional market for other 
countries than sources of supply because of their limited productive capacity.  They include (in reverse order 
of their share of exports to group A) Bangladesh, Cambodia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Myanmar. For 
these countries, particularly the first four, the share of their imports from group A in their total imports is 
considerably higher than their corresponding share of exports, and they run a significant trade deficit with 
“A”. Even a GDP growth dynamic low-income country such as Viet Nam (a member of ASEAN), which also 
displays dynamic regional trade relations, is more of a growing market than a source of supply for the region. 
Moreover, in most low-income countries of the region, the rates of growth of exports to group A are also lower 
than the rates of growth of their total exports. 
In some countries (Bangladesh and Pakistan - members of SAARC, and Cambodia - a member of ASEAN) 
there is no sign of an increase in their regional exports. In fact, for Bangladesh and Cambodia the growth rate 
of exports to group A has been negative. By contrast, Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka, relatively speaking, are 
more dynamic regional exporters. Nevertheless, in these exceptional cases, their source of trade dynamism 
is probably their special bilateral trade relations with, and, to some extent, their close proximity to, a large 
and relatively dynamic neighbouring country (e.g. Nepal and Sri Lanka with India, and Myanmar with China) 
(UNDP, 2005a), rather than their membership of a plurilateral trade agreement. For example, India received 
over 60 per cent of Nepal’s exports in 2004/05 as against about 10 per cent in 1991/92 (Koirala, 2007: table 6.1). 
In the particular case of India, the country’s outward FDI to its low-income trading partners has been a very 
important factor in the expansion of trade with them. In other words, India has contributed to the expansion 
of the supply capacity of its partners. Otherwise, generally speaking, with the exception of Nepal, the lower 
the per capita income, the lower is their average growth rate of exports to group A. 
In short, despite the fact that, in general, tariffs and non-tariff barriers are lower in the first- and second-
tier NIEs than in the low-income countries of the region, regional agreements have been associated with the 
expansion of exports of the former to the latter group, rather than the other way round. Various factors may be 
responsible for such discrepancies in the performance of the two groups of countries. Nevertheless, the lack 
of supply capabilities in manufactured goods, as indicated by the low MVA/GDP ratios in table 9, is definitely 
an important factor. Indeed, in all lower-income countries, the growth rates of GDP and MVA have also been 
lower than the average for group A. 
As market and supply dynamism is a very important factor in the expansion of regional trade, for the 
ease of reference, this paper summarizes the characteristics of the most dynamic regional market countries 
and the sluggish suppliers of regional exports (tables 10a and 10b). Market dynamic countries are those whose 
average annual growth rates of imports from group A exceeded 10 per cent during the period 1995-2005. 
Sluggish exporters are those with the corresponding average annual growth rates of exports of less than 10 
per cent. The countries are ranked according to the degree of regional market dynamism (table 10a).  China 
and India stand out in terms of the size of their trade and the degree of their market and supply dynamism, at 
both regional and world levels. In fact, China ranks first in all respects, far ahead of India not only in terms of its 
market dynamism but also because of the magnitude of its imports that is over five times greater than that of 
India. India exemplifies both a lower per capita income and a lower MVA/GDP ratio. Viet Nam is also a dynamic 
market, but is relatively smaller in size. ASEAN countries show strong export supply dynamism (exports to the 
world), but, with the exception of Thailand, they do not demonstrate strong regional market dynamism (table 
9). Nevertheless, considering the size of the group, the next section briefly examines the composition of their 
imports along with those of China, India and the Republic of Korea.
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Table 10a: Main characteristics of dynamic regional markets in ESSEA
Dynamic regional markets
Size of regional 
imports
Average annual growth rates, 1995-2005
Total M            Region X World X
China VL D D D
India VL D D D
Viet Nam M D D D
Cambodia VS D N D
Taiwan (Province of China) VL S D S
Rep. of Korea VL F D F
Hong Kong (SAR, China) VL S F S
Thailand M S F F
Average annual growth rates of 
Group B in table 9 (%)
6.9 10.2 8.7
Source: Based on table 9.
Notes to tables 10a and 10b:
Dynamic regional markets are those with an average annual growth rate of imports from the region of more than 10 per cent.
VL (very large) = greater than US$100 billion
L (large) = US$50–US$100 billion
M (medium) = US$10 –US$50 billion
S (small) = US$5 –US$10 billion
VS (very small) = less than US$5 billion
EXS (extra small) = less than US$ 0.5 billion
Average annual growth rates (%):
 D (dynamic) = greater than 10%
 F (fast) = 5–10%
 S (slow) =1–5%
 N = negative growth
X= exports
M= imports





Average annual growth rates 1995–2005
Region X World X Region M
Cambodia EXS N D D
Bangladesh EXS N F F
Pakistan VS S F F
Lao PDR EXS S S N
Malaysia M F F F
Myanmar VS F F S
Hong Kong (SAR, China) VL F S D
Singapore L F S F
Average growth rates of Group B in 
table 9
10.2 8.7 11.1
Source: Same as table 10a.
Notes: See above.
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In table 10b, countries are ranked according to ascending rate of growth of their regional exports. 
Except for Cambodia and Bangladesh, the growth rates of regional imports exceed those of their total im-
ports. However, the situation of the lower-income countries differs from the others, because they are basically 
markets for others without enjoying the dynamism of the regional market for their exports. The growth rates 
of their regional exports are lower than those of their total exports. By contrast, other countries enjoy greater 
market dynamism for their export products than the lower-income countries. 
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This section discusses that intra-industry trade through production sharing, particularly in electrical and elec-
tronic products, is the main source of dynamism in the expansion of regional trade in ESSEA. However, such 
trade has a number of drawbacks. Regional trade in these products is concentrated in the first-tier NIEs and, 
to some extent, in the second-tier NIEs, and China is the most dynamic market in this respect; India and other 
lower-income countries have not been integrated. India, unlike China, has focused on the software industry 
rather than hardware production and exports in the information technology (IT) sector. Further, the countries 
of the region have become vulnerable to the risks of interdependence and exposure to external shocks and 
international business cycles. Moreover, the second-tier NIEs need to upgrade their technological capabilities. 
Neither the integration of lower-income countries nor the technological upgrading of the second-tier NIEs 
is feasible through the operation of market forces alone. There is a need for policy initiatives by the govern-
ments of the region in order to enhance regional cooperation for these purposes. 
Production sharing is a form of industrial collaboration and intra-industry trade whereby the process 
of production is fragmented into various parts and components that are produced in different countries, 
crossing borders to another country for assembly. Such a vertical production chain is facilitated by trade and 
investment liberalization and a reduction of transaction costs due to reduced costs of transportation and 
communication (Arndt, 2002). 
According to a World Bank study for the 1985–2001 period (Ng and Yeats, 2003), the sharp increase 
in intraregional trade in the East Asia region has been largely due to the expansion of intra-industry trade, 
which is characteristic of industrialized countries. Their intra-industry trade has expanded particularly in skill-, 
capital- and/or technology-intensive goods such as electronic products and other machinery and transport 
equipment (SITC 7)21. The first-tier NIEs (Hong Kong (SAR, China), the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan 
(Province of China)) undertook more intraregional trade than other countries, followed by the second-tier 
NIEs (e.g. Malaysia and Thailand). Even within ASEAN, the lower the level of development, the lower is the 
intraregional trade of the country (Ng and Yeats, 2003: table 8.1). In other words, as countries industrialize the 
prospects for regional trade increase.
The Ng and Yeats study (2003) also make note that the growth of demand from the East Asian region, 
also improved competitiveness and contributed to diversification of the export structure of the exporting 
countries by providing them with a larger market, thus scale economies, and this enabled them to enter 
into new lines of production. Growth, competitiveness and diversification contributed to the growing market 
share of East Asia in international trade in general (Ng and Yeats, 2003: 27 and table 10.2). However, these 
factors have been less present in the intraregional trade and competitiveness of the lower-income countries 
of ESSEA, regardless of whether or not they were members of a regional trade group such as ASEAN (ibid: table 
5. Intra-industry trade, production sharing and regional trade
21 Machinery and equipment accounted for 19 of the 30 largest four-digit SITC products in intraregional exports, and another 8 items were in 
the category of light manufactured goods (Ng and Yeats, 2003: table12.1).
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9.1). Capital-and technology-intensive goods (SITC 7 items) constituted the bulk of items (16 out of 23 items) 
in which East Asia increased its market share in intraregional trade. In 2001, production sharing through trade 
in P&C accounted for over 26 per cent of the intraregional trade in manufactured goods, excluding chemicals. 
Further, P&C of SITC 7 accounted for half of the growth of East Asian trade during the period 1990-2001, and 
electronic products constituted the bulk of such trade (Kozo, Sazanami and Yu Ching, 2006: 4-5). Apart from 
Japan, China, Taiwan (Province of China), Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Hong Kong 
(SAR, China) the Philippines and Indonesia, were (in that order of importance) among the main exporters 
of P&C. Nevertheless, only China, Indonesia the Republic of Korea and Taiwan (Province of China) showed a 
positive trade balance in P&C (ibid: table 18.1). Others were net importers engaged in assembly operations. 
 
5.1 Composition of imports of main dynamic markets and ASEAN
This section examines the evolution of imports of non-fuel products in general, and the main imports of the 
most dynamic and largest markets of the region (i.e. China and India, and the Republic of Korea in ASEAN) and 
from the lower-income countries of the region. The lower-income countries include members of SAARC (ex-
cluding India), together with Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar. As well, two small 
countries are included in this category: Maldives and Brunei Darussalam; although they are not low-income 
countries, they have low industrial capacity. Further, the section examines the main items of intra-ASEAN 
trade as well as main imports of China and ASEAN from India. The import items selected are those which 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22 For the product categories, see the notes to the table.
Table 11 provides the relevant data on imports from ASEAN and highlights, inter alia, the importance 
of manufactured goods and SITC 7 items in total imports of the country/group concerned. It also shows the 
share of the main items (i.e. electrical and electronic products) in imports of manufactured goods of the 
country/bloc concerned, and the share of each partner country in imports of the reporting country/bloc. The 
main import items and countries of origin are ranked in order of their importance in imports of SITC 7 items 
(machinery and equipment). Except for ASEAN itself, SITC 7 items as a whole are the most dynamic products 
among the manufactured imports of various member countries. Further, they also account for the bulk of 
their imports of manufactured goods, particularly for China and ASEAN. More importantly, a limited number 
of electrical and electronic products - both finished and P&C (11 items) - feature in intra-industry trade. In fact, 
three items (SITCs 776, 752 and 759)22 figure among the main imports of all countries and the bloc included 
in the table; and five items (754, 772, 778, 741 and 716) are among the main import items of three countries 
and the ASEAN bloc. Finally, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines are the major sources of supply of these 
imports.
Such a heavy dependence on a limited number of products and on China, is cause for concern. As men-
tioned earlier, China heavily depends on third markets (especially Europe and the United States) for exports 
of its finished products (see below). Therefore, it is vulnerable to business cycles in these countries as well as 
to other external shocks. To explain further, only seven electrical and electronic products accounted for 58.3 
per cent of imports of manufactured goods of China from ASEAN in 2005, amounting to nearly US$60 billion 
dollars. Moreover, two items (SITC 776 and 752 – thermionic & photo-cathode valves, and automatic data 
processing machines, respectively) accounted for over 38 per cent and 12 per cent, respectively, of total non-
fuel imports of China from ASEAN in 2005 (table A.2). These two items together amounted to nearly US$34 
billion, and their imports grew at an average annual rate of about 63 per cent during the period 1995-2005. 
Malaysia is the most vulnerable country in this respect as it accounts for nearly 56 per cent of China’s imports 
of these two products (based on table A.2).
Table 12 provides data on imports of dynamic countries and ASEAN from the lower-income/smaller 
countries of ESSEA. It also includes data on imports of China and ASEAN from India, and imports of non-fuel 
primary products. Further, as few SITC 7 items are exported by lower-income countries, the table includes data 
on the share of main manufactured goods in total imports of various groups/countries, instead of their share 
of SITC 7 items.  As expected, the value of imports of non-fuel products from lower-income countries is not 
significant, and few manufactured products are imported from these countries. While their share of manufac-
tured goods in the imports of the Republic of Korea was the largest, their growth rate was negative during the 
period 1995–2005. ASEAN’s growth of imports of these products was also negligible. In other words, again, 
lower-income countries have not benefited from dynamism in the regional trade in manufactured goods in 
general, let alone in the market for IT products. 
Secondly, Pakistan, as the most industrialized country among the lower-income countries (see table 
9), is a source of imports by China, the Republic of Korea and ASEAN, followed by Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. 
As the other lower-income countries have limited industrial capacity, they benefit little from the dynamic 
markets of the region. Even in the case of Bangladesh and Pakistan, imports have not been expanding rapidly, 
as mentioned in the previous section.
Thirdly, the list of manufactured products imported from the lower-income/small countries covers very 
low-technology-intensive, light manufactured goods. For example, textile yarn and cotton fabrics account for 
over 45 per cent of China’s imports of non-fuel products from lower-income countries. The picture for ASEAN 
and the Republic of Korea is not much different (tables A.6 and A.8). Even with regard to Pakistan, textile yarn 
constitutes nearly 70 per cent of China’s imports from that country.
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Fourthly, the performance of India stands out, as it is exceptional in certain respects. India is the largest 
and most dynamic importer of non-fuel products, including manufactured goods, from the lower-income 
countries. Indeed, not only are its imports larger than the imports of the whole of ASEAN from these countries, 
but also its structure of imports of manufactured goods is more diverse. Its imports include chemicals, textiles, 
processed ores and metals, paper and cement. Twenty-four items account for 24.2 per cent of its non-fuel 
imports and for over 75 per cent of its imports of manufactured good from the lower-income/small countries. 
Two neighbouring countries, Nepal and particularly Sri Lanka, enjoy important trade relations with India. They 
are the source of nearly 31 per cent and over 20 per cent, respectively, of imports of India from the lower-
income/small countries (see table A.9) Proximity, cultural and political ties are important for such exceptional 
relations. However, they are not the only reason. Apart from wide product coverage of their bilateral trade 
agreements, India’s outward FDI to these countries is an important factor in the expansion of trade of its trade 
with these countries, as mentioned before. By contrast, Bangladesh and Bhutan, among others, have neither 
similar bilateral trade agreements nor do they receive as much FDI from India. The S-S cooperation experience 
of Sri Lanka and Nepal would indicate not only the importance but also the feasibility of industrial collabora-
tion among lower -income countries (discussed further in section 6 below). 
Fifthly, regional imports of two commodity items – ores and metals – from lower-income/small coun-
tries have been expanding relatively fast in all cases, particularly in China’s imports. Such an expansion has 
been due mainly to the growth in import volume, as prices of minerals and metals increased by an average 
annual rate of only about 3 per cent during the period 1995-2005 (based on UNCTAD, 2007c: table 6.1). There-
fore, one area to be considered for industrial collaboration is in the processing of raw materials for increasing 
domestic value added (discussed further in section 6 below).  
Finally, the import structure of China and ASEAN from India is close to the pattern of imports of other 
countries/groups from lower-income/small countries, with a couple of differences. One difference is that the 
manufactured goods imported from India are slightly more sophisticated technologically. Another is that 
chemical products figure among the main import items from India: Five main chemical items accounted for 
about 7 per cent of the non-fuel imports and 15 per cent of the imports of manufactured goods from India 
in 2005. By contrast, for reasons explained earlier, India does not seem to have entered into the network 
of production sharing in electrical and electronics goods, which have been important for the expansion of 
intraregional trade in East Asia, as discussed later in this study.  
5.2 The role of China in regional production sharing
China is regarded in the literature, as the leading country in terms of deepening of vertical intra-industry 
trade specialization (i.e. production sharing), and as the engine of export growth of the East Asian region (e.g. 
Kozo, Sazanami and Yu Ching, 2006; Lall and Albaladejo, 2004; Haltmaier et al., 2007). Trade in P&C, particu-
larly electrical and electronic P&C, has been one of the most dynamic elements of China’s trade in general23, 
including its regional trade with ESSEA. Exports and imports of P&C, necessary for the production of items 
covered by SITC 7, increased at average annual rates of 29.6 per cent and 18.5 per cent, respectively, over 
the period 1992/93–2004/05 (table 13). Such rates far exceeded the corresponding growth rate for exports 
of manufactured goods as a whole, which was about 20 per cent. The share of P&C in exports and imports of 
manufactured products was more than13.2 per cent and 20.5 per cent, respectively, in 2004/05. Trade in the 
10 main items of P&C (mostly electrical and electronic goods) expanded even faster than those of total P&C. 
China has become a net exporter of these main products.
23  For example, according to one estimate, in 2005, trade in P&C accounted for about 30 per cent of China’s total exports and 41 per cent of its 
exports of machinery and equipment (Haltmaier et al., 2007: table 2; see also Shafaeddin, 2004).
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Table 13: China’s trade in parts and components of SITC 7, 1992–2005
Exports  Imports Growth rate (%)* 
1992/93 2004/05 1992/93 2004/05 X M
Total :
 Value (US$ million) 3 458   77 950 10 243 79 317 29.6  18.5
Share in total manufactures (%)  5.3   13.2 15.6 20.5
Ten main items:
Value (US$ million) 2 757 68 71 6 746 66 746 30.7 21.1
Share in parts and components (%) 79.7 88.1 65.8 84.1
Source: Author’s calculations based on UNCOMTRADE database.
* Average annual growth rate for the period 1992/93–2004/05.
X = exports; M= imports.
Data for the regional trade of China in P&C and their corresponding finished products are exhibited 
in table 14. In the table, the developing economies/regions are ranked according to the value of imports of 
P&C in 2006. The data also illustrates the total trade of China with ESSEA, excluding Hong Kong (SAR, China), 
because of its special situation as a major re-exporter. Even when Hong Kong (SAR, China) is excluded, China 
is not only a large market, but also a net importer of P&C and finished products from the region. Yet it is a net 
exporter to the rest of the world. Therefore, it acts as an export hub for the region. 
Secondly, such a large market does not benefit all countries to the same extent. Three groups of econo-
mies can be distinguished in order of their importance as providers of the selected products. The first group 
is the Republic of Korea and Taiwan (Province of China) (NIEs). China’s trade balance with these economies is 
significantly negative for both P&C as well as finished products. This is because they are major regional suppli-
ers to China of sophisticated P&C that it does not produce domestically and requires for assembly of finished 
products, mostly for export. They also export some sophisticated finished consumer goods and capital equip-
ment to China for its own domestic consumption. 
The second group consists of four ASEAN members: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand 
(ASEAN-4). China is a net exporter of P&C to these countries, except to Singapore, and a net importer of 
finished products, mainly from Singapore. In 2005, imports of six electronic products (SITCs 776,752, 764, 
771, 716 and 751 in this order of importance) accounted for 77 per cent of China’s imports from the “rest of 
ASEAN” of which SITC 776 accounted for over 60 per cent. The trade relations of China with the rest of ASEAN 
are dominated by trade in electronics with the Philippines, rather than with lower-income members of that 
regional group (table A.6). China also imports a small amount of electronic goods (worth about US$39 million) 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Philippines has become an increasingly important exporter of electronic products since the late 
1980s through the involvement of Japanese and United States firms. Three characteristics of the country have 
attracted FDI: its proximity to other East Asian countries involved in the vertical production system, its ease 
of regional transport due to its vast coastal areas, and its low-wage and skilled human-power. Japan and the 
United States have been its main markets, but its exports of high-tech products to China have also increased 
significantly, from 1.3 per cent of its total exports in 2000 to 13 per cent in 2005 (Haltmaier et al., 2005: 32-36). 
Whether such a rapid expansion is due to the involvement of China’s FDI or not requires further investiga-
tion. 
The third group consists of lower-income country members of SAARC and India, from which China 
imports only a small amount. 
Finally, even when Hong Kong (SAR, China) is excluded, over 60 per cent of China’s exports go to 
developed countries: Japan (7 per cent) and mainly the United States and other countries (57 per cent)24. In 
other words, China could be vulnerable to changes in the market situation in developed countries for exports 
of its finished products, and risks transmitting these changes to other countries of the ESSEA region through 
its demand for P&C and finished goods, which amount to nearly US$30 billion and US$100 billion, respec-
tively. The study turns to this issue after explaining the role of the market and government in the expansion 
of production sharing below.
5.3 Misconception about the role of market forces
Has production sharing developed through the operation of market forces? Can market forces alone provide 
the necessary impetus for the expansion of regional trade of lower-income countries through expansion of 
intra-industry trade, or are proactive policies required?  There is a common misconception about the role of 
the market in the expansion of regional trade and production sharing in East Asia. It is maintained that the 
expansion of regional trade in East Asia has been market-driven (e.g. Kawai and Wignaraja, 2007: 3-4). Two 
points should be emphasized in this regard. First, while currently some arm’s length intra-industry trade does 
take place among the countries of the region, the bulk of it is intra-firm trade that does not go through the 
market (Isoga, Morishita and Ruffer, 2002: 52). Second, such trade was mostly policy-driven; that is, it was 
initially a result of changes in FDI policies of the East Asian governments and the Government of Japan. The 
combination of these two resulted in the development of fragmented vertical production and distribution 
chains and production sharing mainly among the first- and second-tier NIEs and Japanese companies (Ando 
and Kimura: 2003). The Japanese firms initially played an important role in integrating the East Asian region. 
While US-owned firms based in the region produced mostly for export to the United States, Japanese firms 
produced mainly for export to other countries, including within region (Isoga, Morishita and Ruffer, 2002). 
Furthermore, since the mid-1980s most governments of the region have been pursuing a new 
development strategy for efficient and beneficial use of FDI in the process of their economic development 
and industrialization. Both import-substituting and export-oriented industries were subject to new policies. 
Moreover, while market forces played a role (Isoga, Morishita and Ruffer, 2002: 3–9), this should not imply that 
the process was entirely market-driven. Apart from providing suitable locations for FDI, the governments of 
the region adopted policy packages that included introducing a duty drawback system for imported inputs 
and development of local firms and their clustering to prepare them for entry into the vertical production 
chain. They also took measures for the development of infrastructure, utilities and back-up services that were 
necessary for production and trade (Isoga, Morishita and Ruffer, 2002: 5–6). Throughout the period, capacity-
building of the local firms was emphasized (Lall and Albaladejo, 2004). 
24  It is not easy to judge with certainty the impact on the direction of trade of re-exports of goods imported from China by Hong Kong (SAR, 
China), as there is a large discrepancy between the data on exports of the relevant items from China to Hong Kong (SAR, China) and the 
corresponding data on imports of Hong Kong (SAR, China) from China. Such discrepancy cannot be explained by differences in prices of 
cost, insurance and freight (c.i.f.) and free on board (f.o.b.) of the related products. On the basis of published data, however, the picture of the 
“effective” direction of exports of China does not seem to change much.
37
Subsequently, China adopted fairly similar policies to other countries. However, the differences are 
that the initial, significant contributions of inward FDI came from ethnic Chinese investors of foreign origin 
or investors from Chinese territories (mainly Hong Kong, (SAR, China) and Taiwan (Province of China)) and 
Singapore (Huang, 2002). Even after the country’s accession to WTO, resource allocation has largely been 
governed by government policies (Haltmaier et al., 2007: 24). 
To explain further, the fragmented vertical production chain25 required, inter alia, specialization to ben-
efit from the economies of scale and firm-specific assets of the local or affiliated firms in different countries. 
Initially, the Japanese Government and firms played an important role in the development of the chain and 
the network. The appreciation of the Japanese yen after the Plaza Accord in 1985 was influential in changing 
the Japanese Government’s policy towards outward FDI26. This change of policy, by coincidence, took place 
more or less around the same time as East Asian governments changed their policies towards inward FDI. 
Japanese firms created affiliates in East Asia in order to relocate their labour-intensive industries in the region 
and benefit from availability of low-wage, semi-skilled labour, with the added advantage of geographical 
proximity. According to Gaulier, Lemoine and Unal-Kesenci (2005: 13-15), “In 2000, 3,773 out of 27,655 firms 
located in Japan… have [a total of ] 18,943 foreign affiliates. Among them 2,994 firms have 10,224 affiliates 
in East Asia.” Seventy five per cent of these affiliates were in the manufacturing sector, but there were also 
non-manufacturing affiliates (ibid: 13-15).  The important point, however, is that, influenced partly by policies 
of the host governments, particularly on local content requirements and joint ventures (Amsden, 1989), the 
Japanese affiliates in East Asia purchased the bulk of their inputs – both goods and services – from the local 
markets and local firms (over 41 per cent) and from other East Asian countries (about 21 per cent) (ibid: 16). 
This process contributed to intraregional trade, an increase in local value added and the development of the 
capabilities of local firms. Similarly, although their production was export oriented, the regional market also 
absorbed a significant proportion of goods. 
The development of the regional pattern of industrialization in East Asia resembled the flying geese 
model initially seen in Japan’s domestic development (Akamatsu, 1961; Kasahara, 2004). However, the geese 
did not fly automatically, either in Japan or at the regional level. Government investment in areas such as 
education, training, technological infrastructure and R&D played an important role in the development of 
domestic capabilities in Japan and in other East Asian NIEs as well as China (Malhotra, 2006: 4-8; Fan and 
Watanabe, 2006; Lall, 2004: 14–24). The trickle-down effects of the process have since reached the second-tier 
NIEs (Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, and, to some extent, the Philippines), but so far not enough to up-
grade their industrial structure significantly. In other words, the trickle-down effects have not had a sufficient 
impact on their technological capabilities. Second, the lower-income countries of the region were not part 
of this flying geese process before the recent wave of trade and investment liberalization and changes in 
international rules. Since the early 1980s, these changes have considerably limited the policy space available 
to these countries to follow the kind of government interventions that had enabled industrial upgrading in 
Japan and the NIEs. Hence, it is not clear whether, under the new global economic conditions governed by 
market forces and liberalization, the lower-income countries of the region would be able to follow the same 
path of industrialization as the first-tier or even second-tier NIEs. 
In the particular case of China, as already mentioned, until very recently its inward FDI came mainly 
from ethnic Chinese groups, and part of it was in the form of round-tripping (Huang, 2002). On the basis of 
data provided by China, Hong Kong (SAR, China) and Taiwan (Province of China) alone accounted for nearly 
70 per cent of China’s cumulative FDI in the period 1990–2002 (Gaulier, Lemoine and Unal-Kesenci, 2005: table 
1)27. The Republic of Korea accounted for another 4.2 per cent. More recently, investments by Japan and the 
25 This implies vertical specialization through splitting up of the value added chain.
26 The Plaza Accord was an agreement concluded between France, the then Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and 
the United States at the Plaza Hotel in New York on September 22, 1985. They agreed, inter alia, to a devaluation of the United States dollar in 
relation to the Japanese yen and German deutsche mark by intervening in the currency market.
27 If data of the reporting partners, Hong Kong (SAR, China) and Taiwan (Province of China), are used, these two territories accounted for more 
than 80 per cent of China’s cumulative FDI during the period 1990–2002 (op. cit: table 1).
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Republic of Korea in China have increased significantly and a sort of “triangular trade pattern” has developed. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that in 2002, 60 per cent of Chinese imports from Hong Kong (SAR, China), 
Taiwan (Province of China), the Republic of Korea and Singapore, and 40 per cent of its imports from Japan 
were used as inputs in highly import-intensive processing trade (Gaulier, Lemoine and Unal-Kesenci, 2005: 17 
and table 2). The share of processed exports in total exports of China was over 58 per cent in 2005 (Shafaeddin 
and Pizarro, 2007: table 3). Nevertheless, Chinese firms still play an important role in exports of manufactured 
goods. For example, in 2002 about a quarter of firms involved were Chinese and anther 29 per cent were in 
the form of joint ventures (Gaulier, Lemoine and Unal-Kesenci, 2005: table 8). Further, the Chinese Govern-
ment pursued a policy of expanding supply dynamic and demand dynamic products, such as IT products, in 
addition to its export of labour-intensive items. Supply dynamic products are those with high productivity 
and important externalities, while demand dynamic products are those that enjoy high income elasticity of 
demand in international trade (Shafaeddin and Pizarro, 2007: sections IV.a and IV.b; Rodrik, 2006). 
The strategy followed by China and other East Asian economies has contrasted with, for example, 
Mexico and most other Latin American countries that have relied on market forces and regional trade ar-
rangements alone. Mexico, for instance, imports P&C from the United States and exports the assembled 
goods mainly back to the United States. However, it is not part of a production sharing network and does not 
follow similar policies to those of East Asian governments (Gallagher et al., 2008). 
5.4 Vulnerability and risks of interdependence
The third problem related to the emerging vertical production system in East Asia is the increased interdepen-
dence of the countries of the region and thus their vulnerability to the risks of transmission of the boom and 
bust cycles, particularly from a large trading partner such as China, to other countries. As mentioned earlier, 
China depends on the markets of developed countries in Europe and the United States for exports of its finished 
IT products and for over half of its exports. Thus, it is subject to the risks of business cycles in these countries. 
Moreover, the experience of the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 proved that an economic crisis in one country 
can easily spread to other countries, leading to a slowdown of economic growth. The financial problem, which 
started in Thailand, led to the Asian currency crisis that affected most of the East Asian countries. A shortage of 
foreign exchange and large-scale and abrupt outward movements of capital and currency had an adverse im-
pact on the real sectors of the region’s economies. The high degree of interdependence of countries in the ESSEA 
region, except for most countries of the Indian subcontinent (table A.17) is cause for concern, as the frequency 
and intensity of boom and bust cycles in the world economy has increased over the past three decades (Akyüz, 
forthcoming)28.
The interdependence of the ESSEA region could entail a number of risks. One source of risk is the develop-
ment of shocks in the economy, or bottlenecks in production in one country and their transmission to another 
through the production sharing network, leading to a slowdown of growth (Isoga, Morishita and Ruffer, 2002; 
Kamada and Takagawa, 2005; Kozo, Sazanami and Yu Ching, 2006). Trade and industrial policies pursued in one 
country affect prospects for trade and development in other countries of the region. In addition, exchange rate, 
financial and macroeconomic policies, inter alia, of one country may have important effects on the economies 
28 Some argue that a certain decoupling of the emerging markets is taking place led by China and the United States (see, for example, “The 
Decoupling Debate”, The Economist, 6 March 2008). It is true that S-S trade expansion has reduced the share of the United States and other 
industrialized countries as markets for developing-country exports. However, it is too soon to speak of decoupling. For example, in the case 
of China, the share of industrialized countries in China’s exports declined, from 56.3 per cent in 2000 to 51.6 per cent in 2006, although 
the share of the United States, which is facing an economic slowdown, in fact increased slightly, from 20.9 per cent to 21 per cent (based 
on IMF, 2007: 924). Further, the export/GDP ratio of China increased from 25.9 to 33 per cent during the period 2000–2005, and is likely to 
have increased further since then. According to The Economist (ibid.), China’s exports to the United States account for 8 per cent of China’s 
GDP. Therefore, every 10 per cent decline in its exports to the United States alone will lead directly to a reduction of its GDP by 0.8 per cent. 
Also, the contagion effects of the United States recession on the world economy will essentially have further indirect effects. Exports to 
industrialized countries alone account for nearly 20 per cent of China’s GDP, and the worldwide recession potentially would have an impact 
on China’s exports to other regions. After all, the intraregional trade of the EU accounts for over 60 per cent of its exports. Yet the last time 
around (during the global recession of the early 2000s), it was not immune to the United States’ recession. Moreover, if the financial crisis 
caused by the sub-prime problem persists and spreads to other industrialized countries and developing regions, it would further affect trade 
through its impact on global economic activities.
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of other countries of the ESSEA region. In fact, there has been an increase in the correlation of business cycles 
between economies across the East Asian region since the mid-1980s (Zebregs, 2004: 14). 
Secondly, an important factor affecting the stability of their economic activities is change in the currency 
and exchange rate system. Currently, most countries of the region have floating exchange rates pegged to the 
United States dollar. China still pursues a fixed exchange rate pegged to the dollar with a band.  One issue is the 
impact on exports of agricultural products and raw materials of low-income countries if China were to switch 
from a fixed exchange rate system to a floating rate. These countries are more vulnerable to changes in prices 
of primary commodities due to their low level of development and dependence on exports of these products. 
Another issue is the effect of shifting from a currency system pegged to the dollar to a system pegged to a basket 
of currencies. There are suggestions that a currency basket pegged to the currencies of East Asian economies 
or adoption of a single regional currency may have a stabilizing effect on the economies of the countries in 
the region. However, the result of one study (Kamada and Takagawa, 2005) demonstrates that the impact of 
pegging to a basket of currencies would be ambiguous, depending on the type of economic instability or shock. 
The ambiguity also applies to the impact of a switch to a floating exchange rate of the Chinese currency. 
Yet another risk is the possibility of protectionism by the United States due to its growing trade imbalance 
with China. It could have negative effects on exports and production in China with adverse knock-on effects on 
the exports of other countries in the region (Kozo, Sazanami and Yu Ching, 2006:12). 
In the literature, reference is also made to another source of risk facing the exporters of P&C to China: The 
substitution of imported intermediate products by domestic production as the country increases value added 
in its exports (see, for example, Lall, 2004; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2006). In fact, China, unlike Mexico, has been 
rapidly increasing the value added in its assembly operations (Shafaeddin and Pizarro, 2007). Yet perhaps this risk 
is overstated. While upgrading its existing industrial structure, China also creates demand for new equipment as 
well as intermediate products. Further, the experience of the industrialized countries notably demonstrates that 
as countries industrialize, intra-industry trade in differentiated products also increases. 
How about lower-income countries? As China upgrades its industrial structure, will it leave some low-
technology products to create space for activities of lower-income countries through a type of flying geese 
process? In fact, China has been improving its “revealed comparative advantage”, not only in exports but also in 
the production of technology-intensive products in relation to labour-intensive goods. Nevertheless, it remains 
a massive producer of labour-intensive products (Shafaeddin and Pizarro, 2007) and may take a long time before 
shifting to production of higher technological products sufficiently to leave their production to the lower-in-
come countries. Additional research is needed to study the impact of the dynamics of economic changes in 
China on export opportunities for lower-income countries29. 
In any case, international trade and investment rules have changed. Therefore, as mentioned before, 
lower-income countries of the region may no longer be able to benefit from the flying geese pattern, as did the 
Republic of Korea, Taiwan (Province of China) and the second-tier NIEs. 
In short, regional trade has expanded rapidly in ESSEA mainly through intra-industry trade in the form 
of production sharing in electrical and electronic products. Such expansion has led to three evolving issues 
which require close attention by the countries concerned: the lack of integration of lower-income countries; the 
need for technological upgrading of the second-tier NIEs; and the necessity for insurance against risks of vulner-
ability of the countries involved in production sharing due to their dependence on external markets for finished 
products and on their own interdependence on trade in P&C. These issues need to be dealt with by proactive 
policies, including expanding the scope of regional cooperation beyond trade agreements, as explained in the 
next section.
29 Some observers also refer to the fragility of regionalism in East Asia because of the lack of disciplines in bilateral trade relations and the 
absence of a mechanism for dispute settlement. As mentioned before, they, therefore, recommend binding unilateral tariff cuts in the WTO 
(Baldwin, 2006). Experience shows that this risk is also overstated, and that binding tariff cuts in WTO would result in the loss of policy space 
vis-à-vis third parties.
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Strengthening regional cooperation should cover, inter alia, four main areas: industrial collaboration among 
lower-income countries for developing their productive supply capabilities; provision of necessary assistance 
to these countries by more advanced member countries of the region; cooperation among second-tier NIEs, 
China and India on R&D for upgrading their technological capacities; and enhancing financial cooperation in 
the region in order to reduce their vulnerability, possibly by establishing a regional South Bank. Furthermore, 
although not within the scope of this paper, the region should seriously consider extending cooperation in 
trade in services. To elaborate on these points, the characteristics of the countries of the region need to be 
taken into account.  
6.1 Industrial and technological collaboration
Three main categories of economies can be distinguished in the ESSEA region, based on their different levels 
of development and technological capabilities. The first group comprises the first-tier NIEs: the Republic of 
Korea, Taiwan (Province of China), and to some extent Singapore. The first two economies are at the frontiers 
of technology, especially in electrical and electronic industries. The second group consists of the second-tier 
NIEs and other emerging economies with dynamic industrial supply capacity such as the ASEAN-4, China, 
and, to some extent, India and the Philippines. The third group consists of lower-income countries, whose 
economies are based on production and export of primary commodities, with low manufacturing capacity. 
Some countries, such as Bangladesh, have only a limited capacity to export a few light manufactured goods. 
Most members of SAARC and low-income members of ASEAN fall in this group.
The first group has significant industrial and technological capabilities, but depends on imports of raw 
materials. The economies in this group provide opportunities for the expansion of trade amongst themselves. 
They are also interested in seeking markets in the other countries of the region and in assuring security of 
the supply of raw materials. They are involved in production sharing through FDI, and particularly in exports 
of technology-intensive P&C to the second group. This second group uses P&Cs for assembly operations to 
produce final products for sale in the regional market and/or for export to other countries. As market seekers, 
they are interested in the development of the regional market, therefore, it is in their own interest to pay 
attention to the development needs of the lower-income countries, by providing them with adjustment as-
sistance for development of their industrial supply capabilities, as explained later.
The second group’s crucial need is for the development of the technological and skills capabilities neces-
sary for upgrading of their industrial structure, which requires R&D, among other things. Regional cooperation 
can help them attain their objective through division of labour and specialization in R&D and in skills-based 
industrial collaboration. Further, the countries of this group need to coordinate their policies for intensifying 
the technological spillover of FDI by the developed countries and by the first group. Attempts have been 
made by ASEAN and China to cooperate in research on information and communication technology (ICT) 
activities for which they have envisaged the establishment of an R&D centre for telecommunications equip-
6. Policy initiatives for enhanced regional cooperation in ESSEA
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ment. Nevertheless, with the exception of the Republic of Korea, Singapore and to some extent China, R&D 
expenditure in ESSEA countries is small, not only in lower-income countries, but also in the second-tier NIEs 
(table 15). If those countries are excluded, Hong Kong (SAR, China) ranks higher among the ESSEA economies, 
as demonstrated in the table in terms of the ratio of R&D expenditure to GDP and per capita R&D expenditure. 
Yet these figures are lower than those of Italy and Spain, which note the lowest figures among developed 
countries (table 15). The lack of skills and financial and technical resources prevents individual countries from 
undertaking research in a large number of areas separately at the same time. Large countries, such as China 
and India, are in a better position than others to develop their technological capabilities independently. For 
example, India has succeeded to some extent in the particular case of pharmaceuticals.  Nevertheless, even 
for these countries the R&D/GDP ratios are far below those of developed countries, partly because of a lack of 
requisite skills. Therefore, division of labour and specialization among the countries concerned could help all 
countries of the group in advancing their common technological capabilities.
 
Table 15: Expenditure on research and development in selected ESSEA countries/territories and 
developed countries
Country/territory Year Share in GDP* Per capita (US$)
Selected ESSEA countries/territories
Rep. of Korea 2005 2.99 666.3
Taiwan (Province of China) n.a. n.a.   n.a.
Singapore 2005 2.36 702.2
China 2005 1.34 89.6
Hong Kong (SAR, China) 2004 0.74 231.3
Malaysia 2004 0.63   64.6
India 2005 0.61   20.8
Pakistan 2005 0.43    10.1
Thailand 2004 0.25 29.7
Viet Nam 2002 0.19 4.5
Sri Lanka 2004 0.19      7.4
Philippines 2003 0.14 6.2
Indonesia** 2005 0.05 1.4
Selected developed countries
Israel 2005 4.95 1 317.4
Japan 2004 3.18    440.1
Switzerland 2004 2.94 1 024.4
United States 2004 2.68 1 058
Germany 2005 2.51    736
France 2005 2.13   650.8
Australia 2004 1.77   541.5
United Kingdom 2004 1.75   560
Belgium 2005 1.82   588
Spain 2005 1.12   305.8
Italy 2005 1.10   307.3
Source: UNESCO, Database on Expenditures on R&D.
* GDP in PPP.
** Partial data.     
The third group has scarcity problems, including in finance, skills, infrastructure, organization and en-
trepreneurship. Its crucial problem is the expansion of industrial supply capacity. The first and second groups 
of countries mentioned above could constitute sources of supply for exports to lower-income countries. They 
may also absorb their exports of primary products through trade arrangements. However, market forces alone 
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will not be of much help in providing them with opportunities for trade expansion in industrial products 
because they lack the necessary supply capacity. As for FDI, outward investment by NIEs is directed mainly 
to China and the ASEAN-4, rather than to lower-income countries (Isoga and Shibanuma, 2000). Policies of 
regional investors do not favour low-income countries30.
In the case of the third group, therefore, more concerted efforts and proactive policies are required for 
exploiting the benefits of division of labour and specialization through industrial collaboration among the 
countries concerned. The rationale behind this proposal is that individual countries do not have sufficient 
resources to produce a large number of products. They can enter into an agreement for industrial collabora-
tion whereby each of the countries allocates scarce resources in a way that enables each of them to specialize 
in the production of a limited number of finished goods and/or P&C and exchange them with each other. 
Initially, trade among the countries involved could take place through the exchange of the new products 
produced even though they entail high production costs. Yet the exporting countries could gain increased 
employment, income and experience. Experience is gained more easily through specialization. An additional 
advantage of such industrial collaboration is the benefits arising from economies of scale. The combination 
of specialization, a larger market, economies of scale and experience contribute to a reduction of production 
costs over time. Therefore, they also can eventually export the products concerned to third markets. 
Arranging industrial collaboration cannot, however, be discussed in abstract terms. In order to op-
erationalize the idea, the characteristics, economic structure, stage of development and industrialization, as 
well as the capabilities of specific countries need to be taken into account. It is worth mentioning that UNDP 
Regional Centre in Colombo has studied prospects for diversification of the export structure of a number of 
LDCs in the region (UNDP, 2007). To organize industrial collaboration schemes among those countries as well 
as other lower-income countries, the UNDP may consider linking these schemes to the diversification strate-
gies of individual countries. In such a programme, regional FDI by countries like China, India, the ASEAN-4 and 
Asian NIEs may also be involved. The processing of raw materials before exporting to the importing countries 
of the region could be one possibility, as mentioned before, but it is not the only one. The essential point is that 
for the development of the industrial capacity of individual countries, specialization and division of labour are 
crucial. Division of labour here means not only sharing the market, but also specializing in production of dif-
ferent products, as mentioned before. For this purpose, and to be able to target FDI, individual lower-income 
countries need to adopt industrial strategies as well as coordinate their strategies. The feasibility, modalities 
and choice of products for industrial collaboration and diversification require further research by considering 
specific countries for case studies.
The experiences of SAARC, the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) and other low-income coun-
tries indicate that rules of origin are also an impediment to the expansion of intraregional trade (Kawai and 
Wignaraja, 2007: 15; UNDP, 2005a: 58-62)31. Different trade agreements contain different rules of origin clauses 
that can create confusion for exporters and producers. In the particular case of SAARC, the cumbersome rules 
of origin are not conducive to increased production and trade. Such rules need to be changed and harmo-
nized. If the GSTP Agreement became operational, it could contribute to the harmonization of rules of origin 
among the member countries of SAARC, which are contracting parties to the GSTP Agreement (Annex 3). 
Often, there are political problems in securing agreements among the member countries of a trade 
or economic group concerning the division of labour (i.e. production of different products or undertaking 
different research). Each country may have its own individual interest as against the common interest of the 
group32. Understanding by the partners of the ultimate benefits of such arrangements for individual countries 
30  There are indications that when government policies favour regional cooperation (e.g. through investment), the lower-income countries 
benefit considerably. For example, in the case of India, S-S trade expansion has been influenced by investment cooperation with the partner 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly low-income countries such as Nepal and Sri Lanka (Wishwanath, 2007: 2).
31  See also www.centad.org/events_15.asp:p.7.
32  The experience of the D-8 countries in industrial collaboration is telling. D-8 is a loose arrangement for economic collaboration between 
eight Asian and North African Muslim countries: Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey.
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requires dialogue and the dissemination of information and knowledge. The EU has extensive experience not 
only in industrial collaboration (e.g. aerospace), but also in many areas of research (e.g. nuclear). Drawing on 
its experiences would be useful. 
The geographical proximity and existence of large coastal areas in many South and South-East Asian 
countries enable the provision of easier and cheaper transport infrastructure than in many other developing 
countries. Note that distance-related trade cost is a major impediment to S-S trade. For example, it is estimated 
that a “10% increase in distance tends to reduce North-North trade by about 10%, [but] the comparable figure 
for South-South trade is 17%...” (Kowaski and Shepherd, 2006: 6). Further, the distance effect is stronger for 
trade among low-income countries (ibid: 7). 
6.2 Adjustment assistance
While helpful, proximity, trade agreements and industrial collaboration alone are not sufficient. Arrangements 
have to be made for the division of labour in required back-up services (see below), export credit, information 
and the development of the necessary infrastructure, training and skills development, and business coopera-
tion through chambers of commerce. Moreover, as lower-income countries suffer from resource scarcity, there 
is a need for the provision of adjustment assistance by the more advanced countries of the ESSEA region to 
the lower-income countries, particularly through ASEAN+3. This could be in the long-term interests of the 
assisting countries as development of the lower-income countries could create potential markets for them, as 
mentioned earlier. The provision of financial and technical assistance by the more advanced member countries 
of the EU to the lower-income countries of that grouping (i.e. Greece, Portugal, Spain, and subsequently, the 
East European accession countries) for adjustment and development of their productive capacity could serve 
as a useful guide. Such assistance is, in particular, more relevant for ASEAN and for ASEAN+3 than for SAARC, 
as the members of ASEAN are more heterogeneous than the members of SAARC. SAARC has a compensation 
scheme for LDCs for the loss of revenues from reduced import duties resulting from trade liberalization. Such 
a scheme is helpful from a financial point of view, but the resources provided to the LDCs may not necessarily 
be used for the development of new production capacity as they are intended to compensate for the loss of 
general government revenues. The adjustment assistance should be designed in such a way as to contribute 
to the supply capacity of the country. Further research is required on the modalities and mechanism of such 
assistance. Perhaps a pilot project could be considered for implementation by ASEAN for its lower-income 
country members. 
6.3 Cooperation in services
Although discussion of services is beyond the scope and terms of reference of this study, it needs to be 
touched upon briefly. Services can affect the expansion of South-South trade directly or indirectly in a num-
ber of ways. Three kinds of services may be distinguished: producer services, back-up services and services 
which enter international trade directly. Producer services are those used in the production of other goods 
or services, such as engineering, quality management, general management, training, finance and banking, 
internal transport, procurement and R&D. Therefore, they contribute indirectly to the productive capacity 
of an exporting country. Back-up services, or trade-related services are those that facilitate trade in goods 
and/or other services, such as insurance, export credit and trade facilitation. Finally, certain services enter into 
international trade directly, such as travel-related services, insurances, financial services, commercial presence 
and movements of natural persons. These three types of services often overlap, and S-S cooperation in the 
services sector should operate in such a way that it contributes to the development of productive capacity as 
well as the facilitation of S-S regional trade. More often, however, liberalization of trade in services – the third 
category – is the focus of attention, rather than S-S cooperation in the services sector for the expansion of 
productive supply capacity and trade in general.
44
Unfortunately, data on different types of services are not available, nor are data on intraregional trade 
in services. Rough estimates of regional trade in services and data on trade in services of the countries in the 
ESSEA region indicate that not only is existing intraregional trade in services relatively significant, but also that 
there is room for further expansion. The share of regional trade in services in total trade in services of develop-
ing countries in the Asia-Pacific is substantially higher than that of other developing regions (table 16). The 
region is also responsible for the bulk of S-S trade in services. Nevertheless, significant potential for further 
expansion of trade in services seems to exist in the ESSEA region as indicated in table 17. Again, China and 
India exhibit large and significant growth rates in trade in services. India, in particular, also shows a larger ratio 
of services exports/GDP than China33 with a growing surplus in its trade in services. China, a number of NIEs 
(Indonesia, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan (Province of China) and Thailand), and especially 
most lower-income countries (Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka)34, 
show a significant negative trade balance in their trade in services. This implies that perhaps they rely on third 
parties for their imports of services. Liberalization of trade in services, particularly mode 3 (mainly through 
commercial presence), is recommended for the expansion of trade in services (OECD, 2006). While liberaliza-
tion of trade in services could help expand trade among countries in the region that have adequate supply 
capacities, it would not be sufficient for the development of supply capacity in the lower-income countries. 
ASEAN and SAFTA embarked on liberalization of trade in services in 1995 and 2006, respectively. ASEAN has 
also envisaged certain cooperation schemes for strengthening infrastructure in transport, energy and tele-
communications (UNCTAD, 2007d: 9, 15). Further cooperation for development of supply capacity in producer 
services and trade-related services, particularly among lower-income countries is also required.
Table 16:  Estimated share of regional trade in services of developing regions, 2002 (%)
Asia-Pacific Africa Latin America
Intraregional/total trade 50 17 12
Intraregional/S-S trade 94 57 71
Source: UNCTAD, 2007d, based on OECD sources.
33  Note that while the export/GDP ratio of China is significantly higher than that of India, for services the opposite is true.
34  Although data are not readily available to permit an analysis, the surplus trade of Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Mal-
dives is most probably due to the contribution of travel services.
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Table 17: Trade in services of selected countries/economies in ESSEA, 2006









Exports Imports Balance Exports Imports
China 91 999 100 833 -8 834 15 14 4.6
India 76 645 63 427 13 218 23 17 9.6
Hong Kong (SAR, China) 4 72 733 36 560 36 173 10 5 42.1
Singapore 59 020 61 892 -2 872 8 11 60.4
Republic of Korea 51 873 70 636 -18 763 7 9 6.6
Taiwan (Province of China) 29 272 33 661 -4 389 6 3 8.5
Thailand 24 129 32 052 -7 923 3 5 13.7
Malaysia 21 266 23 268 -2 003 4 3 16.3
Indonesia 12 784 25 362 -12 578 8 6 4.5
Philippines 5 403 6 072 - 669 -10 -5 5.5
Viet Nam 6 5 100 5 122 - 22 7 8 9.6
Pakistan 3 508 8 411 -4 903 8 9 3.2
Sri Lanka 5 1 540 2 088 - 549 8 6 6.4
Cambodia 1 296  790  506 25 14 24
Bangladesh 1 294 2 497 -1 203 7 6 2
Brunei Darussalam 3  617 1 111 - 494 7 3 1
Mongolia  486  526 - 40 24 18 26.6
Maldives  473  233  240 5 9 61.4
Nepal  388  504 - 116 -7 6 5.23
Myanmar 2  271  426 - 155 -6 4 2.5
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 1  166  32  134 11 -22 9.1
Source: Based on UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics database.
Notes:
1 Total value: 2001, growth rate: 1995-2001.
2  Total value: 2005, growth rate: 1995-2005.
3  Total value: 2005, growth rate: 2001-2005.
4  Growth rate: 1998-2006.
5  Total value: 2005, growth rate: 1995-2005.
6  Growth rate: 1996-2006.
7 GDP data are for 2005, except for Lao PDR, which is for 2001.
6.4  Financial cooperation: A regional South Bank 
The experience of East Asian countries with the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 led them to consider the 
adoption of various measures, including establishing a regional monetary fund. However, this was opposed 
by the international financial institutions and some developed countries. Subsequently, ASEAN+3 agreed to 
two financial initiatives35. One was the Chiang Mai Initiative, (a kind of “ASEAN, swap arrangement”), and a 
network of bilateral financial swap arrangements among ASEAN+3 countries. The aim of this scheme, which 
has been in operation since 2000, is to provide liquidity to member countries in the event of short-term bal-
ance of payments deficits. Another scheme is the Asian Bond Market Initiative launched in 2003, which aims 
at strengthening the Asian bond market to enable investors to raise long-term capital without currency and 
maturity risks. The member countries have also created an Economic Review Policy Dialogue mechanism and 
35  See UNCTAD, 2007a, chapter V for a summary.
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a Technical Working Group and Research Group for Economic and Financial Monitoring. Their objective is 
to strengthen regional capacity for surveillance of capital markets in East Asia to monitor short-term capital 
flows and enhance financial cooperation with the aim of promoting financial stability in the region.
These initiatives are useful but not sufficient. Despite various proposals for reform of the international 
financial architecture since the Asian financial crisis, no significant progress has been made in this respect by 
developed countries. Furthermore, the risk of spread of the United States sub-prime crisis to other countries is 
another reminder of the weakness of the international financial system. The US Government has undertaken a 
number of monetary and fiscal measures since late 2007 and early 2008 to mitigate the impact of the sub-prime 
crisis on its economy. However, neither the extent of the problem, nor the degree of its impact on the economy 
or the efficacy of remedial measures taken is as yet clear. The related uncertainty involves risks. Further, the risk 
of inflation in the developed countries as well as in China (which experienced an inflation rate of more than 7 
per cent in early 2008), adds to the possibility of stagflation occurring in these economies, with repercussions 
on the rest of the ESSEA region.  High oil and food prices essentially add to the inflationary pressure.
Bearing in mind the adverse socio-economic impacts of the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 on the 
countries of the region, the subsequent conditionalities imposed on them by the international financial institu-
tions, and their vulnerability to their own interdependence and to external factors, all point to the need for 
serious consideration of further policies and measures to cover their economies against related risks. The Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) correctly recommends the need for “stronger regional cooperation in monitoring 
and regulating financial markets” (ADB Newsletter, 22 November)36. 
The successful experience of Malaysia in adopting capital controls during the Asian financial crisis sig-
nals the need for the harmonization of policies relating to the degree and modalities of capital controls in the 
region. Further research is required on this issue. For instance, Malaysia introduced a complex capital control 
system that involved not only movement of capital and exchange rate policies, but also efficient monetary and 
fiscal policies aimed at reflating the economy. Strong State and administrative support, dynamism in policy 
implementation as well as public support were among the factors contributing to its success; so was consider-
ation of Malaysia’s specific situation (Epstein, Grabel and Jomo, 2003:  Rodrik, 1998 and 2002). 
Another area for further research concerns a proposal to establish a regional South Bank, possibly with 
two windows for short- and long-term lending, as well as for consolidating the Chiang Mai and Asian Bond 
initiatives within this institution. In an internal study for UNCTAD in the early 1980s, Avramovic proposed 
the establishment of a South Bank by developing countries as a group, but it was never implemented. More 
recently, in early December 2007, a number of Latin American countries established a regional bank for Latin 
America. Drawing on their experience, the ESSEA countries might wish to study the feasibility and modalities 
of a similar regional bank. 
Finally, although not discussed in this paper, the region should guard against its vulnerability to a pos-
sible energy crisis. Cooperation on energy issues could include development of facilities for a strategic energy 
reserve to reduce risk associated with the interruption of energy supplies. 
36 See http://www.adb.org/media.
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This paper has examined regional South-South trade and cooperation in East, South and South-East Asian 
countries (ESSEA) with the aim of: providing an economic rationale for South-South trade; shedding some 
light on the extent and pattern of South-South trade in the ESSEA region; examining the dynamic forces 
behind the expansion of such trade; explaining its vulnerabilities; and proposing policies for enhancing and 
strengthening regional cooperation in ESSEA. 
It has shown how regional trade has expanded rapidly in ESSEA, to the extent that the region has 
become not only the most dynamic area in S-S trade, but also a major force in international trade in gen-
eral. Nevertheless, S-S trade in ESSEA highlights three main characteristics that point to the need for policy 
initiatives for enhancing and strengthening regional cooperation in order to further enhance economic 
development of the region. First, the expansion of intraregional trade has been concentrated among the 
relatively more advanced developing countries of ESSEA, and the lower-income countries have benefited 
less.  Second, the nature of regional trade expansion in ESSEA is such that it has increased the vulnerability of 
ESSEA countries to external factors, particularly those countries that are involved in production sharing. Third, 
the countries of the region are not homogeneous. Hence, although they have some common interests, their 
individual situations diverge: Lower-income countries have supply capacity problem, while others that have 
relatively larger supply capacity are market seekers. Although an arrangement for industrial collaboration 
among lower-income countries is needed, they also need to be assisted by market seekers to adjust and 
develop their supply capabilities.
More specifically, the study has sought to prove that while the neo-liberal argument against S-S trade 
is not justified, critics of this argument have not so far provided a strong economic rationale in favour of active 
expansion of such trade. Developing-country policy-makers have paid lip service to the need for promoting 
S-S trade in various international forums, and scholars who have discussed the issue in the literature have 
taken a defensive approach. S-S trade is favoured, for example, because of problems of, or limits to, trade with 
the North, or because of weaknesses and asymmetries in the international trading system and lopsided N-S 
trade agreements. These agreements are considered not conducive to industrial development of developing 
countries. 
 
This paper has proposed an alternative economic rationale for S-S trade based on a combination of 
three elements: theory of “vent for surplus”, the resource scarcity problem of developing countries and the 
need for division of labour and specialization.  Accordingly, S-S trade is viewed as being additional to N-S trade, 
and as a vehicle for enhancing industrialization, upgrading of the industrial structure and general economic 
development through fuller utilization of unemployed resources of developing countries. By specialization 
and division of labour through industrial collaboration and/or cooperation in R&D, developing countries 
can overcome scarcity in complementary factors of production, and benefit from larger markets and scale 
economies. The expansion of supply capabilities and S-S trade could, in turn, reduce the risk of dependence 
7. Concluding remarks, and areas for future research
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on markets of developed countries and improve their bargaining position in multilateral forums as well as in 
their bilateral trade relations with the developed countries.   
ESSEA has increasingly become a dynamic source of supply and demand in international trade as well 
as S-S regional trade. The rate of growth of exports and imports of ESSEA well exceeds that of world trade as 
well as S-S trade in general, such as for manufactured goods. 
The paper has also demonstrated that trade agreements have contributed to increased trade among 
members of each regional trade group, particularly ASEAN. Nevertheless, other factors seem to have been 
more important than trade agreements in expanding regional trade in ESSEA. The share of intrabloc trade 
of the various groups in ESSEA is not in all cases greater than their trade share with a different bloc or blocs. 
Demand and supply dynamism as well as policies of governments and TNCs are among important contribu-
tory factors. At the country level, China and India have been the most dynamic sources of supply and markets 
in the region. By contrast, while the lower-income countries of the region have acted as a market for exports 
of other countries, they have not benefited much from the market opportunities provided by the demand 
dynamic countries. In other words, despite the fact that, generally speaking, tariffs and non-tariff barriers are 
lower in the first- and second-tier NIEs than in the lower-income countries of the region, regional agreements 
have not been able to provide a significant impetus to regional exports of all these lower-income countries. 
While SAARC displays the lowest ratio of intrabloc trade/total trade among the various trade blocs in ESSEA, 
this ratio is nevertheless higher than that of all African regional trade blocs, except those of the Southern Af-
rican Development Community (SADC), which benefits from extensive trade with South Africa, and the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). Further, a number of countries (e.g. Nepal and Sri Lanka, 
and to some extent Viet Nam) benefit from bilateral trade agreements and/or trade with demand dynamic 
countries of the region such as India and China. However, the low-income/small countries of ESSEA have not 
been regionally integrated as much as other countries of the region. 
Various factors may be responsible for such discrepancies in the performance of the more advanced 
ESSEA countries and the lower-income countries. The lack of supply capabilities in manufactured goods is a 
very important factor. Primary products, which are the main export items of the lower-income countries in the 
region, have benefited less than the manufactured goods from dynamism in regional trade. Further, for most 
of the lower-income countries, the rates of growth of exports to the region have been negative or lower than 
their rates of growth of total exports. 
In particular, the low industrial and skills capabilities of the lower-income countries have prevented 
them from getting involved in the rapid expansion of intra-industry trade and production sharing in the 
region, which have been particularly dynamic factors in the expansion of regional trade. These factors have 
been widespread among the first- and second-tier NIEs in a limited number of electrical and electronic prod-
ucts, which have accounted for the bulk of their intraregional trade in non-fuel products. For example, seven 
such products accounted for nearly 58 per cent of non-fuel imports and for about 66 per cent of imports of 
manufactured goods of China from a few ASEAN countries. More importantly, only two electrical and elec-
tronic items accounted for over 50 per cent of total non-fuel imports and for about 60 per cent of imports of 
manufactured goods of China from those countries. In value terms, they amounted to US$34 billion in 2005 
and increased at an average annual rate of 63 per cent over the period 1995–2005. China, as the largest and 
most dynamic market, imports some sophisticated electrical and electronic products from the NIEs.  At the 
same time, it is a major regional market for P&C used for assembly operations, the products of which are 
exported largely to developed countries. 
Such a heavy dependence on a limited number of products and the high degree of interdependence of 
the exporting countries in the region is cause for concern. In particular, the dependence of other countries on 
China increases their vulnerability to external shocks and business cycles. The contagion effects of the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997–1998 serve as a reminder of the need for strengthening regional financial cooperation 
in order to reduce the adverse socio-economic effects of such crises. The sub-prime difficulties in the financial 
markets of the United States are another reminder of weaknesses in the international financial architecture. 
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There is a common misconception about what has driven the rapid expansion of regional trade and 
production sharing in ESSEA. Some observers believe it has been driven by market forces; this paper has 
argued that production sharing is basically an inter-firm operation, initially driven by changes in the policies 
of the Government of Japan, the Japanese TNCs and the governments of the East Asian countries themselves. 
Similarly, the involvement of lower-income countries in intra-industry trade and/or product sharing needs 
to be policy-driven through active cooperation of the countries in the region, including the lower-income 
countries themselves.
Having examined the pattern of regional trade and the characteristics and main development inter-
ests of the countries in the region, the study proposes the need for enhancing and strengthening regional 
cooperation in four areas. The first is for industrial collaboration among the lower-income countries, through 
an arrangement for the division of labour and specialization for building their supply capacity. As the coun-
tries concerned have a common production and export structure, they have little prospects for expanding 
intraregional trade. The idea is to develop complementarity through the division of labour and specialization 
in different products and industries. However, this cannot take place by relying on the operation of market 
forces alone. There is need for cooperation, coordination and harmonization of development and industrial 
policies in the lower-income countries with a view to helping them achieve dynamic comparative advantage. 
Second, regional agreements and arrangements should also consider establishing a facility for the provision 
of adjustment assistance to lower-income countries for building up their supply capacity, and for training, 
skills development and back-up services, among others. The NIEs, in particular, which are interested in enlarg-
ing their markets, should contribute to such a facility, as development of the lower-income countries could 
provide them with additional market opportunities in the region. Further research is required to identify the 
modalities of such assistance. Perhaps a pilot project could be implemented by ASEAN for its lower-income 
country members. The third area for enhanced cooperation should be in technological capacity building 
and R&D by the second-tier NIEs for upgrading their industrial structure.  Finally, there is a need to enhance 
financial cooperation and control of movements of capital in order to reduce the risks of interdependence and 
vulnerability of the ESSEA countries to external factors.
Need for further research
The following issues may be considered for further research in the future: 
l The impact of the dynamics of economic changes in China and India on export opportunities and 
industrialization of the lower-income/small countries of the region, drawing on the experience of 
trade and investment cooperation between India and its two neighbours, Nepal and Sri Lanka.  
l The evolution of the relations between FDI and regional trade cooperation and production sharing in 
the ESSEA region.
l The modalities of adjustment assistance to lower-income countries for development of such aspects 
as productive capacity, skills development, education, training, back-up services and infrastructure, as 
against “aid for trade” in the narrow sense of the term. 
l Building the trade supply capabilities of the lower-income countries of the region, for targeting the 
Chinese and Indian markets in particular, including needs assessment, identification of the necessary 
back-up services, bottlenecks and skills and training requirements.  
l The feasibility of industrial collaboration by lower-income countries, identifying areas for such col-
laboration, and the prospect for processing of the raw materials needed for industrial production in 
China, India and the ASEAN-4.
l Areas and modalities of cooperation in R&D among the second-tier NIEs, China and India.
l Regional cooperation in the services sector, particularly back-up services for trade expansion, such as 
export financing and insurance. 
l In the field of finance,
(i) The feasibility and modalities of establishing a regional South Bank which could also incorporate 
the existing schemes of the Chiang Mai and Asian Bond Market Initiatives; and
(ii) The possibilities and modalities of capital control and harmonization of policies of various coun-
tries in the region, in this respect.
l Regional cooperation by the governments in the region in the field of energy, and development of a 
strategic energy reserve to reduce risks related to the interruption of energy supply. 
50
Agatiello, O. R. (2007). “Is South-South Trade the Answer to Bringing the Poor into the Export Process?” Paper 
presented to the UNCTAD Expert Meeting on Participation of Developing Countries in New and Dy-
namic Sectors of World Trade: The South-South Dimension, Geneva, 16–17 October, 2007.
Akamatsu, K. (1961). “A Theory of Unbalanced Growth in the World Economy,“ Welwirtschaftliches Archiv-Re-
view of World Economics, 86: 3–25.
Akyüz, Y. (forthcoming). “Managing Financial Instability in Emerging Markets: A Keynesian Perspective.”  METU 
Studies in Development.
Amsden, A.H. (1989).  Asia’s Next Giant:  South Korea and Late Industrialization.  New York: Oxford University 
Press.
 (2001). The Rise of “the Rest”:  Challenges to the West from Late Industrializing Economies.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Ando, M. and Kimura, F. (2003). “The Formation of an International Production and Distribution Network in 
East Asia.” NBER Working Paper no. 10167. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Arndt, W.A. (2002). “Production Sharing and Regional Integration.” Claremont College Working Papers, avail-
able at http://owe.clarmont/mckonna.edu; http://ideas.repec.org. 
Baier, S., Bergstrand, J.H. and Vidal, E. (2007). “Free Trade Agreements in the Americas: Are the Trade Effects 
Larger than Anticipated?” World Economy, 30 (9): 1347-77.
Baldwin, R. (2006). “Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism.” Centre for Economic 
Policy Research, Discussion Paper no. 5561, available at www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP5561.asp.asp.
Baldwin, R., Evenett, S. and Low, P. (2007). “Beyond Tariffs: Multilaterising Deeper RTA Commitments.” Paper 
presented at the Conference on Multilateralizing Regionalism, sponsored and organized by the World 
Trade Organization and the Institut de Hautes Etudes Internationales et du Développement, and co-
organized by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) at WTO, Geneva,10 September, 2007. 
Bhagwati, J. (1993). “Regionalism and Multilateralism,” in de Melo, J. and Panagariya, A. (eds.). New Dimensions 
in Regional Integration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, for Centre for Economic Research.
 
Cernat, L. (2003). “Assessing South-South Regional Integration: Some Issues, Many Metrics.”  UNCTAD, Policy 
Issues in International Trade and Commodities, Study Series no. 21. Geneva: UNCTAD.
References
51
Cernat, L. and Laird, S. (2007). “North, South, East, West: What’s Best? Modern RTAs and Their Implications 
for the Stability of Trade Policy.” CREDIT Research Paper no. 03/11. Centre for Research in Economic 
Development and International Trade (CREDIT), School of Economics. Nottingham: University of Not-
tingham. 
Cline, R.W.  (1983). “Trade Policy in the 1980s.” Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.  
Corden, W.M. (1993). “Round Table Discussion,” in de Melo, J. and Panagariya, A., (eds.). New Dimensions in Re-
gional Integration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, for Centre for Economic Research, 457-60.
de Melo, J. and Panagariya, A.(eds.). (1993). New Dimensions in Regional Integration. Centre for Economic Re-
search Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
DAFT (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) (2004). South-South Trade, Winning from Liberalization.  Can-
berra: Australian Government Printers.
ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America) (1950). The Economic Development of Latin America and its 
Principal Problems. New York: United Nations.
Epstein, G., Grabel, I. and Jomo, K.S. (2003). “Capital Management Technique in Developing Countries: An 
Assessment of Experience from the 1990s and Lessons for the Future.” Paper presented to the XVIth 
Technical Group Meeting of G-24, Geneva, 13-14 February, 2003; available at www.g24.org.
Fan, P. and Watanabe, C. (2006). “Promoting Industrial Development through Technology Policy: Lessons from 
Japan and China.” Technology in Society, 28: 303-20.
Gallagher, K. and Zarsky, L. (2007). The Enclave Economy: Foreign Investment and Sustainable Development in 
Mexico’s Silicon Valley. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gallagher, K. et al. (forthcoming). Neo-Development vs. Neo-Liberalism: Industrial Policy and Industrial Develop-
ment in China and Mexico. 
Gaulier, G., Lemoine, F. and Unal-Kesenci, D. (2005). “China’s Integration in East Asia: Production Sharing, FDI 
and High-Tech Trade.” CEPII Paper no. 2005-09. Paris: Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations 
Internationales.
Greenaway, D. and Milner, C. (1990). “South-South Trade, Theory, Evidence and Policy.” The World Bank Research 
Observer (5)1: 47-68.
Haltmaier, J.T. et al. (2007). “The Role of China in Asia: Engine, Conduit or Steamroller.“ Washington, DC: Federal 
Reserve System. 
Hirschman, A.O. (1958).  The Strategy of Economic Development. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
 (1968). National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. Berkeley: University of California Press.
HKMDS (Hong Kong Census and Statistical Department) (2007). Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, June.
Huang, Y.  (2002). Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment during the Reform Era. New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Hufbauer, G.C. and Schott, J.J. (2007). “Multilateralizing Regionalism: Fitting Asia-Pacific Agreements into the 
WTO.” Paper presented at the Conference on Multilateralizing Regionalism, sponsored and organized 
52
by WTO-HEI and co-organized by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) at WTO, Geneva, 10 
September, 2007.
Humphrey, J. and Schmitz, H. (2006). “The Implications of China’s Growth for other Asian Countries.”  Sussex, 
UK: University of Sussex, Institute of Development Studies.
Isoga, T. and Shibanuma, S. (2000). “East Asia’s Intra-and Inter-regional Economic Relations: Data Analysis on 
Trade, Direct Investment and Currency Transactions.” Working Paper no. 00-E-4. Tokyo: Bank of Japan.
Isoga T., Morishita H. and Ruffer, R. (2002). “Analysis of Intra- and Inter-regional Trade in East Asia: Comparative 
Advantage Structures and Dynamic Interdependency in Trade Flows.” Working Paper no. 02-E-1. Tokyo: 
Bank of Japan. 
Kaldor, N. (1972). “The Irrelevance of Equilibrium Economics.” Economic Journal, 8 (338): 1237–55.
Kamada, K. and Takagawa, I. (2005). “Policy Coordination in East Asia and Across the Pacific.” Working Paper no. 
05-E-4. Tokyo: Bank of Japan.
Kasahara, S. (2004). “The Flying Geese Paradigm: A Critical Study of Its Application to East Asian Regional 
Development.” UNCTAD Discussion Paper no. 169. Geneva: UNCTAD. 
Kawai, M. and Wignaraja, G. (2007). “ASEAN+3 or ASEAN+6: Which Way Forward?” Paper presented at the 
Conference on Multilateralizing Regionalism, sponsored and organized by World Trade Organization 
(WTO)-Graduate Institute of International Studies (HEI) and co-organized by the Centre for Economic 
Policy Research at WTO, Geneva, 10 September, 2007.
Koirala, J.R. (2007). Presentation to the Expert Meeting on the Participation of Developing Countries in New 
and Dynamic Sectors of World Trade: The South-South Dimension, at UNCTAD, Geneva, 16-17 Octo-
ber.
Kowaski, P. and Shepherd, B. (2006). “South-South Trade in Goods.” OECD Trade Policy Working Papers, No. 40. 
Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Kozo, K. Sazanami, Y. and Yu Ching, W. (2006). “Intra-regional Trade in Asia: Dynamics of Product Sharing.” 
Working Paper. Yokohama: Yokohama National University. 
Lall, S. (2004). “Reinventing Industrial Strategy: The Role of Government Policy in Building Industrial Competi-
tiveness.”  UNCTAD, G-24 Discussion Papers no. 28. Geneva: United Nations.
Lall, S. and Albaladejo, M. (2004). “China’s Competitive Performance: A Threat to East Asian Manufactured 
Exports?” World Development (32) 9: 1441–66.
List, F. (1856). The National System of Political Economy (translated into English by Matile, G.A.). Philadelphia, 
PA: J. B. Lippincott & Co.
Ng, F. and Yeats, A. (2003). “Major Trade Trends in East Asia: What Are Their Implications for Regional Coopera-
tion and Growth?” World Bank Policy Research Paper, Working Paper Series no. 3084. Washington, DC: 
World Bank.
Malhotra, K. (2006). “National Trade and Development Strategies: Suggested Policy Direction.” Background pa-
per prepared for the 2006 UNDP Human Development Report: Trade on Human Terms: Transforming Trade 
for Human Development in Asia and the Pacific. New York, United Nations Development Programme. 
53
Moen, J. (1998). “Trade and Development: Is South-South Cooperation a Feasible Strategy?” Paper Series 21. 
Bergen, Norway: Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration.
Myint, H. (1958). “The Classical Theory of International Trade and Underdeveloped Countries.” Economic 
Journal, 68. Reprinted in Livingstone, I. (1971). Economic Policy for Development. London: Penguin 
Books.
Myrdal, G. (1971).  Asian Drama:  An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. London: Penguin Books.
OECD (2006). “South-South Services Trade.” OECD Trade Policy Working Paper, 39 (TD/TC (2006)7/ Final). Paris: 
OECD.
Oman, C. (1994). Globalization and Regionalization: The Challenge of Developing Countries. Paris: OECD. 
Otsubo, S. (1998). “New Regionalism and South-South Trade: Could It Be an Entry Point for the South Toward 
Global Integration?” APEC Discussion Paper no.18. Nagoya: Nagoya University, APEC Study Centre.
Prebisch, R. (1984). “Five Stages in My Thinking on Development,” in Mier, J.M. and Seers, D., (eds.). Pioneers in 
Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Puri, L. (2007). “Going Beyond the Doha Negotiations: Promoting South-South Trade and Role of GSTP.” State-
ment presented at a meeting of government officials in New Delhi, 9 August; available at www.unctad.
org; http://www.unctad.org/sections/ditc_dir/docs/statement_0119_09-08-07_en.pdf
Rodrik, D. (1998). “Who Needs Capital-Account Convertibility?” in Fischer, S. et al. Should the IMF Pursue Capital-
Account Convertibility? Princeton Essays in International Finance, 207: 55–65.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University, International Economics Section, Department of Economics. 
 (2002). “After Neo-liberalism.” Talk delivered at the Conference on Coalition for New Rules for Global 
Finance, Washington, DC, 22-23 May.
 (2006). “What’s So Special about China’s Exports?” CEPR Discussion Paper no. 5483. London: Centre for 
Economic Policy Research.
Rollo, J. (2007). “The Challenge of Negotiating RTAs for Developing Countries: What Could the WTO Do to 
Help?” Paper presented at the Conference on Multilateralizing Regionalism, sponsored and organized 
by WTO-HEI and co-organized by the Centre for Economic Policy Research at WTO, Geneva, 10 Sep-
tember, 2007.
Sarkar, P. and Singer, H.W. (1991). “Manufactured Exports of Developing Countries and Their Terms of Trade 
since 1965.” World Development (19) 4: 333–40.
Shafaeddin, M. (1984). Import Capacity as a Bargaining Tool of Developing Countries.” Trade and Development: 
An UNCTAD Review, 5: 53–79. Geneva: UNCTAD.
 (1997). “Review of New Dimensions in Regional Integration,” in de Melo, J. and Panagariya,  A., (eds.). 
Journal of Modern African Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 (2004). “Is China’s Accession to WTO Threatening Exports of Developing Countries?” China Economic 
Review (15) 2: 109–44.  
54
 (2005a). Trade Policy at the Crossroads: The Recent Experience of Developing Countries. 
Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
 (2005b). “Towards an Alternative Perspective on Trade and Industrial Policies.” Development and Change 
(36) 6: 1143–62.
 (2006). “Is Industrial Policy Relevant in the 21st Century?”  Keynote speech to the plenary session of the 
International Conference on New Approaches to Design of Development Policies, Beirut, 20-21 March, 
organized by the Arab Planning Institute (published by the same Institute as a monograph).
Shafaeddin,  M. and Pizarro, J. (2007). “From Export Promotion to Import Substitution: Comparative Experi-
ences of China and Mexico,” available at www.networkieas.org.
South Centre (1996). Enhancing South-South Trade. Geneva: South Centre. 
Subramanian, A. and Tamirisa, N.T. (2001). Africa’s Trade Revisited. IMF Working Paper 01/33. Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund.
UNCTAD (1986).  South-South Trade and Finance: Strengthening the Weakest Link. New York and Geneva: United 
Nations.
 (2007a). Trade and Development Report, 2007.  New York and Geneva: United Nations. 
 (2007b). World Investment Report 2007. New York and  Geneva: United Nations.
 (2007c).  Handbook of Statistics, 2006-2007. New York and Geneva: United Nations.
 (2007d). “Trade in Services, and Development Implications.” TD/B/COM.1/85, Geneva: United Nations.
 (2007e). “Progress Report on the Implementation of the Agreed Conclusions and Recommendations of 
the Commission since UNCTAD XI.” TD7B/COM.1/91, Geneva: United Nations.
UNDP (2003). Making Global Trade Work for People. London and Sterling, VA: Earthscan.
 (2005). “The Great Maze – Regional and Bilateral Free Trade Agreements in Asia: Trends, Characteristics 
and Implications for Human Development.” Colombo: UNDP Regional Centre in Colombo.
 (2007). “Export Diversification for Human Development in the Post-ATC Era.” Colombo: UNDP Regional 
Centre in Colombo.
Viner, J. (1950). “The Customs Union Issue.” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Wishwanath, T.S. (2007). South-South Cooperation: A Business Perspective on India’s Engagement. Presenta-
tion to the Exert Meeting on the Participation of Developing Countries in New and Dynamic Sectors of 
World Trade: The South-South Dimension at UNCTAD, Geneva, 16-17 October, 2007.
World Bank (2000). Trade Blocs. New York: Oxford University Press.
Young, A.R. (1928). “Increasing Return and Economic Progress.”  The Economic Journal, December. 
Zebregs, H. (2004). “Intraregional Trade in Emerging Asia.” IMF Discussion Paper no. PDP/04/1. Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund.
55
Membership of economic cooperation agreements in East, South and South-East Asia
APTA (1975)  Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (former Bangkok Agreement): Bangladesh, India, Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic, Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka and China (which joined in 
2001). 
ASEAN (1967) Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singa-
pore, Thailand, Brunei Darussalam (1984), Viet Nam (1995), Lao PDR and Myanmar 
(1997) Cambodia (1999). The ASEAN Economic Community was established in 2003. 
An ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) is to be created by 2018), an ASEAN Investment Area 
(AIA) was created in 1998 and is intended to allow free of all FDI by 2020; AFAS (ASEAN 
Framework Agreement on Services to liberalize services) was launched in 1992. ASEAN 
Vision 2020 was adopted in 1997, and in 2003 an agreement was reached for the estab-
lishment of an ASEAN Community with the aim, inter alia, of creating a single market in 
2020. 
ASEAN+3 (2002) ASEAN plus China, Japan and the Republic of Korea.
BIMP-EAGA (1994) Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines – East Asian Growth Area.
BIMSTEC (2004) Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi - Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation – an 
agreement linking ASEAN and SAARC. 
CAREC (1997) Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Kazakh-
stan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
ECO (1985) Economic Cooperation Organization: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Founded in 
1985 by Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey and expanded in 1992 to include 
the other seven members.
GCC (1981) Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates
GMS (1992) Greater Mekong Subregion (Economic Cooperation Programme): China, Cambodia, 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Thailand and Viet Nam.
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SAARC (1985)  South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, 
Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 
 A South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA), established in 1993, came into 
effect in 1995, and expanded in 2002. In 2004, a framework agreement on a SAARC 
Free Trade Area (SAFTA) superseded SAPTA.
SASEC (1997) South Asian Sub-regional Economic Cooperation: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and the 
Eastern States of India.
SECSCA (2003) Subregional Economic Cooperation in South and Central Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, with Iran as observer. Turkmenistan is also part of the 
proposed North-South and East-West corridors and has been invited to participate in 
ministerial conferences.
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Main electrical and electronic parts and components traded in ESSEA
SITCs (rev.2) Description
Parts and components
7169 Parts, n.e.s. of rotating electrical plants
759 Parts, n.e.s. of and accessories for use in SITC 751 & 752
7649 Parts, n.e.s. for use in equipment falling under SITC 76
77129 Parts, n.e.s. of electric power machinery for SITC 771
772 Electrical  apparatus for making and breaking electric circuits
77689 Parts, n.e.s. of the electric components for SITC 776 
784 Parts and components n.e.s. for motor vehicles for SITC 722, 781, 782 or 783
7929 Parts, n.e.s. of aircraft for SITC 792
7139 Parts of a piston engine
78539 Parts, n.e.s. for SITS 785
Finished products
716 Rotating electrical plants, excl. parts (SITC 7169)
751 Office machines  
752 Automatic data processing machines
764 Telecommunications equipment excl.  parts (SITC 7649)
771 Electric power machinery excl. parts (SITC 77129)
776 Valves and tubes excl. parts (SITC 77689)
722 Tractors
781 Passenger cars
785 Motor cycles excl. parts (78539)
792 Aircrafts and parts excl.  parts (SITC 7929)
------------------------------------
    
n.e.s. = not elsewhere specified. 
Annex 2
58
The Agreement on the Global System of Trade Preferences among developing countries: 
Its implications for regional trade
A separate study is required on the interrelationship between the GSTP Agreement and regional trade agreements. 
Nevertheless, a few points are worth mentioning. First of all, the scheme is limited in its scope and membership. It is 
mainly a preferential scheme for trade in goods aimed at provision of preferential tariffs and non-tariffs concessions 
on a reciprocal basis to contracting parties. Only LDCs are supposed to be provided with concessional preferences. 
It can also provide possibilities for harmonization of rules of origin. However, it is, neither a forum for negotiation 
with developed countries, nor a platform for designing trade or industrial policies.  Further, the system is by no 
means “general”. Only 42 developing countries and one trading bloc (MERCOSUR) are contracting parties to the 
GSTP Agreement. China is not yet the contracting party, although it participates in the third round of negotiations. 
The member countries account for only about half of S-S trade (Puri, 2007: 4). Moreover, despite the fact that LDCs 
are supposed to enjoy concessional preferences, only seven LDCs have so far signed the agreement and few others 
have applied (see table A.16). 
 Secondly, the idea of a GSTP Agreement was initiated in 1976 and two rounds of negotiations have taken 
place with another in the process, but so far the scheme has not become operational. The first round began in 1986 
and led to the establishment of the GSTP Agreement in 1988, which came into force in 1989. The second round 
took place during the period 1992–1998, when 24 countries exchanged preferential tariff concessions for about 900 
products. However, the concessions did not take effect, as less than the required 15 members ratified the related 
protocol. Hence, when the third round started in 2004, the participating countries were back to square one, as no 
concessions had been exchanged (Agatiello, 207:10). This was mainly because the trade policies of the member 
countries had changed considerably in the meantime. The third round was supposed to conclude by November 
2006, and the deadline for its conclusion was extended to the end of 2007 (UNCTAD, 2007e:11). Thus far little has 
been achieved in terms of exchanging concessions. 
Thirdly, as far as the relationship between GSTP and regional trade agreements are concerned, as mentioned 
before, trade liberalization is not the most significant factor in the expansion of S-S regional trade. To the extent 
that trade liberalization contributes to the expansion of S-S regional trade, it is most unlikely that preferences given 
through GSTP would exceed those offered through regional agreements. 
Fourthly, if more countries and trading blocs were to participate in the GSTP scheme, it could contribute 
to the reduction of trade barriers among the various trading blocs in the ESSEA region and elsewhere and act as a 
building bloc for S-S trade liberalization. Provided it is supplemented by other cooperative and collaboration mea-
sures at the regional level, it could become an important vehicle for further expansion of S-S trade. The alternative 
markets of the developing countries could provide them with greater bargaining power in their trade relations 
with industrialized countries, provided the developing countries also improve their bargaining skills, enhance their 
necessary knowledge and information and clarify their own trade and industrial policies before they enter into 
negotiations in multilateral forums or in bilateral trade agreements (Shafaeddin, 1984). 
One important advantage of GSTP is that it would result in a possible harmonization of the rules of origin, the 
lack of which has been a problem in the expansion of regional trade, particularly among SAARC members. However, 












1990  27 365  3 598  10 314  38 424  2 633  54 181  144 427 
2005  165 064  21 522  96 531  263 782  52 284  290 387  629 166 
SAARC-6 
1990  1 211  863  1 158  2 530  118  6 396  27 230 
2005  10 663  7 062  14 134  26 563  6 964  55 095  129 569 
APTA-6 
1990  10 194  2 682  2 429  13 530  52  58 696  152 018 
2005  93 499  27 974  127 277  226 721  68 459  460 321  1160 161 
Total of above* 
1990  37 826  6 525  13 220  52 700  2 751  114 545  302 231 
2005  258 639  50 589  225 511  492 292  121 163  757 373  1805 406 
China 
1990  4 151  950  865  5 533  ..  37 353  62 760 
2005  55 479  15 910  47 504  106 506  ..  317 115  762 337 
Developing countries excluding China 
1990  57 112  13 702  50 029  110 027  25 163  198 904  757 047 
2005  278 393  68 438  502 865  794 957  358 994  938 264  2918 853 
Table A.1: Value of total exports (including fuel) of various regional blocs in ESSEA, 1990 and 2005 
(US$ million)
Source: UNCTAD, 2007c, based on IMF Direction of Trade Statistics database.
* Includes all member countries of the above groupings once (double counting is avoided).
Note: Bhutan is not included as a reporter, but is included as a member of SAARC.
ASEAN-10: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam.
SAARC-7: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
APTA-6: Bangladesh, China, India, Lao PDR, Republic of Korea and Sri Lanka. 
Annex  tables
General note
All data on product levels are based on SITC (Standard International Trade Classification), Revision 2.
Annex 4
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Table A.2: Imports of China from ASEAN-6, 2005 (values in US$ ‘000)











Malaysia Singapore Thailand Indonesia Philippines Viet Nam
776 Thermionic, microcircuits, transistors, valves, etc. 25 888 544 38.61 63.89 10 857 370 4243506 2188549 221604 8368780 8 736
752 Automatic data processing machines and units thereof 8 196 513 12.22 62.53 818 255 1824104 2702808 718041 2102716 30 589
333 Crude petroleum and oils obtained from bituminous minerals 3 589 933 5.35 15.21 149 641 509120 1592098 49002 1 290 072
583 Polymerization and copolymerization products 2 884 678 4.30 24.60 722 735 1165189 872649 85 657 36 223 2 225
764
Telecommunications equipment, n.e.s.; parts and accessories, 
n.e.s.
2 653 563 3.96 27.45 875 776 693718 519256 166 849 388 247 9 715
334 Petroleum products, refined 2 548 984 3.80 7.84 211 449 2 067 700 18 155 229 044 20 267 2 369
759
Parts, n.e.s., and accessories for machines of headings 751 and 
752
2 479 544 3.70 21.86 609 989 57 1966 820 047 151 096 322 267 4 178
424 Other fixed vegetable oils, fluid or solid, crude, refined 2 001 443 2.98 12.45 1 257 050 128 2 744 738 173 3 169 178
232 Natural rubber latex; rubber and gums 1 799 389 2.68 15.18 558 638 1 756 782 610 373 760 18 693 63 932
513 Carboxylic acids, and their derivatives 1 345 264 2.01 36.47 222 008 352 964 317 435 452 842 4 11
582 Condensation, polycondensation and polyaddition products 1 158 168 1.73 37.95 107 675 511 301 501 959 29 480 3 625 4 128
772 Electrical apparatus for making and breaking electrical circuits 1 043 970 1.56 33.00 192 353 331 652 312 421 81 690 96 027 29 828
778 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.s. 902 284 1.35 28.62 292 629 193 295 187 130 99 114 127 504 2 612
898 Musical instruments, parts and accessories thereof 735 052 1.10 60.81 101 570 610 317 5 774 12 451 4 876 64
251 Pulp and waste paper 694 139 1.04 24.00 932 32 448 659 432 1 327
512 Alcohols, phenols etc., and their derivatives 606 458 0.90 36.99 220 677 210108 7 163 164 116 4 394
682 Copper 575 738 0.86 20.11 96 780 49 500 20 290 180 026 228 815 326
741 Heating and cooling equipment and parts thereof, n.e.s. 522 298 0.78 30.26 65 930 406 056 37 741 4 336 8 235
511 Hydrocarbons, n.e.s., and derivatives 498 698 0.74 48.97 36 890 248 377 69 778 139 806 3 847
874 Measuring, checking, analysis, controlling instruments, n.e.s., parts 493 863 0.74 30.63 176 992 284 234 13 573 3 406 14 100 1 559
Total of 7 electrical & electronic items (listed above) 58.28
Food (SITC 0+1+22+4) 346 9430 5.17 9.62 13 77 328 85 032 850 303 895 384 106 958 154 423
Agr. raw mats. (SITC 2-(22+27+28)) 368 7867 5.50 16.42 974 114 9 289 1 174 014 1 341 829 34 748 153 872
Ores & metals (SITC 27+28+68) 147 9347 2.21 21.15 200 918 116 911 72 443 594 867 368 366 125 842
Manufactures 584 21433 87.12 30.69 17 032 896 14 027 726 11 086 769 3 604 015 12 214 974 455 053
7 Machinery and transport equipment 447 27587 66.70 38.60 14 322 231 9 315 701 7 607 503 1 665 357 11 659 726 157 070
Other 13693845 20.42 19.32 2 710 665 4 712 025 3 479 266 1 938 658 555 248 297 983
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 7306181 10.90 12.42 471871 2220438 807118 2 000 290 142 957 1 663 507
Total imports 74 459 175 111.0368 23.78 20 093 205 16 514 596 13 991 887 8 436 960 12 869 689 2 552 838
 Non-fuel imports 67058077 100 26.39 19585256 14238958 13183531 6436 096 12 725 047 889 190
Shares of countries in China’s non-fuel imports (%) 100 29 21 20 10 19 1
Share of countries in China’s SITC 7 imports (%) 32 21 17 4 26 nil
Source: Author’s calculations based on UN COMTRADE database.
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Malaysia Singapore Thailand Indonesia Philippines Viet Nam
776 Thermionic, microcircuits, transistors, valves, etc. 25 888 544 38.61 63.89 10 857 370 4243506 2188549 221604 8368780 8 736
752 Automatic data processing machines and units thereof 8 196 513 12.22 62.53 818 255 1824104 2702808 718041 2102716 30 589
333 Crude petroleum and oils obtained from bituminous minerals 3 589 933 5.35 15.21 149 641 509120 1592098 49002 1 290 072
583 Polymerization and copolymerization products 2 884 678 4.30 24.60 722 735 1165189 872649 85 657 36 223 2 225
764
Telecommunications equipment, n.e.s.; parts and accessories, 
n.e.s.
2 653 563 3.96 27.45 875 776 693718 519256 166 849 388 247 9 715
334 Petroleum products, refined 2 548 984 3.80 7.84 211 449 2 067 700 18 155 229 044 20 267 2 369
759
Parts, n.e.s., and accessories for machines of headings 751 and 
752
2 479 544 3.70 21.86 609 989 57 1966 820 047 151 096 322 267 4 178
424 Other fixed vegetable oils, fluid or solid, crude, refined 2 001 443 2.98 12.45 1 257 050 128 2 744 738 173 3 169 178
232 Natural rubber latex; rubber and gums 1 799 389 2.68 15.18 558 638 1 756 782 610 373 760 18 693 63 932
513 Carboxylic acids, and their derivatives 1 345 264 2.01 36.47 222 008 352 964 317 435 452 842 4 11
582 Condensation, polycondensation and polyaddition products 1 158 168 1.73 37.95 107 675 511 301 501 959 29 480 3 625 4 128
772 Electrical apparatus for making and breaking electrical circuits 1 043 970 1.56 33.00 192 353 331 652 312 421 81 690 96 027 29 828
778 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.s. 902 284 1.35 28.62 292 629 193 295 187 130 99 114 127 504 2 612
898 Musical instruments, parts and accessories thereof 735 052 1.10 60.81 101 570 610 317 5 774 12 451 4 876 64
251 Pulp and waste paper 694 139 1.04 24.00 932 32 448 659 432 1 327
512 Alcohols, phenols etc., and their derivatives 606 458 0.90 36.99 220 677 210108 7 163 164 116 4 394
682 Copper 575 738 0.86 20.11 96 780 49 500 20 290 180 026 228 815 326
741 Heating and cooling equipment and parts thereof, n.e.s. 522 298 0.78 30.26 65 930 406 056 37 741 4 336 8 235
511 Hydrocarbons, n.e.s., and derivatives 498 698 0.74 48.97 36 890 248 377 69 778 139 806 3 847
874 Measuring, checking, analysis, controlling instruments, n.e.s., parts 493 863 0.74 30.63 176 992 284 234 13 573 3 406 14 100 1 559
Total of 7 electrical & electronic items (listed above) 58.28
Food (SITC 0+1+22+4) 346 9430 5.17 9.62 13 77 328 85 032 850 303 895 384 106 958 154 423
Agr. raw mats. (SITC 2-(22+27+28)) 368 7867 5.50 16.42 974 114 9 289 1 174 014 1 341 829 34 748 153 872
Ores & metals (SITC 27+28+68) 147 9347 2.21 21.15 200 918 116 911 72 443 594 867 368 366 125 842
Manufactures 584 21433 87.12 30.69 17 032 896 14 027 726 11 086 769 3 604 015 12 214 974 455 053
7 Machinery and transport equipment 447 27587 66.70 38.60 14 322 231 9 315 701 7 607 503 1 665 357 11 659 726 157 070
Other 13693845 20.42 19.32 2 710 665 4 712 025 3 479 266 1 938 658 555 248 297 983
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 7306181 10.90 12.42 471871 2220438 807118 2 000 290 142 957 1 663 507
Total imports 74 459 175 111.0368 23.78 20 093 205 16 514 596 13 991 887 8 436 960 12 869 689 2 552 838
 Non-fuel imports 67058077 100 26.39 19585256 14238958 13183531 6436 096 12 725 047 889 190
Shares of countries in China’s non-fuel imports (%) 100 29 21 20 10 19 1
Share of countries in China’s SITC 7 imports (%) 32 21 17 4 26 nil
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Malaysia Singapore Thailand Indonesia Philippines Viet Nam
776 Thermionic, microcircuits, transistors, valves, etc. 24 672 513  23.44  10 10 786 450 5 123 358 1 798 390 1 001 393 5 936 269  26 653
334 Petroleum products, refined 19 193 887  18.23  20 2 069 667 13 776 481 1 892 757 1 265 991  185 378  3 613
759 Parts, n.e.s., and accessories for machines of headings 751 or 752 10 218 183 9.71  6 4 194 006 1 324 845 2 189 695 1 563 260  836 942  109 435
333 Crude petroleum and oils obtained from bituminous minerals 7 543 059 7.16  23 3 681 203  18 271  344 769  646 437  173 696 2 678 682
752 Automatic data processing machines and units thereof 4 247 968 4.04  4 1 470 852  743 177 1 011 431  649 455  316 340  56 714
764 Telecommunications equipment, n.e.s.; parts and accessories, n.e.s. 4 205 759 3.99  8 2 324 244  606 836  343 674  762 968  156 299  11 738
772 Electrical apparatus for making and breaking electrical circuits 3 733 510 3.55  5 1 205 981  840 545  524 544  641 286  164 804  356 350
778 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.s. 2 443 821 2.32  7  584 114  601 453  460 818  696 906  91 358  9 172
583 Polymerization and copolymerization products 2 386 248 2.27  17  419 939 1 188 036  584 367  149 239  30 111  14 555
511 Hydrocarbons, n.e.s.., and derivatives 2 375 585 2.26  24  450 099 1 021 011  625 331  274 761  2 366  2 016
784 Motor vehicle parts and accessories, n.e.s. 1 516 035 1.44  36  159 420  32 921  666 183  317 241  327 731  12 539
874 Measuring, checking, analysis, controlling instruments, n.e.s., parts 1 317 181 1.25  20  669 629  405 845  88 578  70 858  74 924  7 347
749 Non-electrical parts and accessories of machinery, n.e.s. 1 266 115 1.20  11  314 801  392 126  307 546  186 301  55 539  9 801
781 Passenger motor vehicles (excl. buses) 1 252 503 1.19  60  11 669  8 755  931 041  137 286  163 752
716 Rotating electric plants and parts thereof, n.e.s. 1 241 298 1.18  3  177 846  144 309  514 798  257 580  109 602  37 163
898 Musical instruments, parts and accessories thereof 1 189 755 1.13  8  536 205  534 071  45 323  68 249  4 828  1 079
641 Paper and paperboard 1 119 231 1.06  13  121 985  245 618  210 706  499 706  32 583  8 632
682 Copper 1 112 807 1.06  12  196 321  82 272  111 307  616 838  105 797  271
699 Manufactures of base metal, n.e.s. 1 078 479 1.02  3  457 373  350 132  109 964  104 423  44 098  12 488
893 Articles n.e.s. of plastic materials 1 074 468 1.02  9  492 820  291 254  129 186  96 498  41 544  23 166
582 Condensation, polycondensation and polyaddition products 1 052 105 1  16  262 141  405 370  239 261  134 752  3 598  6 984
771 Electric power machinery, and parts thereof, n.e.s.  866 897  0.82 - 1  152 913  158 935  78 173  350 242  106 859  19 775
741 Heating and cooling equipment and parts thereof, n.e.s.  854 425 0.81  7  326 931  93 314  362 410  52 024  15 850  3 895
687 Tin  851 196 0.81  50  127 275  22 439  6 998  682 919  126  11 440
322 Coal, lignite and peat  816 860 0.78  16  96  5 443  2 144  744 136   65 040
042 Rice  814 104 0.77 - 5  147  1 904  216 219  218  69  595 547
785 Cycles, scooters, motorized or not; invalid carriages  809 764 0.77  17  184 169  20 537  443 563  113 820  189  47 487
Total of 8 electronic & electrical items (listed above) 44.6
Total: Food (SITC 0+1+22+4) 7 145 179 6.79  8 1 697 060  658 651 1 698 979 1 880 211  367 844  842 435
Agr. raw mats. (SITC 2-(22+27+28)) 2 090 773 1.99  7  723 159  129 480  712 546  456 317  44 243  25 028
Ores & metals (SITC 27+28+68) 3 452 822 3.28  13  609 834  409 018  305 842 1 780 930  303 009  44 189
Manufactures: 92 588 574 87.95  9 32 472 832 20 529 574 16 483 257 12 599 523 9 171 619 1 331 768
7 Machinery and transport equipment 65 052 286 61.79  8 24 146 105 12 335 642 11 230 959 8 039 204 8 500 014  800 362
Others 27 536 288 26.16  10 8 326 727 8 193 932 5 252 299 4 560 319  671 605  531 406
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 28 732 967 27.29  20 5 992 092 14 251 333 2 499 492 2 876 665  366 039 2 747 345
 Total Total trade 136 053 084  129.23  10 41 694 588 36 613 589 22 425 287 20 033 010 10 282 016 5 004 596
Non-fuel imports 105 277 349  100  9 35 502 886 21 726 723 19 200 624 16 716 980 9 886 715 2 243 421
Shares of countries in ASEAN-6 non-fuel imports (%)  100  34  21  18  16  9  2
Share of countries in ASEAN-6 SITC 7 imports (%) 37 19 17 12 13 1
Table A.3: Imports of ASEAN-6 from ASEAN-6, 2005 (values in US$ ‘000)
Source: Same as table A.2. 
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Malaysia Singapore Thailand Indonesia Philippines Viet Nam
776 Thermionic, microcircuits, transistors, valves, etc. 24 672 513  23.44  10 10 786 450 5 123 358 1 798 390 1 001 393 5 936 269  26 653
334 Petroleum products, refined 19 193 887  18.23  20 2 069 667 13 776 481 1 892 757 1 265 991  185 378  3 613
759 Parts, n.e.s., and accessories for machines of headings 751 or 752 10 218 183 9.71  6 4 194 006 1 324 845 2 189 695 1 563 260  836 942  109 435
333 Crude petroleum and oils obtained from bituminous minerals 7 543 059 7.16  23 3 681 203  18 271  344 769  646 437  173 696 2 678 682
752 Automatic data processing machines and units thereof 4 247 968 4.04  4 1 470 852  743 177 1 011 431  649 455  316 340  56 714
764 Telecommunications equipment, n.e.s.; parts and accessories, n.e.s. 4 205 759 3.99  8 2 324 244  606 836  343 674  762 968  156 299  11 738
772 Electrical apparatus for making and breaking electrical circuits 3 733 510 3.55  5 1 205 981  840 545  524 544  641 286  164 804  356 350
778 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.s. 2 443 821 2.32  7  584 114  601 453  460 818  696 906  91 358  9 172
583 Polymerization and copolymerization products 2 386 248 2.27  17  419 939 1 188 036  584 367  149 239  30 111  14 555
511 Hydrocarbons, n.e.s.., and derivatives 2 375 585 2.26  24  450 099 1 021 011  625 331  274 761  2 366  2 016
784 Motor vehicle parts and accessories, n.e.s. 1 516 035 1.44  36  159 420  32 921  666 183  317 241  327 731  12 539
874 Measuring, checking, analysis, controlling instruments, n.e.s., parts 1 317 181 1.25  20  669 629  405 845  88 578  70 858  74 924  7 347
749 Non-electrical parts and accessories of machinery, n.e.s. 1 266 115 1.20  11  314 801  392 126  307 546  186 301  55 539  9 801
781 Passenger motor vehicles (excl. buses) 1 252 503 1.19  60  11 669  8 755  931 041  137 286  163 752
716 Rotating electric plants and parts thereof, n.e.s. 1 241 298 1.18  3  177 846  144 309  514 798  257 580  109 602  37 163
898 Musical instruments, parts and accessories thereof 1 189 755 1.13  8  536 205  534 071  45 323  68 249  4 828  1 079
641 Paper and paperboard 1 119 231 1.06  13  121 985  245 618  210 706  499 706  32 583  8 632
682 Copper 1 112 807 1.06  12  196 321  82 272  111 307  616 838  105 797  271
699 Manufactures of base metal, n.e.s. 1 078 479 1.02  3  457 373  350 132  109 964  104 423  44 098  12 488
893 Articles n.e.s. of plastic materials 1 074 468 1.02  9  492 820  291 254  129 186  96 498  41 544  23 166
582 Condensation, polycondensation and polyaddition products 1 052 105 1  16  262 141  405 370  239 261  134 752  3 598  6 984
771 Electric power machinery, and parts thereof, n.e.s.  866 897  0.82 - 1  152 913  158 935  78 173  350 242  106 859  19 775
741 Heating and cooling equipment and parts thereof, n.e.s.  854 425 0.81  7  326 931  93 314  362 410  52 024  15 850  3 895
687 Tin  851 196 0.81  50  127 275  22 439  6 998  682 919  126  11 440
322 Coal, lignite and peat  816 860 0.78  16  96  5 443  2 144  744 136   65 040
042 Rice  814 104 0.77 - 5  147  1 904  216 219  218  69  595 547
785 Cycles, scooters, motorized or not; invalid carriages  809 764 0.77  17  184 169  20 537  443 563  113 820  189  47 487
Total of 8 electronic & electrical items (listed above) 44.6
Total: Food (SITC 0+1+22+4) 7 145 179 6.79  8 1 697 060  658 651 1 698 979 1 880 211  367 844  842 435
Agr. raw mats. (SITC 2-(22+27+28)) 2 090 773 1.99  7  723 159  129 480  712 546  456 317  44 243  25 028
Ores & metals (SITC 27+28+68) 3 452 822 3.28  13  609 834  409 018  305 842 1 780 930  303 009  44 189
Manufactures: 92 588 574 87.95  9 32 472 832 20 529 574 16 483 257 12 599 523 9 171 619 1 331 768
7 Machinery and transport equipment 65 052 286 61.79  8 24 146 105 12 335 642 11 230 959 8 039 204 8 500 014  800 362
Others 27 536 288 26.16  10 8 326 727 8 193 932 5 252 299 4 560 319  671 605  531 406
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 28 732 967 27.29  20 5 992 092 14 251 333 2 499 492 2 876 665  366 039 2 747 345
 Total Total trade 136 053 084  129.23  10 41 694 588 36 613 589 22 425 287 20 033 010 10 282 016 5 004 596
Non-fuel imports 105 277 349  100  9 35 502 886 21 726 723 19 200 624 16 716 980 9 886 715 2 243 421
Shares of countries in ASEAN-6 non-fuel imports (%)  100  34  21  18  16  9  2
Share of countries in ASEAN-6 SITC 7 imports (%) 37 19 17 12 13 1
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growth rate,  
1995-2005 (%)
Malaysia Singapore Thailand Indonesia Philippines Viet Nam
776 Thermionic, microcircuits, transistors, valves, etc. 5 828 545  34.72  19.30 1 196 221 3 057 531  485 894  30 295 1 045 685  12 918
341 Gas, natural and manufactured 4 136 589 24.64  8.74 1 456 923  1 977 2 677 689
333 Crude petroleum and oils obtained from bituminous minerals 2 816 501 16.78  9.88  721 507  141 121 1 953 873
752 Automatic data processing machines and units thereof  876 592 5.22  7.81  310 873  243 789  201 691  41 295  72 683  6 261
322 Coal, lignite and peat  742 934 4.43 19.48  4 488  713 778  24 669
764 Telecommunication equipment, n.e.s.; parts and accessories, n.e.s.  679 152 4.05 17.02  253 977  61 641  195 935  100 272  51 779  15 547
778 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.s.  644 409 3.84 24.31  162 250  151 476  85 430  18 956  218 675  7 623
334 Petroleum products, refined  548 813 3.27 14.62  128 540  128 047  3 542  288 380  302  2
287 Ores and concentrates of base metals, n.e.s.  508 769 3.03 6.80  256  81  44  505 519  12  2 857
232 Natural rubber latex; rubber and gums  504 161 3.00 0.17  93 282  534  259 053  112 122  7 070  32 100
634 Veneers, plywood, “improved” wood and other wood, worked, n.e.s.  415 234 2.47 - 1.18  209 296  1 066  61 797  142 353  180  542
651 Textile yarn  348 227 2.07 11.74  34 367  21 463  84 602  151 434  358  56 002
251 Pulp and waste paper  334 440 1.99 9.87  261  1 393  12 184  320 429  47  126
898 Musical instruments, parts and accessories thereof  313 645 1.87 28.36  114 397  175 791  2 386  20 121  336  614
759 Parts, n.e.s. of and accessories for machines of headings 751 or 752  285 984 1.70 6.89  67 395  139 996  15 700  870  61 751  273
598 Miscellaneous chemical products, n.e.s.  277 349 1.65  0.23  167 617  89 257  3 644  13 878  1 995  957
874 Measuring, checking, analysis, controlling instruments, n.e.s., parts  198 624 1.18 8.49  70 619  112 858  1 199  1 050  12 348  551
682 Copper  193 636 1.15 4.57  9 761  20 325  7 082  1 234  155 154  79
036 Crustaceans and molluscs, fresh, chilled, frozen, salted, etc  193 062 1.15  13.96  2 717  443  77 400  7 670  14 317  90 515
716 Rotating electric plants and parts thereof, n.e.s.  165 725 0.99 12.33  1 568  8 488  40 446  18 198  83 596  13 428
057 Fruit and nuts, fresh, dried  155 318 0.93 10.33  159  569  207  151 560  2 824
335 Residual petroleum products, n.e.s., and related materials  149 731 0.89 16.48  2 236  4 381  54 236  88 856  21
424 Other fixed vegetable oils, fluid or solid, crude, refined  142 609 0.85 -1.14  112 245  982  2 070  1 396  25 916
288 Non-ferrous base metal waste and scrap, n.e.s.  141 201 0.84  6.35  27 441  12 923  22 708  14 488  63 066  575
582 Condensation, polycondensation and polyaddition products  139 195 0.83  25.36  24 653  67 125  41 750  3 372  1 235  1 060
687 Tin  138 180 0.82  8.04  69 368  24 831  8 707  35 151  124
512 Alcohols, phenols etc., and their derivatives  135 963 0.81  14.37  62 171  15 358  4 374  38 819  15 242
772 Electrical apparatus for making and breaking electrical circuits  131 095 0.78  10.01  34 808  37 552  22 513  11 621  22 558  2 044
513 Carboxylic acids, and their derivatives  128 795 0.77  42.84  53 384  72 988  698  1 614  111
Total of 7 electronic items (listed above) 46.10
Total: Food (SITC 0+1+22+4) 1 161 460 6.92  3.43  180 632  37 600  266 182  154 942  295 673  226 432
Agr. raw mats. (SITC 2-(22+27+28)) 1 047 288 6.24 -0.75  154 802  2 673  293 409  538 835  13 953  43 617
Ores and metals (SITC 27+28+68) 1 101 268 6.56 6.33  128 219  70 172  75 522  570 314  238 690  18 351
manufactures 13 479 330 80.29 12.61 3 238 632 5 064 197 1 853 046 1 179 779 1 763 203  380 473
7 Machinery and transport equipment 9 409 690 56.05 15.34 2 177 548 4 009 702 1 193 786  307 809 1 650 328  70 516
Other manufactures 4 069 640 24.24 7.89 1 061 084 1 054 494  659 260  871 969  112 875  309 957
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 8 395 041 50.00 8.88 2 309 206  138 894  198 899 5 722 577  302  25 163
Total imports 25 212 480  150.17 9.59 6 011 639 5 317 585 2 688 753 8 184 433 2 316 026  694 043
Non-fuel imports 16 789 346  100 9.76 3 702 285 5 174 642 2 488 159 2 443 870 2 311 519  668 872
Share of countries in Rep. of Korea’s non-fuel imports (%)  100  22.1  31 14.8 14.6 13.7  3.9
Share of countries in Rep. of Korea’s SITC 7 imports (%) 23.1  43  13  3.3  17.5 0.75
Table A.4: Imports of Republic of Korea from ASEAN-6, 2005 (values in US$ ‘000)
Source: Same as table A.2.
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growth rate,  
1995-2005 (%)
Malaysia Singapore Thailand Indonesia Philippines Viet Nam
776 Thermionic, microcircuits, transistors, valves, etc. 5 828 545  34.72  19.30 1 196 221 3 057 531  485 894  30 295 1 045 685  12 918
341 Gas, natural and manufactured 4 136 589 24.64  8.74 1 456 923  1 977 2 677 689
333 Crude petroleum and oils obtained from bituminous minerals 2 816 501 16.78  9.88  721 507  141 121 1 953 873
752 Automatic data processing machines and units thereof  876 592 5.22  7.81  310 873  243 789  201 691  41 295  72 683  6 261
322 Coal, lignite and peat  742 934 4.43 19.48  4 488  713 778  24 669
764 Telecommunication equipment, n.e.s.; parts and accessories, n.e.s.  679 152 4.05 17.02  253 977  61 641  195 935  100 272  51 779  15 547
778 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.s.  644 409 3.84 24.31  162 250  151 476  85 430  18 956  218 675  7 623
334 Petroleum products, refined  548 813 3.27 14.62  128 540  128 047  3 542  288 380  302  2
287 Ores and concentrates of base metals, n.e.s.  508 769 3.03 6.80  256  81  44  505 519  12  2 857
232 Natural rubber latex; rubber and gums  504 161 3.00 0.17  93 282  534  259 053  112 122  7 070  32 100
634 Veneers, plywood, “improved” wood and other wood, worked, n.e.s.  415 234 2.47 - 1.18  209 296  1 066  61 797  142 353  180  542
651 Textile yarn  348 227 2.07 11.74  34 367  21 463  84 602  151 434  358  56 002
251 Pulp and waste paper  334 440 1.99 9.87  261  1 393  12 184  320 429  47  126
898 Musical instruments, parts and accessories thereof  313 645 1.87 28.36  114 397  175 791  2 386  20 121  336  614
759 Parts, n.e.s. of and accessories for machines of headings 751 or 752  285 984 1.70 6.89  67 395  139 996  15 700  870  61 751  273
598 Miscellaneous chemical products, n.e.s.  277 349 1.65  0.23  167 617  89 257  3 644  13 878  1 995  957
874 Measuring, checking, analysis, controlling instruments, n.e.s., parts  198 624 1.18 8.49  70 619  112 858  1 199  1 050  12 348  551
682 Copper  193 636 1.15 4.57  9 761  20 325  7 082  1 234  155 154  79
036 Crustaceans and molluscs, fresh, chilled, frozen, salted, etc  193 062 1.15  13.96  2 717  443  77 400  7 670  14 317  90 515
716 Rotating electric plants and parts thereof, n.e.s.  165 725 0.99 12.33  1 568  8 488  40 446  18 198  83 596  13 428
057 Fruit and nuts, fresh, dried  155 318 0.93 10.33  159  569  207  151 560  2 824
335 Residual petroleum products, n.e.s., and related materials  149 731 0.89 16.48  2 236  4 381  54 236  88 856  21
424 Other fixed vegetable oils, fluid or solid, crude, refined  142 609 0.85 -1.14  112 245  982  2 070  1 396  25 916
288 Non-ferrous base metal waste and scrap, n.e.s.  141 201 0.84  6.35  27 441  12 923  22 708  14 488  63 066  575
582 Condensation, polycondensation and polyaddition products  139 195 0.83  25.36  24 653  67 125  41 750  3 372  1 235  1 060
687 Tin  138 180 0.82  8.04  69 368  24 831  8 707  35 151  124
512 Alcohols, phenols etc., and their derivatives  135 963 0.81  14.37  62 171  15 358  4 374  38 819  15 242
772 Electrical apparatus for making and breaking electrical circuits  131 095 0.78  10.01  34 808  37 552  22 513  11 621  22 558  2 044
513 Carboxylic acids, and their derivatives  128 795 0.77  42.84  53 384  72 988  698  1 614  111
Total of 7 electronic items (listed above) 46.10
Total: Food (SITC 0+1+22+4) 1 161 460 6.92  3.43  180 632  37 600  266 182  154 942  295 673  226 432
Agr. raw mats. (SITC 2-(22+27+28)) 1 047 288 6.24 -0.75  154 802  2 673  293 409  538 835  13 953  43 617
Ores and metals (SITC 27+28+68) 1 101 268 6.56 6.33  128 219  70 172  75 522  570 314  238 690  18 351
manufactures 13 479 330 80.29 12.61 3 238 632 5 064 197 1 853 046 1 179 779 1 763 203  380 473
7 Machinery and transport equipment 9 409 690 56.05 15.34 2 177 548 4 009 702 1 193 786  307 809 1 650 328  70 516
Other manufactures 4 069 640 24.24 7.89 1 061 084 1 054 494  659 260  871 969  112 875  309 957
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 8 395 041 50.00 8.88 2 309 206  138 894  198 899 5 722 577  302  25 163
Total imports 25 212 480  150.17 9.59 6 011 639 5 317 585 2 688 753 8 184 433 2 316 026  694 043
Non-fuel imports 16 789 346  100 9.76 3 702 285 5 174 642 2 488 159 2 443 870 2 311 519  668 872
Share of countries in Rep. of Korea’s non-fuel imports (%)  100  22.1  31 14.8 14.6 13.7  3.9
Share of countries in Rep. of Korea’s SITC 7 imports (%) 23.1  43  13  3.3  17.5 0.75
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424 Other fixed vegetable oils, fluid or solid, crude, refined 1 097 656  11.90  10  163 899  78  568  933 060  16  35
322 Coal, lignite and peat  846 797 9.18  26  12  827 264  19 521
752 Automatic data processing machines and units thereof  795 326 8.63  27  257 419  446 559  50 960  32 320  7 380  690
759 Parts, n.e.s. of and accessories for machines of headings 751 or 752  603 717 6.55  27  191 831  292 801  8 499  5 288  104 886  413
511 Hydrocarbons, n.e.s., and derivatives  427 890 4.64  19  172 668  245 193  4 392  5 417  219
764 Telecommunications equipment, n.e.s.; parts and accessories, n.e.s.  405 554 4.40  20  134 449  236 694  28 968  3 270  1 816  358
287 Ores and concentrates of base metals, n.e.s.  334 489 3.63  38  1 364  802  93  332 124  29  77
776 Thermionic, microcircuits, transistors, valves, etc.  298 790 3.24  14  71 441  173 499  31 769  5 393  16 432  256
793 Ships, boats and floating structures  294 638 3.20  39  19 929  217 467  7 822  16 558  32 858  4
247 Other wood, in the rough or roughly squared  278 439 3.02  14  276 689  381  1 259  80  29
892 Printed matter  269 333 2.92  42  4 312  261 957  1 379  1 512  170  4
341 Gas, natural and manufactured  261 576 2.84  34  251 434  10 142  
513 Carboxylic acids, and their derivatives  226 201 2.45  17  89 058  103 086  4 448  29 551  57
583 Polymerization and copolymerization products  193 934 2.10  10  35 024  80 007  52 542  24 481  371  1 509
582 Condensation, polycondensation and polyaddition products  145 083 1.57  24  8 578  33 433  69 265  29 152  860  3 796
431 Animal and vegetable oils and fats, processed, and waxes  140 242 1.52  7  91 617  3 088  1 978  43 376  159  24
792 Aircraft and associated equipment and parts thereof, n.e.s.  139 300 1.51  15  3 120  131 961  1 273  8  2 937
874 Measuring, checking, analysis, controlling instruments, n.e.s., parts  121 637 1.32  23  18 324  97 735  3 604  905  918  151
651 Textile yarn  114 489 1.24  20  42 674  6 429  15 505  48 458  63  1 361
761 Television receivers  109 172 1.18  44  3 715  9 933  93 195  2 328
713 Internal combustion piston engines, and parts thereof, n.e.s.  104 250 1.13  42  1 367  23 879  77 158  1 844  
898 Musical instruments, parts and accessories thereof  99 130 1.08  19  13 572  80 992  3 893  645  18  9
282 Waste and scrap metal of iron or steel  96 778 1.05  18  24 306  38 662  19 444  3 312  8 536  2 518
778 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.s.  95 672 1.04  17  13 727  52 210  18 545  2 719  2 260  6 210
251 Pulp and waste paper  86 659 0.94  6  792  4 065  3 689  78 106  8
723 Civil engineering, contractors’ plant and equipment and parts, n.e.s.  86 401 0.94  26  12 131  43 504  606  30 025  17  117
716 Rotating electrical plant and parts thereof, n.e.s.  79 209 0.86  16  487  14 852  855  62 762  20  233
522 Inorganic chemical elements, oxides and halogen salts  74 691 0.81  16  45 370  5 719  539  23 062  
057 Fruit and nuts, fresh, dried  73 501 0.80  5  12  40  1 474  70 161  501  1 313
641 Paper and paperboard  72 835 0.79  11  8 026  3 220  10 319  32 999  18 270  
743 Pumps, compressors; centrifuges; filtering apparatus; etc, parts  71 253 0.77  29  6 789  18 926  44 823  254  457  3
674 Universals, plates, and sheets, of iron or steel  70 956 0.77  29  16 977  9 833  37 350  6 796  
741 Heating and cooling equipment and parts thereof, n.e.s.  67 989 0.74  24  18 708  10 182  35 354  1 725  1 925  95
Total of 9 electrical & electronic items (listed above) 27.40
Total
Total Food (SITC 0+1+22+4) 1 451 479  15.74  10  270 664  11 400  15 291 1 101 577  1 813  50 733
Agr. raw mats. (SITC 2-(22+27+28))  512 183 5.55  10  299 401  10 413  59 465  131 446  1 391  10 066
Manuf. Manufactures 6 600 094 71.58  19 1 467 893 3 221 934 1 058 331  591 553  218 389  41 994
7 Machinery and transport equipment 3 726 105 40.41  21  815 982 1 972 080  554 652  190 580  182 862  9 948
others 2 873 989 31.17 n.a  651 911 1 249 854  503 679  400 972  35 526  32 046
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 1 121 260 12.16  1  252 789  17 212  4 342  827 347  49  19 521
 Total Total trade 10 397 047  112.75  14 2 425 193 3 367 084 1 216 390 3 020 048  236 426  131 907
Total Non-fuel inports 9 220 991  100 n.a 2 160 173 3 333 916 1 206 650 2 171 765  236 114  112 373
Share of countries in India’s non-fuel imports (%)  100  25  35  13  23  3  1
Share of countries in India’s SITC 7 imports (%)  22  53  15  5  5  
Table A.5: Imports of India from ASEAN-6, 2005 (values in US$ ‘000)
Source: Same as table A.2.
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424 Other fixed vegetable oils, fluid or solid, crude, refined 1 097 656  11.90  10  163 899  78  568  933 060  16  35
322 Coal, lignite and peat  846 797 9.18  26  12  827 264  19 521
752 Automatic data processing machines and units thereof  795 326 8.63  27  257 419  446 559  50 960  32 320  7 380  690
759 Parts, n.e.s. of and accessories for machines of headings 751 or 752  603 717 6.55  27  191 831  292 801  8 499  5 288  104 886  413
511 Hydrocarbons, n.e.s., and derivatives  427 890 4.64  19  172 668  245 193  4 392  5 417  219
764 Telecommunications equipment, n.e.s.; parts and accessories, n.e.s.  405 554 4.40  20  134 449  236 694  28 968  3 270  1 816  358
287 Ores and concentrates of base metals, n.e.s.  334 489 3.63  38  1 364  802  93  332 124  29  77
776 Thermionic, microcircuits, transistors, valves, etc.  298 790 3.24  14  71 441  173 499  31 769  5 393  16 432  256
793 Ships, boats and floating structures  294 638 3.20  39  19 929  217 467  7 822  16 558  32 858  4
247 Other wood, in the rough or roughly squared  278 439 3.02  14  276 689  381  1 259  80  29
892 Printed matter  269 333 2.92  42  4 312  261 957  1 379  1 512  170  4
341 Gas, natural and manufactured  261 576 2.84  34  251 434  10 142  
513 Carboxylic acids, and their derivatives  226 201 2.45  17  89 058  103 086  4 448  29 551  57
583 Polymerization and copolymerization products  193 934 2.10  10  35 024  80 007  52 542  24 481  371  1 509
582 Condensation, polycondensation and polyaddition products  145 083 1.57  24  8 578  33 433  69 265  29 152  860  3 796
431 Animal and vegetable oils and fats, processed, and waxes  140 242 1.52  7  91 617  3 088  1 978  43 376  159  24
792 Aircraft and associated equipment and parts thereof, n.e.s.  139 300 1.51  15  3 120  131 961  1 273  8  2 937
874 Measuring, checking, analysis, controlling instruments, n.e.s., parts  121 637 1.32  23  18 324  97 735  3 604  905  918  151
651 Textile yarn  114 489 1.24  20  42 674  6 429  15 505  48 458  63  1 361
761 Television receivers  109 172 1.18  44  3 715  9 933  93 195  2 328
713 Internal combustion piston engines, and parts thereof, n.e.s.  104 250 1.13  42  1 367  23 879  77 158  1 844  
898 Musical instruments, parts and accessories thereof  99 130 1.08  19  13 572  80 992  3 893  645  18  9
282 Waste and scrap metal of iron or steel  96 778 1.05  18  24 306  38 662  19 444  3 312  8 536  2 518
778 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.s.  95 672 1.04  17  13 727  52 210  18 545  2 719  2 260  6 210
251 Pulp and waste paper  86 659 0.94  6  792  4 065  3 689  78 106  8
723 Civil engineering, contractors’ plant and equipment and parts, n.e.s.  86 401 0.94  26  12 131  43 504  606  30 025  17  117
716 Rotating electrical plant and parts thereof, n.e.s.  79 209 0.86  16  487  14 852  855  62 762  20  233
522 Inorganic chemical elements, oxides and halogen salts  74 691 0.81  16  45 370  5 719  539  23 062  
057 Fruit and nuts, fresh, dried  73 501 0.80  5  12  40  1 474  70 161  501  1 313
641 Paper and paperboard  72 835 0.79  11  8 026  3 220  10 319  32 999  18 270  
743 Pumps, compressors; centrifuges; filtering apparatus; etc, parts  71 253 0.77  29  6 789  18 926  44 823  254  457  3
674 Universals, plates, and sheets, of iron or steel  70 956 0.77  29  16 977  9 833  37 350  6 796  
741 Heating and cooling equipment and parts thereof, n.e.s.  67 989 0.74  24  18 708  10 182  35 354  1 725  1 925  95
Total of 9 electrical & electronic items (listed above) 27.40
Total
Total Food (SITC 0+1+22+4) 1 451 479  15.74  10  270 664  11 400  15 291 1 101 577  1 813  50 733
Agr. raw mats. (SITC 2-(22+27+28))  512 183 5.55  10  299 401  10 413  59 465  131 446  1 391  10 066
Manuf. Manufactures 6 600 094 71.58  19 1 467 893 3 221 934 1 058 331  591 553  218 389  41 994
7 Machinery and transport equipment 3 726 105 40.41  21  815 982 1 972 080  554 652  190 580  182 862  9 948
others 2 873 989 31.17 n.a  651 911 1 249 854  503 679  400 972  35 526  32 046
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 1 121 260 12.16  1  252 789  17 212  4 342  827 347  49  19 521
 Total Total trade 10 397 047  112.75  14 2 425 193 3 367 084 1 216 390 3 020 048  236 426  131 907
Total Non-fuel inports 9 220 991  100 n.a 2 160 173 3 333 916 1 206 650 2 171 765  236 114  112 373
Share of countries in India’s non-fuel imports (%)  100  25  35  13  23  3  1
Share of countries in India’s SITC 7 imports (%)  22  53  15  5  5  
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Table A.6: Imports of China from lower-income/smaller countries, 2005 (values in US$ ‘000)
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651 Textile yarn  464 325  36.19  11.85  934  12  455 901  291  7 187
333 Crude petroleum and oils obtained from bituminous minerals  207 626 16.18  73.6  207 626
247 Other wood, in the rough or roughly squared  138 523 10.80 12.53  788  75  8 591  129 068
652 Cotton fabrics, woven (not including narrow or special fabrics)  114 558 8.93 5.65  107  113 900  162  389
682 Copper  90 623  7.06 n.a.  84 339  6 226  58
611 Leather  81 364 6.34  12.06  28 944  692  51 451  145  2  131
248 Wood, simply worked, and railway sleepers of wood  74 984 5.84  24.36  8  8 332  2 592  64 051
287 Ores and concentrates of base metals, n.e.s.  66 019 5.15  12.12  28 483  16 314  628  20 595
513 Carboxylic acids, and their derivatives  46 768 3.64  163.06  46 765  3
264 Jute, other textile bast fibres, n.e.s., raw, processed but not spun  26 301 2.05  2.33  25 816  485
232 Natural rubber latex; rubber and gums  18 451 1.44 25.77  1 513  3 131  4 185  9 622
263 Cotton  15 825 1.23 -7.22  15 818  7  1
583 Polymerization and copolymerization products  13 530 1.05  53.32  8 840  10  3 686  51  45  1  897
034 Fish, fresh, chilled or frozen  13 145 1.02  30.56  2 179  1  9 916  79  420  551
292 Crude vegetable materials, n.e.s.  8 212 0.64 1.47  165  1 842  184  79  354  5 587
081 Feeding stuff for animals (not including unmilled cereals)  7 127 0.56 29.17  3 261   3 866
278 Other crude minerals  5 887 0.46 31.74  2  379  737  2  31  4 737
281 Iron ore and concentrates  5 812 0.45 n.a  5 812
222 Seeds and oleaginous fruit, whole or broken, for ‘soft’ fixed oil  5 537 0.43 18.66  1 055  32  83  80  4 288
036 Crustaceans and molluscs, fresh, chilled, frozen, salted, etc.  5 253 0.41 13.00  1 258  1 532  26  312  2 125
6 manufactured items (listed above)  49.08
Total Food (SITC 0+1+22+4)  49 400 3.85 6.82  3 452  1  3 194  16 716  2 384  93  952  1 471  21 137
Agr. raw mats. (SITC 2-(22+27+28))  286 789 22.35  10.24  26 585  953  18 112  4 043  11 851  15 740  209 506
Ores & metals (SITC 27+28+68)  172 335  13.43 17.08  452  6  116 156  17 051  2  6 885  31 782
manufactures  774 572  60.37 8.96  48 114  2  26  4 343  682 147  13 117  9  14 257  917  11 640
7 Machinery and transport equipment  6 391 0.50  22.59  109  5  58  339  5 641   124  117
Other manufactures  768 180 59.87  8.89  48 006.651  1.631  21.487  4 285  681 808.3  7 476.5  9  14 132.67  917.17  11 522.62
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials  207 957 16.21  66.85   207 626  330
 Total Total trade 1 491 864 116.27  12.72  78 603  2  27  8 495  833 169  36 595  207 728  27 305  25 545  274 395
China’s non-fuel imports 1 283 096  100  9.6  78 603  2  27  8 495  833 132  36 595  102  27 061  25 013  274 065
Share of countries in China’s non-fuel imports (%)  100  6.1 nil nil  0.7  64.9  2.9 nil  2.1  1.95  21.3
Share of countries in China’s imports of manufactures (%) 6.2 nil nil 0.6 88.1 1.7 nil  1.8 0.1  1.5
Source: Same as table A.2.
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651 Textile yarn  464 325  36.19  11.85  934  12  455 901  291  7 187
333 Crude petroleum and oils obtained from bituminous minerals  207 626 16.18  73.6  207 626
247 Other wood, in the rough or roughly squared  138 523 10.80 12.53  788  75  8 591  129 068
652 Cotton fabrics, woven (not including narrow or special fabrics)  114 558 8.93 5.65  107  113 900  162  389
682 Copper  90 623  7.06 n.a.  84 339  6 226  58
611 Leather  81 364 6.34  12.06  28 944  692  51 451  145  2  131
248 Wood, simply worked, and railway sleepers of wood  74 984 5.84  24.36  8  8 332  2 592  64 051
287 Ores and concentrates of base metals, n.e.s.  66 019 5.15  12.12  28 483  16 314  628  20 595
513 Carboxylic acids, and their derivatives  46 768 3.64  163.06  46 765  3
264 Jute, other textile bast fibres, n.e.s., raw, processed but not spun  26 301 2.05  2.33  25 816  485
232 Natural rubber latex; rubber and gums  18 451 1.44 25.77  1 513  3 131  4 185  9 622
263 Cotton  15 825 1.23 -7.22  15 818  7  1
583 Polymerization and copolymerization products  13 530 1.05  53.32  8 840  10  3 686  51  45  1  897
034 Fish, fresh, chilled or frozen  13 145 1.02  30.56  2 179  1  9 916  79  420  551
292 Crude vegetable materials, n.e.s.  8 212 0.64 1.47  165  1 842  184  79  354  5 587
081 Feeding stuff for animals (not including unmilled cereals)  7 127 0.56 29.17  3 261   3 866
278 Other crude minerals  5 887 0.46 31.74  2  379  737  2  31  4 737
281 Iron ore and concentrates  5 812 0.45 n.a  5 812
222 Seeds and oleaginous fruit, whole or broken, for ‘soft’ fixed oil  5 537 0.43 18.66  1 055  32  83  80  4 288
036 Crustaceans and molluscs, fresh, chilled, frozen, salted, etc.  5 253 0.41 13.00  1 258  1 532  26  312  2 125
6 manufactured items (listed above)  49.08
Total Food (SITC 0+1+22+4)  49 400 3.85 6.82  3 452  1  3 194  16 716  2 384  93  952  1 471  21 137
Agr. raw mats. (SITC 2-(22+27+28))  286 789 22.35  10.24  26 585  953  18 112  4 043  11 851  15 740  209 506
Ores & metals (SITC 27+28+68)  172 335  13.43 17.08  452  6  116 156  17 051  2  6 885  31 782
manufactures  774 572  60.37 8.96  48 114  2  26  4 343  682 147  13 117  9  14 257  917  11 640
7 Machinery and transport equipment  6 391 0.50  22.59  109  5  58  339  5 641   124  117
Other manufactures  768 180 59.87  8.89  48 006.651  1.631  21.487  4 285  681 808.3  7 476.5  9  14 132.67  917.17  11 522.62
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials  207 957 16.21  66.85   207 626  330
 Total Total trade 1 491 864 116.27  12.72  78 603  2  27  8 495  833 169  36 595  207 728  27 305  25 545  274 395
China’s non-fuel imports 1 283 096  100  9.6  78 603  2  27  8 495  833 132  36 595  102  27 061  25 013  274 065
Share of countries in China’s non-fuel imports (%)  100  6.1 nil nil  0.7  64.9  2.9 nil  2.1  1.95  21.3
Share of countries in China’s imports of manufactures (%) 6.2 nil nil 0.6 88.1 1.7 nil  1.8 0.1  1.5
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341 Gas,natural and manufactured 1,493,189 82.90 n.a 2 1,493,187
333 Petrol.oils,crude,& c.o.obtain.from 1,483,086 82.34 22 17,350 1,418,529 47,207
248 Wood,simply worked,and railway slee 211,145 11.72 17 4 60,896 115,149 35,097
682 Copper 167,396 9.29 100 0 29 119 137 45 70,706 96,359
247 Other wood in the rough or roughly 146,738 8.15 5 149 26,307 120,282
845 Outer garments and other articles 134,159 7.45 19 27,255 2 115 411 1,355 72,450 28,329 53 4,189
034 Fish,fresh (live or dead),chilled o 124,959 6.94 17 1,045 45,889 16,972 1,537 8 791 58,716
232 Natural rubber latex; nat.rubber & 98,418 5.46 4 2,148 586 67,409 39 28,236
036 Crustaceans and molluscs,fresh,chil 76,377 4.24 -1 10,651 1,678 9,024 6,687 43 432 47,860
351 Electric current 62,812 3.49 n.a 62,812
054 Vegetab.,fresh,chilled,frozen/pres. 60,852 3.38 -1 1,289 8 5,937 15 9 707 3,120 49,767
651 Textile yarn 46,684 2.59 -4 940 1 41,979 2,433 42 1,186 78 26
846 Under garments,knitted or crocheted 43,411 2.41 8 6,591 0 394 133 1,373 30,831 3,146 144 800
334 Petroleum products,refined 42,034 2.33 18 35,469 0 1 6,490 71 0 0 4
263 Cotton 41,762 2.32 6 58 41,585 25 65 28 1
971 Gold,non-monetary 38,201 2.12 50 8 1,274 36,919
057 Fruit & nuts(not includ. oil nuts), 32,388 1.80 17 823 8,153 39 21,125 541 1,707
843 Outer garments,women’s,of textile f 31,677 1.76 8 10,503 5 573 1,005 993 2,987 12,385 492 2,734
611 Leather 31,108 1.73 8 11,569 294 19,109 61 75
562 Fertilizers,manufactured 29,415 1.63 -2 29,414 1
042 Rice 25,125 1.39 -3 17 17,648 494 2,872 4,094
122 Tobacco manufactured 21,516 1.19 71 196 0 1,929 0 14,347 5,043
759 Parts of and accessories suitable f 21,027 1.17 -7 65 30 12 647 19,642 502 18 7 105
046 Meal and flour of wheat and flour o 20,298 1.13 n.a 1 20,297
652 Cotton fabrics,woven 18,879 1.05 -6 183 3 15,882 1,443 4 1,142 104 118
658 Made-up articles,wholly/chiefly of 18,727 1.04 20 8,231 0 121 7,333 66 0 77 28 2,871
222 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruit,whol 16,441 0.91 0 26 161 109 7,734 1,692 6,718
282 Waste and scrap metal of iron or st 15,641 0.87 32 69 2 195 10,378 4,738 211 48
653 Fabrics,woven,of man-made fibres 15,358 0.85 5 885 11 0 12,018 1,221 62 888 49 224
001 Live animals chiefly for food 15,288 0.85 19 0 15 11 1,301 13,961
541 Medicinal and pharmaceutical produc 12,931 0.72 21 1,398 48 10,644 62 247 347 157 28
044 Maize (corn),unmilled 12,897 0.72 14 231 1,154 2,990 8,521
667 Pearls,precious& semi-prec.stones,u 12,559 0.70 -4 10 312 9,794 38 1 2 2,403
842 Outer garments,men’s,of textile fab 12,286 0.68 -7 5,767 185 424 339 1,294 1,764 502 2,011
081 Feed.stuff for animals(not incl.unm 12,008 0.67 34 6,074 2,035 6 79 27 3,787
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341 Gas,natural and manufactured 1,493,189 82.90 n.a 2 1,493,187
333 Petrol.oils,crude,& c.o.obtain.from 1,483,086 82.34 22 17,350 1,418,529 47,207
248 Wood,simply worked,and railway slee 211,145 11.72 17 4 60,896 115,149 35,097
682 Copper 167,396 9.29 100 0 29 119 137 45 70,706 96,359
247 Other wood in the rough or roughly 146,738 8.15 5 149 26,307 120,282
845 Outer garments and other articles 134,159 7.45 19 27,255 2 115 411 1,355 72,450 28,329 53 4,189
034 Fish,fresh (live or dead),chilled o 124,959 6.94 17 1,045 45,889 16,972 1,537 8 791 58,716
232 Natural rubber latex; nat.rubber & 98,418 5.46 4 2,148 586 67,409 39 28,236
036 Crustaceans and molluscs,fresh,chil 76,377 4.24 -1 10,651 1,678 9,024 6,687 43 432 47,860
351 Electric current 62,812 3.49 n.a 62,812
054 Vegetab.,fresh,chilled,frozen/pres. 60,852 3.38 -1 1,289 8 5,937 15 9 707 3,120 49,767
651 Textile yarn 46,684 2.59 -4 940 1 41,979 2,433 42 1,186 78 26
846 Under garments,knitted or crocheted 43,411 2.41 8 6,591 0 394 133 1,373 30,831 3,146 144 800
334 Petroleum products,refined 42,034 2.33 18 35,469 0 1 6,490 71 0 0 4
263 Cotton 41,762 2.32 6 58 41,585 25 65 28 1
971 Gold,non-monetary 38,201 2.12 50 8 1,274 36,919
057 Fruit & nuts(not includ. oil nuts), 32,388 1.80 17 823 8,153 39 21,125 541 1,707
843 Outer garments,women’s,of textile f 31,677 1.76 8 10,503 5 573 1,005 993 2,987 12,385 492 2,734
611 Leather 31,108 1.73 8 11,569 294 19,109 61 75
562 Fertilizers,manufactured 29,415 1.63 -2 29,414 1
042 Rice 25,125 1.39 -3 17 17,648 494 2,872 4,094
122 Tobacco manufactured 21,516 1.19 71 196 0 1,929 0 14,347 5,043
759 Parts of and accessories suitable f 21,027 1.17 -7 65 30 12 647 19,642 502 18 7 105
046 Meal and flour of wheat and flour o 20,298 1.13 n.a 1 20,297
652 Cotton fabrics,woven 18,879 1.05 -6 183 3 15,882 1,443 4 1,142 104 118
658 Made-up articles,wholly/chiefly of 18,727 1.04 20 8,231 0 121 7,333 66 0 77 28 2,871
222 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruit,whol 16,441 0.91 0 26 161 109 7,734 1,692 6,718
282 Waste and scrap metal of iron or st 15,641 0.87 32 69 2 195 10,378 4,738 211 48
653 Fabrics,woven,of man-made fibres 15,358 0.85 5 885 11 0 12,018 1,221 62 888 49 224
001 Live animals chiefly for food 15,288 0.85 19 0 15 11 1,301 13,961
541 Medicinal and pharmaceutical produc 12,931 0.72 21 1,398 48 10,644 62 247 347 157 28
044 Maize (corn),unmilled 12,897 0.72 14 231 1,154 2,990 8,521
667 Pearls,precious& semi-prec.stones,u 12,559 0.70 -4 10 312 9,794 38 1 2 2,403
842 Outer garments,men’s,of textile fab 12,286 0.68 -7 5,767 185 424 339 1,294 1,764 502 2,011
081 Feed.stuff for animals(not incl.unm 12,008 0.67 34 6,074 2,035 6 79 27 3,787
322 Coal,lignite and peat 11,777 0.65 42 3,970 7,807
72
Source: Same as table A.2.
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513 Carboxylic acids,& their anhydrides 11,405 0.63 130 11,343 4 49 9
674 Universals,plates and sheets,of iro 11,134 0.62 43 10,817 45 176 22 74
897 Jewellery,goldsmiths and other art. 11,118 0.62 5 49 1,057 2,126 7,812 0 5 68
771 Electric power machinery and parts 10,709 0.59 8 114 4 4 739 1,480 4 7 1,597 6,759
634 Veneers,plywood,improved or reconst 10,089 0.56 0 0 8 20 309 8,002 1,751
269 Old clothing and other old textile 9,995 0.55 46 300 0 0 826 37 13 8,812 2 5
778 Electrical machinery and apparatus, 9,496 0.53 19 246 0 14 228 8,816 32 140 2 18
total:14items of manufactires (above) 20.1
Total: Food (SITC 0+1+22+4) 452,007 25.10 4 16,449 29 47,982 211 66,802 39,204 378 53,123 18,273 209,556
Agricultural Raw Materials (SITC 2- 532,706 29.58 8 5,304 49 108 44,705 3,131 1,116 140,704 146,593 190,996
Ores & Metals (SITC 27+28+68) 196,929 10.93 26 625 0 486 684 13,530 5,476 76,827 99,301
manufactures 619,468 34.39 3 140,465 551 1,268 3,278 149,914 81,571 123,764 62,274 17,743 38,639
7        Machinery & transport equip. 76,565 4.25 -9 9,249 398 417 7,755 36,030 4,218 4,093 5,512 8,895
       Other 542,902 30.14 6 131,216 551 870 2,861 142,159 45,541 119,546 58,181 12,232 29,744
3 Mineral fuels,lubricants and relate 3,093,050 171.73 39 35,469 0 1 23,978 1,418,605 0 66,793 1,548,205
 Total Total Trade 4,966,347 275.74 201,330 585 49,422 3,838 288,209 125,753 1,565,671 302,751 338,797 2,089,991
Non-fuel 
imports
Non-fuel imports 1,801,109 100.00 6 162,843 580 49,300 3,598 261,907 124,590 138,787 261,577 259,436 538,492
Share of countries in non-fuel 100 11.2 0.03 2.8 0.2 14.5 6.9 7.7 14.5 14.4 30
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513 Carboxylic acids,& their anhydrides 11,405 0.63 130 11,343 4 49 9
674 Universals,plates and sheets,of iro 11,134 0.62 43 10,817 45 176 22 74
897 Jewellery,goldsmiths and other art. 11,118 0.62 5 49 1,057 2,126 7,812 0 5 68
771 Electric power machinery and parts 10,709 0.59 8 114 4 4 739 1,480 4 7 1,597 6,759
634 Veneers,plywood,improved or reconst 10,089 0.56 0 0 8 20 309 8,002 1,751
269 Old clothing and other old textile 9,995 0.55 46 300 0 0 826 37 13 8,812 2 5
778 Electrical machinery and apparatus, 9,496 0.53 19 246 0 14 228 8,816 32 140 2 18
total:14items of manufactires (above) 20.1
Total: Food (SITC 0+1+22+4) 452,007 25.10 4 16,449 29 47,982 211 66,802 39,204 378 53,123 18,273 209,556
Agricultural Raw Materials (SITC 2- 532,706 29.58 8 5,304 49 108 44,705 3,131 1,116 140,704 146,593 190,996
Ores & Metals (SITC 27+28+68) 196,929 10.93 26 625 0 486 684 13,530 5,476 76,827 99,301
manufactures 619,468 34.39 3 140,465 551 1,268 3,278 149,914 81,571 123,764 62,274 17,743 38,639
7        Machinery & transport equip. 76,565 4.25 -9 9,249 398 417 7,755 36,030 4,218 4,093 5,512 8,895
       Other 542,902 30.14 6 131,216 551 870 2,861 142,159 45,541 119,546 58,181 12,232 29,744
3 Mineral fuels,lubricants and relate 3,093,050 171.73 39 35,469 0 1 23,978 1,418,605 0 66,793 1,548,205
 Total Total Trade 4,966,347 275.74 201,330 585 49,422 3,838 288,209 125,753 1,565,671 302,751 338,797 2,089,991
Non-fuel 
imports
Non-fuel imports 1,801,109 100.00 6 162,843 580 49,300 3,598 261,907 124,590 138,787 261,577 259,436 538,492
Share of countries in non-fuel 100 11.2 0.03 2.8 0.2 14.5 6.9 7.7 14.5 14.4 30
Share of countries in manufactured 22.6 0.1 0.2 0.5 24.1 13.1 19.9 10 2.9 6.2
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Table A.8: Imports of Republic of Korea from lower-income/smaller countries, 2005 (values in $ ‘000)
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333 Crude petroleum and oils obtained from bituminous minerals  643 748  207.03  8.57  622 037  21 711
341 Gas, natural and manufactured  164 782  52.99  4.82  164 782
334 Petroleum products, refined  131 720  42.36 n.a.  131 703  17
651 Textile yarn  110 271  35.46 - 2.52  1 073  108 173  1 025
611 Leather  59 366 19.09  12.22  25 846  33 430  68  22  1
652 Cotton fabrics, woven (not including narrow or special fabrics)  14 066 4.52 - 13  29   13 907  62  67   
634 Veneers, plywood, “improved” wood and other wood, worked, n.e.s.  12 651  4.07  23.69  8   80  12 562
081 Feeding stuff for animals (not including unmilled cereals)  12 536  4.03 - 5.11  7  12 530
292 Crude vegetable materials, n.e.s.  11 891 3.82  3.17  3 271  7 108  363  18  1 131
036 Crustaceans and molluscs, fresh, chilled, frozen, salted, etc.  9 700 3.12  51.68  166  3 818  934  4 781
843 Women’s, girls’, infants’ outerwear, textiles, not knitted or crocheted  7 942 2.55 18.65  1 706   23  86  1 073  453  11  4 588
842 Men’s and boys’ outerwear, textile fabrics not knitted or crocheted  7 435 2.39  2.91  2 451  3  196  894  1 095  23  2 773
034 Fish, fresh, chilled or frozen  6 401 2.06 63.86  204  5 824  12  1  360
846 Undergarments, knitted or crocheted  3 761 1.21 28.23  88  1  83  3 201  335  17  36
054 Vegetables, fresh or simply preserved; roots and tubers, n.e.s.  3 587 1.15 - 1.21  17  33  420   3 117
562 Fertilizers, manufactured  3 120  1 n.a.  3 120
288 Non-ferrous base metal waste and scrap, n.e.s.  3 091 0.99 4.86  2 333  659  58  42
848 Articles of apparel, clothing accessories, non-textile, headgear  2 999 0.96  2.48  878  92  385  1 639  6
263 Cotton  2 705 0.87 - 11.84  11  2 695
682 Copper  1 922 0.62 n.a.  1 922
899 Other miscellaneous manufactured articles, n.e.s.  1 889 0.61  8.56  12   6  142  27  1 352  349
278 Other crude minerals  1 886 0.61  26.64  56  1 047  783
696 Cutlery  1 754 0.56  19.72  1 704  50
222 Seeds and oleaginous fruit, whole or broken, for “soft” fixed oil  1 706 0.55 n.a.  1 625  80
872 Medical instruments and appliances, n.e.s.  1 630  0.52 8.75  1 629  1
232 Natural rubber latex; rubber and gums  1 601 0.51 6.59  629  637  335
264 Jute, other textile bast fibres, n.e.s., raw, processed but not spun  1 588 0.51 n.a.  1 588
894 Baby carriages, toys, games and sporting goods  1 555 0.50  0.85  21   1 412  99  22
Total of 12 manufactured items (listed above)  72.40
Total: Food (SITC 0+1+22+4)  36 960 11.89  4.48  828  1  11 528  15 181  79  453  8 890
Agr. raw mats. (SITC 2-(22+27+28))  19 100  6.14 - 2.49  1 720  1  6 337  7 876  1  1 003  92  2 069
Ores and metals (SITC 27+28+68)  8 179 2.63  23.55  3 350  56  1 737  845  42  54  2 096
Manufactures  246 710  79.34 - 0.92  39 597  36  4  719  164 284  14 182  23  4 809  1 565  21 491
7 Machinery and transport equipment  3 371  1.08 - 15.19  838  197  43  288  21  1 660  25  297
 Other manufactures  243 340  78.26 - 0.37  38 759  36  4  522  164 240  13 893  2  3 149  1 540  21 194
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials  940 249  302.38  7.57  131 703  786 818  17  21 711
Total trade 1 251 201  402.38  4.73  45 495  36  4  778  315 591  38 083  786 884  5 962  2 110  56 257
Non-fuel imports  310 949.3  100  1.46  45 495  36  4  777  183 886  38 083  66  5 945  2 110  34 547
Share of countries in Rep. of Korea’s non-fuel imports (%)  100  15 nil nil   59  12 nil  2  1  11
Share of countries in Rep. of Korea’s imports of manufactured goods (%)  16 nil nil  6  67  6 nil  2  1  9
Source: Same as table A.2.
Note: n.a. = not available.
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333 Crude petroleum and oils obtained from bituminous minerals  643 748  207.03  8.57  622 037  21 711
341 Gas, natural and manufactured  164 782  52.99  4.82  164 782
334 Petroleum products, refined  131 720  42.36 n.a.  131 703  17
651 Textile yarn  110 271  35.46 - 2.52  1 073  108 173  1 025
611 Leather  59 366 19.09  12.22  25 846  33 430  68  22  1
652 Cotton fabrics, woven (not including narrow or special fabrics)  14 066 4.52 - 13  29   13 907  62  67   
634 Veneers, plywood, “improved” wood and other wood, worked, n.e.s.  12 651  4.07  23.69  8   80  12 562
081 Feeding stuff for animals (not including unmilled cereals)  12 536  4.03 - 5.11  7  12 530
292 Crude vegetable materials, n.e.s.  11 891 3.82  3.17  3 271  7 108  363  18  1 131
036 Crustaceans and molluscs, fresh, chilled, frozen, salted, etc.  9 700 3.12  51.68  166  3 818  934  4 781
843 Women’s, girls’, infants’ outerwear, textiles, not knitted or crocheted  7 942 2.55 18.65  1 706   23  86  1 073  453  11  4 588
842 Men’s and boys’ outerwear, textile fabrics not knitted or crocheted  7 435 2.39  2.91  2 451  3  196  894  1 095  23  2 773
034 Fish, fresh, chilled or frozen  6 401 2.06 63.86  204  5 824  12  1  360
846 Undergarments, knitted or crocheted  3 761 1.21 28.23  88  1  83  3 201  335  17  36
054 Vegetables, fresh or simply preserved; roots and tubers, n.e.s.  3 587 1.15 - 1.21  17  33  420   3 117
562 Fertilizers, manufactured  3 120  1 n.a.  3 120
288 Non-ferrous base metal waste and scrap, n.e.s.  3 091 0.99 4.86  2 333  659  58  42
848 Articles of apparel, clothing accessories, non-textile, headgear  2 999 0.96  2.48  878  92  385  1 639  6
263 Cotton  2 705 0.87 - 11.84  11  2 695
682 Copper  1 922 0.62 n.a.  1 922
899 Other miscellaneous manufactured articles, n.e.s.  1 889 0.61  8.56  12   6  142  27  1 352  349
278 Other crude minerals  1 886 0.61  26.64  56  1 047  783
696 Cutlery  1 754 0.56  19.72  1 704  50
222 Seeds and oleaginous fruit, whole or broken, for “soft” fixed oil  1 706 0.55 n.a.  1 625  80
872 Medical instruments and appliances, n.e.s.  1 630  0.52 8.75  1 629  1
232 Natural rubber latex; rubber and gums  1 601 0.51 6.59  629  637  335
264 Jute, other textile bast fibres, n.e.s., raw, processed but not spun  1 588 0.51 n.a.  1 588
894 Baby carriages, toys, games and sporting goods  1 555 0.50  0.85  21   1 412  99  22
Total of 12 manufactured items (listed above)  72.40
Total: Food (SITC 0+1+22+4)  36 960 11.89  4.48  828  1  11 528  15 181  79  453  8 890
Agr. raw mats. (SITC 2-(22+27+28))  19 100  6.14 - 2.49  1 720  1  6 337  7 876  1  1 003  92  2 069
Ores and metals (SITC 27+28+68)  8 179 2.63  23.55  3 350  56  1 737  845  42  54  2 096
Manufactures  246 710  79.34 - 0.92  39 597  36  4  719  164 284  14 182  23  4 809  1 565  21 491
7 Machinery and transport equipment  3 371  1.08 - 15.19  838  197  43  288  21  1 660  25  297
 Other manufactures  243 340  78.26 - 0.37  38 759  36  4  522  164 240  13 893  2  3 149  1 540  21 194
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials  940 249  302.38  7.57  131 703  786 818  17  21 711
Total trade 1 251 201  402.38  4.73  45 495  36  4  778  315 591  38 083  786 884  5 962  2 110  56 257
Non-fuel imports  310 949.3  100  1.46  45 495  36  4  777  183 886  38 083  66  5 945  2 110  34 547
Share of countries in Rep. of Korea’s non-fuel imports (%)  100  15 nil nil   59  12 nil  2  1  11
Share of countries in Rep. of Korea’s imports of manufactured goods (%)  16 nil nil  6  67  6 nil  2  1  9
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054
Vegetables, fresh or simply preserved; roots and 
tubers, n.e.s.
 331 246 17.54  11.46  146  420  8 711  68 215  253 755
247 Other wood, in the rough or roughly squared  262 233 13.89 16.90  229  157  743  261 103
431 Animal and vegetable oils and fats, processed, and waxes  204 912 10.85 n.a.  1 425  2 469  48 095  152 896  26
682 Copper  151 158 8.01 179.2  2 396  28 028  1 633  119 101
684 Aluminium  60 555 3.21  69.67  13 016  47 539
075 Spices  48 020 2.54  22.71  2  30  13 297  929  33 215  546
651 Textile yarn  46 369 2.46 21.30  6 929  8 144  25 747  5 276  272
522 Inorganic chemical elements, oxides and halogen salts  44 611 2.36 8.79  39 337  3  13  5 258
513 Carboxylic acids, and their derivatives  35 202 1.86 87.49  10 846  24 304  52
057 Fruit and nuts, fresh, dried  32 272 1.71  - 0.29  2 925  308  26 244  1 639  455  701
541 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products  28 313 1.5 7.96   5 186  33  23 093
893 Articles, n.e.s., of plastic materials  27 885 1.48 64.75  1 761  3   18 482  1 215  6 419  4  
652
Cotton fabrics, woven (not including narrow or special 
fabrics)
 27 620 1.46 17.62  142  22 975  4 486  17
583 Polymerization and copolymerization products  22 563  1.20 67.74  66  50  21 548  162  737
678 Tube, pipes and fittings, of iron or steel  22 475  1.19 n.a.  26  2  21 028  1 419
773 Equipment for distribution of electricity  22 448 1.19 n.a.  268  3 977  18 203
111 Non-alcoholic beverages, n.e.s.  21 611 1.14 n.a.  999  4 061  16 524  27
693
Wire products (excluding insulated electrical wire); 
fencing grills
 21 472  1.14  101.07  613  20 858
264
Jute, other textile bast fibres, n.e.s., raw, processed but not 
spun
 21 136  1.12 - 1.06  21 132  4
674 Universals, plates and sheets, of iron or steel  20 922  1.11  97.29  18  20 493  395  16
553 Perfumery, cosmetics, toilet preparations, etc.  18 723  0.99  17.53  1  18 408  3  311
658
Made-up articles, wholly or chiefly of textile materials, 
n.e.s.
 16 857  0.89  47.62  14 821  1 267  750  19
641 Paper and paperboard  14 249 0.75 62.89  57  584  1 678  11 918  12
091 Margarine and shortening  14 218 0.75 n.a  14 218
657 Special textile fabrics and related products  14 120 0.75  9.90  3 585  8 631  143  1 760
654
Textile fabrics, woven, other than cotton or man-made 
fibres
 13 696 0.73  23.72  1 870  11 679  13  3  20  111
081 Feeding stuff for animals (not including unmilled cereals)  13 549 0.72  22.75  555  10  11 007  1 978
661 Lime, cement and fabricated construction materials  13 496 0.71 97.26  552  165  558  175  12 042  5
634
Veneers, plywood, “improved” wood and other wood, 
worked, nes
 12 709 0.67  4.06  4 563  3 802  26  4 318
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054
Vegetables, fresh or simply preserved; roots and 
tubers, n.e.s.
 331 246 17.54  11.46  146  420  8 711  68 215  253 755
247 Other wood, in the rough or roughly squared  262 233 13.89 16.90  229  157  743  261 103
431 Animal and vegetable oils and fats, processed, and waxes  204 912 10.85 n.a.  1 425  2 469  48 095  152 896  26
682 Copper  151 158 8.01 179.2  2 396  28 028  1 633  119 101
684 Aluminium  60 555 3.21  69.67  13 016  47 539
075 Spices  48 020 2.54  22.71  2  30  13 297  929  33 215  546
651 Textile yarn  46 369 2.46 21.30  6 929  8 144  25 747  5 276  272
522 Inorganic chemical elements, oxides and halogen salts  44 611 2.36 8.79  39 337  3  13  5 258
513 Carboxylic acids, and their derivatives  35 202 1.86 87.49  10 846  24 304  52
057 Fruit and nuts, fresh, dried  32 272 1.71  - 0.29  2 925  308  26 244  1 639  455  701
541 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products  28 313 1.5 7.96   5 186  33  23 093
893 Articles, n.e.s., of plastic materials  27 885 1.48 64.75  1 761  3   18 482  1 215  6 419  4  
652
Cotton fabrics, woven (not including narrow or special 
fabrics)
 27 620 1.46 17.62  142  22 975  4 486  17
583 Polymerization and copolymerization products  22 563  1.20 67.74  66  50  21 548  162  737
678 Tube, pipes and fittings, of iron or steel  22 475  1.19 n.a.  26  2  21 028  1 419
773 Equipment for distribution of electricity  22 448 1.19 n.a.  268  3 977  18 203
111 Non-alcoholic beverages, n.e.s.  21 611 1.14 n.a.  999  4 061  16 524  27
693
Wire products (excluding insulated electrical wire); 
fencing grills
 21 472  1.14  101.07  613  20 858
264
Jute, other textile bast fibres, n.e.s., raw, processed but not 
spun
 21 136  1.12 - 1.06  21 132  4
674 Universals, plates and sheets, of iron or steel  20 922  1.11  97.29  18  20 493  395  16
553 Perfumery, cosmetics, toilet preparations, etc.  18 723  0.99  17.53  1  18 408  3  311
658
Made-up articles, wholly or chiefly of textile materials, 
n.e.s.
 16 857  0.89  47.62  14 821  1 267  750  19
641 Paper and paperboard  14 249 0.75 62.89  57  584  1 678  11 918  12
091 Margarine and shortening  14 218 0.75 n.a  14 218
657 Special textile fabrics and related products  14 120 0.75  9.90  3 585  8 631  143  1 760
654
Textile fabrics, woven, other than cotton or man-made 
fibres
 13 696 0.73  23.72  1 870  11 679  13  3  20  111
081 Feeding stuff for animals (not including unmilled cereals)  13 549 0.72  22.75  555  10  11 007  1 978
661 Lime, cement and fabricated construction materials  13 496 0.71 97.26  552  165  558  175  12 042  5
634
Veneers, plywood, “improved” wood and other wood, 
worked, nes
 12 709 0.67  4.06  4 563  3 802  26  4 318
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653
Fabrics, woven, of manmade fibres (not narrow or special 
fabrics)
 11 742 0.62  21.25  91  8 493  2 929  229
672 Ingots and other primary forms, of iron or steel  11 723  0.62 n.a.  11 008  714
282 Waste and scrap metal of iron or steel  11 566 0.61  5.22  860  1 132  332  488  8 741  14
598 Miscellaneous chemical products, nes  11 433 0.61  47.25  42  11 076  7  307
523 Other inorganic chemicals; compounds of precious metals  11 347 0.6  10.94  6  11 321  6  14
288 Non-ferrous base metal waste and scrap, nes  10 114 0.54  7.96  1 034  572  233  4 473  3 259  524  20
034 Fish, fresh, chilled or frozen  10 037 0.53 - 2.08  9 630  15  146  71  175
251 Pulp and waste paper  9 890 0.52  18.02   5  1  9 835  48
061 Sugar and honey  9 558 0.51  11.65  911  1 181  7 462  3
Total of 24 manfd. items (listed above)  24.2
Total: Agri. raw mats. (SITC 2-(22+27+28))  317 988 16.84  12.73  23 902  381  161  5 231  5 032  16 363  21  54  266 843
Food (SITC 0+1+22+4)  713 169 37.77  12.04  18 327  9 880  58  114 770  103 535  209 768  541  256 290
Ores and metals (SITC 27+28+68)  249 719  13.23  39.87  6 032  28 350  1 704  19 014  7 639  186 421  539  20
Manufactures  607 197  32.16 18.13  79 229  49 545  59  242 200  63 985  166 770  220  238  51  4 899
7  Machinery and transport equipment  48 754  2.58  32.25  3 941  13  7 489  717  36 351  198  26  19
 Other  558 442 29.58  17.32  75 288  49 545  47  234 711  63 268  130 419  21  212  51  4 880
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials  83 0.00  16.23   2  82
 Total Total imports 1 890 086  100.11  15  127 533  89 123  1 987  381 358  180 274  579 993  883  779  105  528 051
Non-fuel imports 1 888 073  100  15.56  127 491  88 156  1 982  381 215  180 191  579 323  780  779  105  528 051
Share of countries in India’s non-fuel imports (%)  6.7  4.6 nil  20 9.5  30.6 0.04 0.04 nil  27.5
Share of countries in India’s imports of manufactured 
goods (%)
 13  8 nil  39.8  11  27 nil nil nil  1
Source: Same as table A.2.














Bangladesh Bhutan Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka
Brunei 
Darussalam
Cambodia Lao PDR Myanmar
653
Fabrics, woven, of manmade fibres (not narrow or special 
fabrics)
 11 742 0.62  21.25  91  8 493  2 929  229
672 Ingots and other primary forms, of iron or steel  11 723  0.62 n.a.  11 008  714
282 Waste and scrap metal of iron or steel  11 566 0.61  5.22  860  1 132  332  488  8 741  14
598 Miscellaneous chemical products, nes  11 433 0.61  47.25  42  11 076  7  307
523 Other inorganic chemicals; compounds of precious metals  11 347 0.6  10.94  6  11 321  6  14
288 Non-ferrous base metal waste and scrap, nes  10 114 0.54  7.96  1 034  572  233  4 473  3 259  524  20
034 Fish, fresh, chilled or frozen  10 037 0.53 - 2.08  9 630  15  146  71  175
251 Pulp and waste paper  9 890 0.52  18.02   5  1  9 835  48
061 Sugar and honey  9 558 0.51  11.65  911  1 181  7 462  3
Total of 24 manfd. items (listed above)  24.2
Total: Agri. raw mats. (SITC 2-(22+27+28))  317 988 16.84  12.73  23 902  381  161  5 231  5 032  16 363  21  54  266 843
Food (SITC 0+1+22+4)  713 169 37.77  12.04  18 327  9 880  58  114 770  103 535  209 768  541  256 290
Ores and metals (SITC 27+28+68)  249 719  13.23  39.87  6 032  28 350  1 704  19 014  7 639  186 421  539  20
Manufactures  607 197  32.16 18.13  79 229  49 545  59  242 200  63 985  166 770  220  238  51  4 899
7  Machinery and transport equipment  48 754  2.58  32.25  3 941  13  7 489  717  36 351  198  26  19
 Other  558 442 29.58  17.32  75 288  49 545  47  234 711  63 268  130 419  21  212  51  4 880
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials  83 0.00  16.23   2  82
 Total Total imports 1 890 086  100.11  15  127 533  89 123  1 987  381 358  180 274  579 993  883  779  105  528 051
Non-fuel imports 1 888 073  100  15.56  127 491  88 156  1 982  381 215  180 191  579 323  780  779  105  528 051
Share of countries in India’s non-fuel imports (%)  6.7  4.6 nil  20 9.5  30.6 0.04 0.04 nil  27.5
Share of countries in India’s imports of manufactured 
goods (%)















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.15: Trade of Hong Kong (SAR, China) in parts and components and 
corresponding finished goods, 2006
Parts & components Finished products
Imports Exports Imports Exports
Total world (US$ million) 62 187 71 575 80 559 65 613
ESSEA (US$ million) 47 461 55 589 65 201 46 447
Shares (%):
China 52 64.1 34.1 56.7
ASEAN-4 9.3 5.9 20.6 5.7
Taiwan (Province of China) 3.8 8.9 1.9 13.9
Rep. of Korea 3.8 3.7 8.3 2.8
Rest of ASEAN 2.2 1.7 4.0 1.0
India 0.08 0.44  0.1 0.7
SAARC excl. India 0.02 0.4 nil 0.2
Total ESSEA 76.3 77.7 80.9 70.8
Japan 13.9 9.4 8.0 3.9
Others 9.8 18.0 11.0 25.4
Total world 100 100 100 100
Source: Same as table A.11.
Table A.16: Contracting parties to the GSTP Agreement
Source: Based on http://www.g77.org/gstp/participants.
Note: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Haiti, Madagascar, Mauritania, Rwanda, Suriname, 
Uganda and Uruguay, applied for accession to GSTP in 2005.
ESSEA Other Asia Africa Latin America
Bangladesh ( LDC) Guyana Algeria Argentina
India Islamic Rep. of Iran Benin (LDC) Bolivia
Indonesia Iraq Cameroon Brazil
Malaysia
Dem. People’s Rep. of 
Korea
Egypt Chile
Myanmar ( LDC) Ghana Colombia
Pakistan Guinea  (LDC) Cuba
Philippines Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Ecuador
Singapore Morocco Mexico
Republic of Korea Mozambique  (LDC) Nicaragua
Sri Lanka Nigeria Peru
Thailand Sudan  (LDC) Trinidad
Viet Nam Tunisia Venezuela




12 4 14 13
87
Table A.17: Share of exports in GDP of ESSEA countries/territories, 2005 (%)
Country/territory Share Country Share
Singapore 243.0 Philippines 56.4
Hong Kong (SAR, China) 197.5 Republic of Korea 42.5
Malaysia 123.4 Indonesia 33.5
Brunei Darussalam 97.1 Sri Lanka 33.3
Thailand 73.7 China 33.0
Maldives 69.3 Lao PDR 27.6
Viet Nam 69.0 Bhutan 26.5
Mongolia 66.3 Nepal 16.4
Taiwan (Province of China) 62.5 Pakistan 15.3
Cambodia 59.1 Bangladesh 14.9
India 14.5
Source: Based on UNCTAD, 2007c: table 8.31.
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